CA Unpub Decisions

On November 20, 2009, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Peter Michael Lewis of first degree murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1); first degree residential robbery under section 211 (count 2); and residential burglary under section 459 (count 3). With respect to all three counts, the jury also found true that a principal in all three counts was armed with a handgun under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
On January 12, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for seven years for count 2, followed by 25 years to life for count 1, with a consecutive one year for the possession conviction. After defendant appealed, on March 22, 2011, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction in People v. Lewis (March 22, 2011, E050174) [nonpub. opn.].)
On February 26, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court found that defendant presented a prima facie case for relief and conducted an evidentiary hearing.

Daelani Griffin filed a petition for a harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) against Rylee Cesal. Griffin claimed that Cesal and others had insulted her in social media posts. The trial court denied the petition. It commented, among other things, “This stuff . . . doesn’t even come close to the kind of harassment that’s required for a civil restraining order. You guys . . . have a spat on Facebook. . . . Just block them and move on. . . .”
Griffin appeals. She contends that Cesal’s conduct was civilly and criminally unlawful. She also contends that the trial court “was not acting as a neutral based on the law.”
We will hold that Griffin has forfeited her contention that the conduct was unlawful by failing to show that she raised it below, by failing to give us an adequate record, and by failing to support it with a meaningful legal analysis.

E.S. (Mother) and H.I. Sr. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders adjudicating their child, H.I., a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and removing him from their custody. They contend the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not comply with its inquiry duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and section 224.2. The Agency concedes it did not comply with its inquiry duties under ICWA and section 224.2, and agrees, the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply. On the record before us, we agree with the Agency’s concession. The parties have submitted a joint stipulation for issuance of an immediate remittitur pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).

A jury found defendant Deandre Lynch guilty of three counts of domestic violence and one count of simple assault. The trial court imposed an upper term sentence on the principal domestic violence count. Defendant contends that Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) (Senate Bill 567), which took effect while his appeal was pending, applies retroactively to his case and requires reversal of his sentence and remand for resentencing. The People agree Senate Bill 567 applies retroactively but argue the trial court sufficiently complied with the new law in selecting an upper term sentence and any error was harmless. We agree with the parties that Senate Bill 567 applies retroactively. We further conclude that the trial court’s consideration of aggravating circumstances that are inconsistent with the new statutory standard was harmless error.

Defendant and appellant Shon Oliventa Williams appeals the trial court’s denial of a recommendation made by the California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), under Penal Code former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to consider recalling Williams’ sentence and resentence him in light of changes made to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court denied the request, citing previous orders in which it had denied resentencing requests initiated by Williams and deemed amendments to section 667 inapplicable to final judgments.
While Williams’ appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) (AB 1540) came into effect on January 1, 2022.

T.S. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders terminating parental rights to her children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, mother’s sole contention is that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) adequately investigated the children’s possible Indian ancestry, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state statutes. DCFS concedes its inquiry was inadequate as to father but maintains it was adequate as to mother. We conditionally affirm the orders and remand for compliance with ICWA as to mother and father.

Christine Owens appeals from the order dissolving a temporary restraining order (TRO) and dismissing her petition for a restraining order. She contends the trial court erred in ruling against her based on her absence at the hearing. We affirm.

Trevor Glenn Landers (defendant) appeals the trial court’s denial of relief under Penal Code section 1170.95 after an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

A father awaiting trial on criminal charges for molesting his stepchildren appeals the juvenile court’s order limiting his educational and developmental decisionmaking rights over his biological, teenage daughter. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s order. Accordingly, we affirm.

Martin Pantaleon, Richard D. Pantaleon, Richard L. Pantaleon Vergara, Jadira Y. Vergara, Miriam Fajardo, Maria Pantaleon, Jadira Vergara, and Juan Pantaleon (appellants) filed a petition pursuant to Government Code section 946.6 for relief from the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) requirement that a plaintiff present a timely claim to the Los Angeles County Department of Water and Power (LADWP) before bringing a tort action against it (§§ 911.2, 945.4). Appellants had filed an application for relief from the timely filing requirement. But this application for relief was, itself, untimely. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that because the application for relief was itself untimely, the court lacked jurisdiction to act. The court went on to hold that even if the court had jurisdiction, appellants had not shown their failure to timely file their claim was a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

We previously granted Ladrae Watson’s (petitioner’s) habeas corpus petition seeking early parole consideration under a provision added to our state constitution by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). The cause is now again before us after our Supreme Court directed us to reconsider the matter in light of its opinion in In re Mohammad (2022) 12 Cal.5th 518 (Mohammad), which reversed this court’s grant of habeas corpus relief under similar circumstances.

A jury convicted Bernard Mitchell (defendant) of six counts of second degree robbery, one for each victim of his two bank robberies. The jury also found true six enhancements for the personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)). Those enhancements added a total of 26 years and eight months to his sentence. In the most recent sentencing proceeding, defendant asked the trial court to exercise its then-newly conferred discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to dismiss the firearm enhancements entirely or instead to impose a lesser sentence under the enhancement for personal use of a firearm contained in section 12022.5. The trial court declined, and we affirmed that ruling. (People v. Mitchell (May 28, 2020, B298910) [nonpub. opn.].)

In this writ proceeding, petitioner F.B. (Mother) requests that this court vacate the juvenile court’s March 10, 2022 order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing on June 30. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s findings and the court erred in reducing visitation. We deny Mother’s petition.

J.W.S. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights with respect to J.S., his son. Father contends that the San Francisco Human Services Agency and the court failed to satisfy their inquiry and notice obligations under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (the Act)) and related California law. Because Father’s contention is correct, we conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and direct the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Act’s inquiry and notice requirements.