CA Unpub Decisions

S.K. (mother) appeals the orders summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions. We conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion when it found mother failed to make a prima facie showing (1) her circumstances were changed, and (2) it was in her children's best interest to place them in her care and/or order additional reunification services, given that she had been a drug addict for about 11 years; that she had a previous dependency and had relapsed; that she had neither engaged in any court-ordered services nor visited her children during the reunification period; and that she filed her petitions on the "eve" of the section 366.26 hearing after maintaining sobriety for a relatively short period of time. Affirmed.

Prior to the preliminary hearing in this case, appellant Michael J. Marx entered a guilty plea to one count of corporal injury to a spouse or roommate causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). Marx also admitted a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The plea agreement also stipulated to a four-year prison term and included the pending probation revocation case.
Marx replaced his retained counsel with the public defender. Thereafter, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his attorney pressured him by telling Marx he would get more time if convicted. Following an evidentiary hearing the court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. The court sentenced Marx to a four-year term pursuant to the plea agreement.

In the complaint in this action, plaintiff Del Rayo Estates Homeowners Association (Association) alleges that it is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, serving as the owners' association of Del Rayo Estates, a " 'common interest development' " under California law. The Association filed the underlying complaint to collect what it alleges is a "disciplinary fine" or "monetary penalty" that it had imposed against the Petra Krismer Living Trust (Trust), the record owner of a specified lot within the Del Rayo Estates development (Property). The Association further alleged that the Trust "operates through its Trustee, defendant Georg Lingenbrink" and prayed for "judgment against defendant Georg Lingenbrink, Trustee of the [Trust]." Lingenbrink, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, appeared in the action and eventually obtained a summary judgment in his favor.

Scherrieto Little, a self-represented litigant, appeals the probate court's order granting in part and modifying Janis Nau's "Petition for Third and Final Account; Report of Administrator and Petition for Settlement; for Allowance of Statutory and Extraordinary Attorney's Fees; for Allowance of Statutory and Extraordinary Administrators Fees; for Reimbursement of Costs Advanced; for Determination of Persons Entitled to Distribution; and for Final Distribution filed on [August 13, 2014]." Little challenges the attorney and administrator fee as "fraud[ulent], excessive
and unreasonable," and argues the probate case presented "no extraordinary circumstances . . . ." She appears to assert that the heirs have received no benefit "due to the fraud and lie's [sic] that have been committed by these corrupt attorney's [sic] and judge's [sic]." Little fails to raise any cognizable legal error; accordingly, we affirm the order.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jessica Kay Henderson filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Tyrone Murphy guilty of numerous felonies, including assault with a firearm and infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on his wife, J.M., and found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 15 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of his victim, J.M., as well as her earlier statements to law enforcement. In support of his contention, defendant argues the People failed to establish their due diligence in attempting to secure J.M.’s presence at trial. He also argues admission of J.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony and earlier statements to law enforcement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
We conclude the trial court properly admitted the evidence an

In 2015, defendant Alfredo Reyes Reyes was convicted by jury of the 1982 murders of two 13-year-old girls, R. and N. (Pen. Code, § 187. ) The jury concluded each murder was of the first degree (§ 189) and was committed under the special circumstances of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), felony-murder rape (id., subd. (a)(17)(C)), and felony-murder lewd conduct (id., subd. (a)(17)(E)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison to serve a term of life without the possibility of parole and imposed other orders.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by instructing the jury it need not unanimously agree as to which theory of murder applied in this case; and (2) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment.

Defendant and appellant Marvin Segovia appeals from the superior court’s order revoking and reinstating his parole supervision on condition that he serve 150 days in jail. Defendant’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, stating no arguable issue exists and requesting that this court independently review the record. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue. We affirm the order.

Martin D. raises only one issue on appeal: the trial court’s October 21, 2016 order denying his request for presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). We granted Kendall J.’s request for judicial notice of a June 16, 2017 subsequent order (while this appeal was pending) in which the trial court found that Martin D. was Kendall J.’s presumed father. Because Martin D. now has presumed father status, his appeal is moot.
“ ‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief.’ ” (In re Anna S . (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.)

Mother Shannon C. appeals from the dependency court’s disposition order of October 7, 2016 removing her daughter J.C. from her custody, and the order of November 7, 2016, further extending the removal. She contends that court should have continued the disposition hearing to give her more time to obtain the necessary training to care for the child and that there were reasonable means to protect the child short of removing her from parental custody. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Erick Julian Ortega (defendant) appeals from his convictions of murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, both found to be gang related. He contends: that the trial court’s denial of a continuance infringed upon his constitutional rights to counsel, self-representation, and due process; that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient Marsden inquiry ; that the gang enhancement must be stricken because there was insufficient proof of the primary activities of defendant’s gang; that hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity; that the sentence for count 2 should have been stayed; and the sentence per Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) associated with count 2 was in error. Finding no merit to any of defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Cameron Alex Cole (defendant) appeals from his murder conviction. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim’s drug use, and it gave incorrect murder and manslaughter jury instructions. He also contends that the cumulative effect of such errors was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. In addition defendant contends, and respondent agrees, that substantial evidence did not support the restitution order. Though we find no merit to defendant’s claims of evidentiary and instructional error, and thus find no prejudicial cumulative effect, we agree that substantial evidence did not support the restitution order. The restitution order is thus reversed and remanded for a new restitution hearing. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

Cross-complainant and appellant Zia Shlaimoun appeals from an order granting cross-defendant and respondent Hybrid Finance, Ltd.’s (Hybrid) motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to strike the fourth cause of action for tortious interference with contract from Shlaimoun’s cross-complaint. We affirm the order because (1) Shlaimoun’s claim that Hybrid tortiously interfered in his contract with a third party by filing a complaint arose from protected activity as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute, and (2) the litigation privilege precludes Shlaimoun from making the minimal showing required to continue pursuing his claim.

Defendant and appellant Jesus Octavio Soto (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of six acts of domestic violence. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting uncharged prior acts as foundational to expert testimony, by admitting certain expert testimony, and by imposing consecutive sentences as to four of the six counts. We find no merit to defendant’s contentions, and thus affirm the judgment.