CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Miguel Arias Placido pleaded no contest to assault with intent to commit rape, a registrable sex offense, and was placed on probation for three years, subject to various conditions.
On appeal, Placido challenges the probation condition requiring him to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. He also contends that the trial court erred in (1) imposing a monthly probation supervision fee, without determining that he had the ability to pay and given insufficient evidence in the record of his ability to pay, and (2) imposing “sex offender management program participation fees” without determining the amount. He further contends there are errors in the sentencing minute order that require correction.

A jury convicted defendant Tuan Thanh Tran of attempted premeditated attempted murder (count 1), two counts of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (counts 2, 3), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (count 4). The jury and the court found true sentence enhancement allegations related to defendant’s gun use and prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole, plus 25 years for gun use and five years for the prior serious felony conviction.
Defendant asserts the court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress his statement to the police because they violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), and the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument. We conclude neither contention has merit and affirm the judgment.

Steven Fox (Steven) and his son Jason Fox (Jason) appeal from the trial court’s order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) in favor of Collier Management & Development Company, Inc. (CMDC), Sunrise Oaks Capital Fund, LLC (Sunrise), Allen M. Collier (Collier), and Dennis Heiner (Heiner). They argue there was no legal basis to have granted the motion and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give them leave to amend. We conclude their contentions on appeal lack merit and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Antonio Bautista Guzman of five counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child age 10 or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1-5) and five counts of lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 6-10). The court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 55 years to life.
The alleged victim, J.F., is defendant’s step-granddaughter. She told investigators and testified at trial, that defendant had continually sexually molested her, from the time she was five or six years old until she was nine.

Where a written contract expressly requires that an option be exercised on and not before a specific date, and the option holder purports to exercise the option before the specified date, we hold that the option has not been properly exercised. In this case, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the contract’s language was clear in its requirement that the exercise of an option take place on a date certain, and that the option holder failed to exercise the option as specified by the contract. We further hold that an equitable duty to advise the option holder of the imperfection of the purported exercise cannot be imposed when the contract’s language removes any such duties. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment that the option was not exercised.

A jury found defendant Juan Manuel Hernandez guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 496d.) After the electorate approved Proposition 47, the “Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,” Hernandez filed a petition to have his convictions reduced from felonies to misdemeanors. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).) Hernandez claimed that the value of stolen vehicle was $950 or less. (§ 490.2, subd. (a).)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 provides that upon successful completion of probation by a juvenile, the petition shall be dismissed and all records sealed. Appellant E.P. challenges the juvenile court’s order determining him to be ineligible for relief pursuant to section 786 as premature because he still is on probation. We affirm.

On March 15, 2016, a complaint charged defendant and appellant Thomas Edward Chenoweth with possessing metal knuckles under Penal Code section 21810. Defendant pled no contest and admitted that he previously suffered a prison-prior conviction under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced him to a four-year split sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), with three months in local custody, and three years nine months on mandatory supervision.

Defendant and appellant L.V. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her son S.V. (born 2007) and daughter A.V. (born 2010). Mother argues that the order must be reversed because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the children are adoptable. We disagree, and affirm.

Appellant C. H., (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to three children, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).) The only issue, which respondent concedes, is that DPSS did not comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Because there is no dispute between the parties, we reverse and remand the judgment terminating parental rights, based on the failure to provide the required ICWA notice, and direct the trial court to order DPSS to comply with ICWA’s notice provisions. If after such compliance, the children are not claimed as Indian, the judgment shall be reinstated. (In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 711.)

Defendant and appellant F.T. (mother) is the mother of the three children—C.R., a boy born in 1999; S.T., a girl born in 2000; and M.T., a girl born in 2012—who are the subjects of this dependency matter. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s orders, issued March 1, 2017, regarding her educational rights and visitation. More specifically, mother argues that the court applied the incorrect legal standard when it limited her educational rights with respect to the two older children, and she asserts that applying the correct standard there was no appropriate basis for the limitation. She also contends that the court’s visitation orders were not reasonable, because they provide that the two older children “will not be forced to visit.” Defendant and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) argues that mother waived or forfeited these arguments, and in any case the juvenile court did not err.
We find no prejudicial error, and affirm.

Appellant E.A. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to her daughter, J.A. (the child). She claims that the court erred in denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, and that the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Defendant and appellant X.B. (father) is the father of T.K. (child), who was born in 2010, and is the child at issue in the present dependency matter. In this appeal, father challenges an order, issued February 28, 2017, temporarily suspending his visitation with the child. Plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) contends the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion. We agree with CFS, and affirm.

C.D. is the maternal grandmother (MGM) of P.M., who was five months old on the date of the challenged order, February 7, 2017. MGM argues the court erred when it: (1) denied her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 asking the court to reverse its disposition order placing P.M. with the prospective adoptive parents and instead place her with MGM; and (2) failed to apply the section 361.3 relative placement preference to her when she requested placement after disposition. We affirm.