CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants, two law firms and private investigator, moved to strike the complaint by plaintiff, a manufacturing company, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” statute. The trial court denied their motion, ruling that defendants failed to make the requisite threshold showing that the challenged causes of action arose from protected activity.
Defendants appeal the order, contending plaintiff’s claims arose out of statements that are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, because (1) the statements were made during post-judgment asset discovery that was in the course of and in connection with litigation, within the meaning of section 425.16, subsections (e)(1) and (2); and (2) the statements concerned a person in the public eye whose life and controversies were a subject of public interest, within the meaning of section 425.16, subsection (e)(4).

Following the death of Timothy A. Horan, Jr. (the Trustor), his son, Timothy G. Horan (Horan), became the successor trustee of the Timothy A. Horan, Jr. Trust (the Trust). The Trustor’s daughter, Deborah Stone (Stone), petitioned the probate court to determine a purported amendment to the Trust was invalid. While the original trust documents named both Horan and Stone as remainder beneficiaries, a subsequent unsigned amendment and a signed document titled “Certificate of Trustee’s Power and Authority and Abstract of Trust” identified Horan as the Trust’s sole beneficiary after the Trustor’s death. Horan filed a competing petition to confirm the validity of the Trust amendment and to confirm the validity of the Abstract as an independent amendment. The trial court concluded the Abstract was a valid amendment of the Trust. Stone appealed. We affirm the trial court order.

Dia C. Rianda (Rianda) filed an action against Richard J. Foster (Foster) for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Foster, an attorney, responded by retaining counsel, Tracy L. Anielski (Anielski) and then moving to strike the action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.)

A jury convicted defendant, Marcus Sean Word, of voluntary manslaughter, that is, an “unlawful killing . . . without malice,” “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of 11 years in state prison. We affirm the judgment.
Defendant asserts it was an abuse of discretion to impose the upper term sentence because there were no aggravating circumstances. Defendant, however, did not object to the trial court’s statement of reasons for imposing the upper term. As a result, he forfeited this argument. (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 730-731; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352-353.) “[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356; accord, People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 730.)

Appellant Donald David Watts (appellant) appeals from a judgment sentencing him to seven years in state prison based on his guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b)) and his admission that he left the scene of the crime (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)).
Appellant’s counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Counsel declared that appellant was notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende was being requested instead. Appellant also was advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief was filed by appellant personally.

Dwain Scales appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1) and misdemeanor battery on a spouse (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 3), a lesser offense to the charged crime of corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury acquitted appellant on count 2, criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). Following a court trial, the trial court found true all prior strike and serious felony conviction allegations, as well as all prior prison term allegations. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b), 667.5, subds. (a) & (b).) The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for 25 years to life plus 15 years on count 1, and a concurrent term of 180 days in county jail on count 3.

Defendant Gabriel Rodriguez pled no contest to heroin possession for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. The trial court placed defendant on three years’ formal probation. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to withdraw his plea for failure to advise of immigration consequences as required by Penal Code section 1016.5. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues. On July 26, 2017, we gave notice to defendant that counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a brief or letter. We affirm.

An information filed on October 26, 2015, charged defendant Richard Ramos with one count of engaging in oral copulation or sexual penetration with M.L., a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b) [count 1]); seven counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon M.L., a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 2-8]); one count of engaging in oral copulation or sexual penetration with S.G., a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b) [count 9]); and three counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon S.G., a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 10-12]). The information further alleged: (1) in connection with counts 2 through 6 and 10 through 12, he had substantial sexual conduct with a victim under 14 years of age (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)); and (2) in connection with counts 2 through 8 and 10 through 12, he committed the underlying offense against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (b)).

A jury found Robert Nico Ramirez (Ramirez) guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) ). In a separate and subsequent proceeding, Ramirez admitted to three prior convictions for serious and violent felonies. As a result, the trial court sentenced Ramirez to 40 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, Ramirez makes two central arguments. First, he contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance that prejudiced his case; specifically, Ramirez maintains his counsel improperly told the jury that the abiding conviction necessary for a guilty verdict was akin to the certainty that jurors find in making everyday decisions. Second, Ramirez argues that the trial court erred by not giving the jury a unanimity instruction. We are not persuaded by either of these arguments.

Defendant Walter Lee Meeks appeals from his convictions after jury trial for three sex offenses against five-year-old twin sisters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, for which he was sentenced to 35 years to life in state prison.
Meeks contends numerous prejudicial errors occurred in the course of his trial. He contends that the trial court denied him his constitutional and statutory rights to be present for all critical proceedings unless he properly waived these rights; that regarding his count two conviction for committing a lewd and lascivious act upon Jane Doe 1, he was improperly convicted of a lesser included offense of another count; that regarding his count three conviction for committing a lewd and lascivious act upon Jane Doe 2, he was convicted of an uncharged crime, the court should have given further instruction regarding this count, and the court should have declared a hung jury; that the court erred in denying his motion for a trial continuance to try to obtain the testim

Defendant Anthony Manuel Martinez pleaded no contest to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)). Defendant was placed on probation, which was terminated after he violated probation several times.
Defendant subsequently filed an application with the trial court pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47, to have his felony conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor. The court denied the application after determining that a Vehicle Code section 10851(a) offense may not be redesignated as a misdemeanor under section 1170.18 and because the value of the vehicle at issue was more than $950. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the application.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Webster Lucas appeals from a judgment entered upon a plea of no contest to a charge of failure to register after an address change in violation of Penal Code section 290, subdivision (b).

Useplatique Monk Lacey pleaded guilty to grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Lacey also admitted suffering eight prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and the trial court found he had suffered a prior conviction under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds (b) & (c)(1)). Lacey appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Because our independent review of the record discloses no arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.

A jury found Curtis Arthur Jennings guilty of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) (count 1) and receiving stolen property valued at over $950 (§ 496, subd. (a)) (count 2). The offenses arose out of the burglary of the maintenance shed at a condominium complex, during which valuable tools and construction materials were taken.
On appeal, Jennings contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion for acquittal (§ 1118.1) that defense counsel made after the People rested their case at trial. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion because the People presented sufficient evidence of Jennings's commission of the charged crimes.