CA Unpub Decisions

Ivan Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction on counts of burglary, vehicle taking, receiving stolen property, and battery. He alleges instructional error with respect to the charges of burglary and receiving stolen property. The claims have merit. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

Maria Denardo sued Tom Givens and Kenneth Beasley for damages in a dispute arising from a real estate transaction. Givens and Denardo, with the assistance of counsel, mediated their dispute and memorialized an agreement to settle the litigation in a mediation settlement agreement (MSA). Denardo subsequently moved to set aside the MSA and filed, without leave of court, a supplemental complaint. The motion was denied. Givens filed motions to strike the supplemental complaint and enforce the MSA. The court granted the motion to enforce the MSA and found the motion to strike then moot. The court dismissed the complaint. Denardo appeals. We affirm.

In 1997, appellant Ahdante Abdoula Harris was convicted of robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true allegations that appellant personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery, and that he suffered two prior convictions for robbery. Citing appellant’s two prior robbery convictions, the trial court sentenced appellant under the Three Strikes law to a total term of 34 years to life. We affirmed the convictions and sentence in 1998, and the Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for review.

N.G. (mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights over her son A.A. Mother contends the court’s finding that the child is adoptable is not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree and affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant J.B. (Guardian) and her partner M.P. are the court-appointed legal guardians (Guardians) of three special needs children, J.O., C.N., and J.N. Guardian appeals the juvenile court’s December 19, 2016 order denying two Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions. In the petitions, Guardian asked the juvenile court to change its previous orders of legal guardianship to an order of adoption so that Guardians could adopt the children. In considering the petitions, the juvenile court received and heard evidence on the substantial government funding Guardians currently receive for care of the children, which funding would be lost if adoption were ordered. Guardian argues it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to consider the issue of funding.

Jerald B. (father) appeals from jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 removing his then-three-year-old son, D., from his custody. D. displayed highly sexualized behavior and, at times, attributed some of it to father. Father contends there was insufficient evidence his conduct posed a risk of physical harm to D. or caused D.’s behavior; he also argues that D.’s removal from his custody was unnecessary. We disagree and affirm.

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant Eric D., Sr. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. In particular, Father argues the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that he physically abused his seven-year-old son Eric is not supported by substantial evidence and that, once Eric was placed with his mother (Mother), Eric was no longer at risk of future harm. Father also claims that at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court simply should have terminated its jurisdiction and issued a family law order. As discussed below, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and orders and, therefore, we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Nelson Rincon of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and he thereafter admitted that he had suffered a 2006 conviction for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) that qualified as a strike and a prior serious or violent felony conviction (see § 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(j); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Rincon to state prison for a total term of 15 years comprised of the upper term of five years for the robbery, doubled for the prior strike, plus five years for the prior felony. Rincon contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a witness disclosed that Rincon made a statement indicating that he had a prison history and gang affiliation. We disagree and affirm.

After a jury convicted appellant William Alexander Mendez of multiple counts of kidnapping and sexually assaulting two victims in 2015, the trial court sentenced him to 120 years to life in prison pursuant to the “One Strike” law (Pen. Code, § 667.61). Appellant now contends that under the One Strike law, the trial court could have imposed only 25-year-to-life sentences on all sex crimes counts, rather than the 40-year-to-life sentences. He further contends that the factual circumstances did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences on two sex crime counts, as the two crimes were part of one continuous course of conduct. The People concede the trial court erred in imposing the 40-year-to-life sentences, but contend the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences because between the commission of the first and the second crime, appellant had an opportunity to reflect on his actions. We conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences on the

Appellant, James Wagner, contends that his admission to a prior conviction for auto theft or unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle pursuant to Penal Code section 666.5 must be vacated because the trial court failed to admonish him of his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 239 (Boykin) and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132. We agree, and therefore vacate the admission and remand the case for either (1) another admission after proper admonitions and waivers or (2) a jury or court trial on the truth of the allegation of the prior conviction.

Alexsei Durack and Colin Fulford brought an action against their condominium homeowners association and several individual defendants, including Ada Wang, alleging wrongful conduct related to their residence. A settlement disposed of all causes of action against all of the defendants except Wang. Shortly before trial, Durack and Fulford dismissed their complaint against Wang. Wang filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, which the trial court denied after finding there was no prevailing party. Because Wang was entitled to statutory attorneys’ fees for prevailing on two causes of action against her, we reverse.

Freddie Delgado Castro appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation in two cases and sentencing him to three years and eight months in state prison. The court found appellant violated his probation by (1) failing to appear in court; (2) failing to report to probation; (3) failing to submit to drug and alcohol tests; (4) leaving his treatment program; and (5) failing to give prior notice of his change of residence. Appellant contends the first finding must be reversed for lack of proper notice, and that the other four findings are based on inadmissible hearsay. We shall order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the proper award of presentence custody credits. Otherwise, we affirm.

Sadegh S. Panahi (Panahi) filed the underlying action on behalf of himself and the Sadegh S. Panahi Trust (the Panahi Trust), alleging causes of action for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure against Oakland Housing Investors, L.P. (OHI). This appeal is from an order denying OHI’s special motion to strike two claims from Panahi’s pleading pursuant to section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, California’s anti-SLAPP statute (section 425.16). Our standard of review is de novo. (Sanowicz v. Bacal (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1035.)

Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, defendant Graig Maurice Houston pleaded no contest to possession of marijuana in jail. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike a prior felony conviction at sentencing, arguing (1) the trial court erred by relying on facts related to a charge dismissed as part of his plea bargain in in violation of People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey); (2) the trial court abused its discretion because defendant falls outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law “in part”; and (3) his sentence violates the state and federal constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant further contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial discovery motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). While Harvey likely applies in this case, we decline to remand for resentencing because there is no reasonable probability the court would have granted his motion. We