CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Zane Molina Hubbard appeals from the order denying his petition under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47; Pen. Code, § 1170.18) to have his 2008 conviction for unauthorized possession of a controlled substance reclassified as a misdemeanor. The People opposed the petition on the basis that Hubbard was convicted in 2011 of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery or rape and kidnapping during the commission of carjacking. The trial court denied the petition, finding Hubbard was ineligible for Proposition 47 relief because of his prior disqualifying convictions. On appeal, Hubbard contends Proposition 47 only precludes reclassification where a defendant had a “prior” disqualifying conviction, and since his kidnapping for the purpose of rape or robbery and kidnapping during the commission of carjacking convictions occurred after his possession conviction, he is eligible for reclassification. Finding no merit to his contention, we affirm.

Counsel for defendant and appellant, Tammy Sue Holloway, filed a petition for reclassification of her conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, which the court denied. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying her petition. We affirm.

A jury convicted Neil Evan Green of the first degree murder of his father, Melvin. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Green to 25 years to life in prison. Green appeals, contending his conviction must be reversed because the trial court improperly admitted: (1) character evidence of his past acts of violence during the prosecutor's case-in-chief, (2) irrelevant evidence regarding Melvin's peaceful character, and (3) three hearsay statements by Melvin. We affirm.

About 26 years ago, Salvador Murillo’s dead body was found in an orange grove. The police discovered a shell casing and an empty beer can near the body, but there were no other leads and the case went cold. Seven years ago, DNA was recovered from the beer can; three years ago, the DNA was linked to defendant Paulino Olmos Gonzalez. The police interviewed Olmos twice over the course of two days. He made inculpatory statements and a jury later convicted Olmos of murdering Murillo.
Olmos’s sole contention on appeal is that the police deliberately engaged in a two-step interview process designed to undermine the protections of Miranda. (Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert).) We find substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual determination that the police did not do so. Thus, we affirm the judgment.

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was denied when the trial court ruled that she could not cross-examine the complaining witness in a felony stalking and criminal threats case about why he had not supplied the defense with a DNA sample. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Samuel Tony Edwards waived preliminary hearing and pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. He appeals from the judgment. We affirm.

The People appeal from an order granting defendant Cristian Lopez Cruz’s motion to dismiss one count of the information, which charged attempted willful, premeditated, deliberate murder (Pen. Code, § 664, 187, subd. (a)). We shall reverse and order the trial court to reinstate the attempted murder charge without the allegation that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.

George Chavez was convicted of possessing a controlled substance in jail and was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment under the Three Strikes Law. He filed a petition under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code) for resentencing. On appeal, he maintains the court abused its discretion in denying his petition due to insufficiency of the evidence. While the appeal was pending, our Supreme Court issued the opinion People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 (Valencia), holding Proposition 36 was not amended by provisions contained in Proposition 47. The opinion is relevant here because the trial court in this case applied Proposition 47’s definitions to Chavez’s Proposition 36 resentencing proceedings. “An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard. [Citation.]” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 (Costco).) Afte

When the trial court sentenced Christopher Scott Chapman to probation, on the condition he serve one year in county jail, he had already amassed 376 days of presentence custody credits – meaning he was left with 11 days of excess credits. On appeal, he argues the court erred by failing to apply those excess custody credits to satisfy his restitution fine and court fees – a total of $510 – pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5.
The Attorney General concedes Chapman is entitled to have his excess custody credits applied to satisfy certain fines, but argues that (1) under the applicable version of section 2900.5, he is entitled to be credited at a rate of only $30 per day of excess custody credit, rather than the $125 rate he claims, and (2) his credits cannot be applied to offset either his restitution fine or the court fees. Thus, under the Attorney General’s analysis, Chapman is not entitled to have any portion of his $510 payment obligation deemed satisfied.

Before dawn on January 15, 2015, Kevfon Camp, a member of the Pasadena Denver Lanes gang, fired several rounds from a .45-caliber pistol at members of a rival gang, Victor Mendoza and Fernando Zuniga, as Mendoza and Zuniga loitered in an apartment building doorway.
The district attorney charged Camp with two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling, each alleged to constitute a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c). (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 189, 246, 1192.7, subds. (c)(9), (c)(22), (c)(23) & (c)(33).) The attempted murder charges were also alleged to be violent felonies because Camp both used and discharged a firearm while committing the crime. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c).) The alleged crimes also qualified for a gang sentencing enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b). The district attorney also alleged Camp had committed a prior serious and/or violent felony.

Angela E. Anderson and a codefendant, Frederick Weekly, were charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187). Anderson entered into a plea agreement, under which she pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). Anderson's codefendant went to trial and was convicted of first degree murder prior to Anderson's sentencing.
Anderson filed an extensive statement in mitigation and the prosecution filed a statement in aggravation. The court sentenced Anderson to the upper term of 11 years in prison.

Appellant Luis Francisco Abrams pled no contest to vehicle theft with a prior (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) & Pen. Code, § 666.5/count 1) and evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd, (a)/count 3). Abrams also admitted four prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b) (i)). On appeal, Abrams contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. We conclude there is no merit to this contention. However, our review of the record disclosed that the court imposed an unauthorized sentence when it stayed the four prior prison term enhancements and we will strike them. In all other respects, we affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Gisselle Morales-Simental, a minor, et al. appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant and respondent Genentech, Inc., one of the defendants in this personal injury case. Morales-Simental alleges that she, with the other named plaintiffs, suffered injuries and sustained damages as a result of the negligence of defendant Vincent Inte Ong, an employee of Genentech, when Ong’s vehicle collided with the vehicle in which the decedent was riding.
The issue presented to us is whether Genentech’s employee, Ong, was acting within the scope of his employment when he was involved in the automobile collision that killed Marisol Morales. Genentech asserts the trial court correctly determined the “going and coming” rule precludes Genentech’s liability because Ong was driving to Genentech for his own convenience and not at Genentech’s request or as part of his regular duties. Plaintiffs argue Genentech is liable under the “special errand

This appeal presents a straightforward issue of contract interpretation. Appellant Lebohang Morake (Husband) appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for an order both terminating his alleged obligation to pay his former wife, respondent Nandi Morake (Wife), spousal support and requiring Wife to reimburse him for alleged overpayments of spousal support. The dispute turns on the proper interpretation of the parties’ marital settlement agreement, which was negotiated by the parties and their counsel and incorporated into their final judgment of dissolution of marriage. As explained below, we conclude the trial court properly interpreted the marital settlement agreement and affirm.