CA Unpub Decisions

In 2012 Jason Robinson pleaded no contest to possession of ammunition in violation of Penal Code section 30305, subdivision (a)(1). His sentence included a one-year enhancement based on a 2008 felony conviction for second degree burglary for which Robinson served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In 2014 the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and School Act of 2014 (§ 1170.18), which, among other things, reduced some felony property crimes to misdemeanors. The next year Robinson requested and obtained relief under Proposition 47 to designate his 2008 felony conviction for second degree burglary as a misdemeanor. Robinson then filed a “motion for resentencing” in this case asking the trial court to strike the one-year sentence enhancement based on the prior prison term Robinson had served for second degree burglary because that conviction no longer qualified as a felony, a prerequisite for imposing the sentence enhancement under section 667.5, subdivisio

Jaclyn Qirreh appeals from the trial court’s judgment awarding sole legal and physical custody of her children—seven-year-old K.S.Q. and five-year-old K.A.Q.—to Samer Qirreh, her former husband and father of the children. She contends the court erred in: (1) finding there were changed circumstances justifying a modification of custody; and (2) refusing to apply a presumption against awarding custody to Samer based on his prior acts of domestic violence. We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jared Silverio Rosalez pleaded no contest to two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [knife]), and two counts of assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). Appellant also admitted the truth of the allegations that during the commission of each offense he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12207.7, subd. (a)), and personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1). As part of the plea agreement, appellant expressly waived all section 654 issues. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 20 years, 8 months. At the sentencing hearing, after sentence had been imposed, defense counsel advised the court that appellant had just advised him that he wanted to withdraw his plea and have “another attorney . . . look into the issue.” The tri

A jury convicted defendant Travis Jesse Maresh of first degree burglary, possession of a firearm by a felon, and related charges arising out of a burglary of a residence. On appeal, he contends the first degree burglary conviction is not supported by substantial evidence because the residence, which was undergoing renovations at the time of the burglary, was not “inhabited” within the meaning of Penal Code section 459. He also contends that his sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. We agree that defendant’s sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon should be stayed but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Robert Wayne Jones appeals from the trial court’s order extending his involuntary commitment at Atascadero State Hospital for one year, as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contends the court violated both state evidentiary law and his due process right to confrontation when it permitted three experts to testify at his trial to case-specific facts based on inadmissible hearsay. Because we find that appellant was not prejudiced by the erroneous admission of case-specific hearsay, we shall affirm the trial court’s order extending his commitment.

Appellant Michael Sean Shaffer appeals from an order revoking his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) and requiring him to serve 180 days in the county jail for his third PRCS violation (CR 939426), plus a consecutive 180 days in the county jail for his fourth PRCS violation (CR 940776). Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel submitted a declaration stating that she notified appellant that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Counsel also advised appellant of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.

This case comes before us for review under the procedures prescribed in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441–442 (Wende). Billie Latrice Poindexter appeals from her convictions by no contest plea of conspiracy (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1)), grand theft (count 3) (§ 487, subd. (a)), and two counts of offering false or forged instruments to be filed, registered, or recorded in a public office (counts 14 and 15) (§ 115, subd. (a)). Finding no issues that merit briefing, we affirm.

Appellant Jason Paul Bienvenu appeals from an eight-year, eight-month state prison sentence he received after the court found him to be in violation of probation in Case No. SCUKCRCR-11-17706 (hereafter Case No. 11-17706) and probation was terminated, and appellant pleaded no contest to two counts in Case No. SCUKCRCR-15-81865 (hereafter Case No.15-81865). Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel submitted a declaration stating that she notified appellant that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Counsel also advised appellant of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.

In this mortgage fraud case, co-defendants Wilma Dondoy and Ronaldo Dondoy appeal from an order requiring them to pay Sun Trust Bank, jointly and severally, restitution in the amount of $250,000. Appellate counsel for Wilma and Ronaldo have filed separate opening briefs in which no issues are raised and each counsel asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel for Wilma submitted a declaration stating that he notified Wilma that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Counsel also advised Wilma of her right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues she chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by Wilma personally. Similarly, counsel for Ronaldo submitted a declaration stating that he notified Ronaldo that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an indepen

Defendant Joshua Neil Harrell appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motions to reduce his 2010 felony conviction for receipt of stolen property and his 2013 felony conviction for second degree commercial burglary to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47). The trial court denied both motions, concluding defendant was not eligible for relief under Proposition 47. As we explain below, it was defendant’s burden to demonstrate his eligibility for such relief, and he failed to discharge that burden. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motions.

Defendant Armando Canchola pleaded no contest to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) pursuant to a negotiated plea that he would receive a maximum of 35 years in prison. The plea agreement also provided that if defendant committed another crime between the time of his plea and the time of sentencing, his maximum sentence would increase to 42 years.
Defendant committed a crime while awaiting sentence and received 42 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in increasing his sentence, because he was denied due process and the right to a jury trial on whether he committed a new crime. He argues that he never agreed to a court determination that he committed a new crime for the purpose of increasing his maximum sentence.

Defendant Steven David Berliner pleaded no contest to possessing child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)) and was granted probation. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of the probation conditions required by section 1203.067, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), and he contends that the use of the word “frequent” in another probation condition rendered that condition unconstitutionally vague. We reject his challenges to the statutorily mandated probation conditions, but we modify the other challenged probation condition to replace “frequent” with “visit or remain in.”

Defendant James Munoz pleaded no contest to possessing child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)) and was granted probation. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of probation conditions required by section 1203.067, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) and several other probation conditions. We uphold the section 1203.067 probation conditions, but we modify two of the other probation conditions that defendant challenges to remediate vagueness concerns.

Defendant Loren Silverfox Cody pleaded no contest to possessing child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)) and was granted probation. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of the probation conditions required by section 1203.067, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), and he contends that the use of the word “frequent” in another probation condition rendered that condition unconstitutionally vague. He also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to specify the statutory bases for the $900 in penalty assessments it imposed in association with the $300 section 290.3 fine. We reject his challenges to the statutorily mandated probation conditions, but we modify the other challenged probation condition to replace “frequent” with “visit or remain in.” We also modify the court’s order to specify the statutory bases for the $900 in penalty assessments associated with the section 290.3 fine.