CA Unpub Decisions

Under a plea agreement, defendant Matthew Baptista pleaded no contest to misdemeanor drug possession, and the superior court sent Baptista to drug treatment under Proposition 36. Over a year later, at a hearing that the district attorney did not attend, the superior court found that Baptista had successfully completed drug treatment, so it set aside his conviction and dismissed the information. The People appeal.
On appeal, the People contend we must reverse the setting aside of the conviction and dismissal of the information because the district attorney did not have notice of the hearing and motion to set aside the conviction and dismiss the information. Acknowledging that the superior court’s order states that the district attorney had notice, the People claim we should disregard that statement for various reasons. In response, Baptista argues that (1) the procedure leading to dismissal of the information was authorized by a memorandum of understanding for Proposition 36 cas

A jury found defendant Jason Everett Armstrong guilty of second degree murder involving the personal use of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to state prison for the prescribed term of 40 years to life. He contends the verdict is infected by two instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and one instance of misinstruction by the trial court. We conclude defendant’s contentions are without merit, and affirm.

Following a plea bargain in a case involving a registrable sex offense, defendant Ivan Arizpe was placed on probation for three years, subject to various conditions.
On appeal, Arizpe challenges several of his probation conditions, including those which: (1) require his consent to polygraph examinations; (2) require that he waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege and his privilege against self-incrimination; (3) limit his right to associate; and (4) preclude him from purchasing or possessing sexually-explicit material. He also argues the trial court erred by imposing booking fees and probation supervision costs without determining he had the ability to pay such fees. In the alternative, if the court finds this argument is forfeited due to trial counsel’s failure to object, Arizpe contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
We find that the appeal is moot with respect to Arizpe’s probation conditions. We further find that Arizpe forfeited any claim of error wi

Plaintiff and appellant Warren J. Michaels, representing himself in propria persona, seeks the return of more than a half million dollars in attorney fees and expenses paid to his former attorneys, plus punitive damages and interest. The bulk of the fees and expenses were paid pursuant to a fee agreement, after the attorneys substituted into the case and the representation resulted in a settlement before trial of $1.6 million in Michaels’s favor.
Michaels’s third amended complaint asserts purported causes of action for promissory fraud, conversion, and fraudulent misrepresentation. He appeals from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, entered after it sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of defendants and respondents Matthew T. Ward, Law Offices of Matthew T. Ward, and Don C. Burns to the third amended complaint. We affirm the judgment.

This is the second time around for this case. When the parties were here before, in 2013, the issue was the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration brought by respondent (then appellant) Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Tenet sought to arbitrate the Labor Code violations claims alleged by a nurse, the present appellant Kristiane McElroy, an employee of a Tenet hospital. Her complaint included individual claims for unpaid wages, class claims, and a representative cause of action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. The trial court had found the arbitration agreement unenforceable, and we reversed.

Stephen Madigan (Stephen) appeals the trial court’s order denying his request for further attorney fees and sanctions against his former wife, Christy Madigan (Christy). The only question on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion under the relevant provisions of the Family Code. Stephen’s appeal is essentially no more than a request for us to second-guess the court’s conclusions. Because he has no colorable argument that the court abused its discretion, we affirm the order.

It has long been the rule in California that an appealing party may not flagrantly disobey court orders concerning the subject of the appeal without risking dismissal. This case presents no exception, and we dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine.

R.M. appeals a juvenile court disposition order declaring him a continuing ward and committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), for a maximum term of confinement of 11 years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 202, subd. (e)(5).) We decide that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the DJF commitment, and affirm.

Juan L. and Lindsey E. are the parents of Natalia L. They both appeal from the order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Lindsey does not appeal in her own right; she merely asserts that if the order is reversed as to Juan, it must be reversed as to her as well. Juan asserts that he met the burden of proof to establish the parental benefit exception to adoption of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
We affirm the order terminating parental rights. Although Juan met the regular visitation and contact condition of the parental benefit exception, he did not successfully carry his burden to show that continuing a relationship with him outweighed the benefits of adoption for Natalia and that severing this relationship would be detrimental to her. Lindsey has presented no argument opposing this order. Given the record in this case, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it terminated their parental r

Petitioner John Lambert was convicted of first degree murder with a special circumstance finding. He is currently serving a prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Lambert filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, seeking relief from the special circumstance finding that supports his sentence under the authority of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks). The Supreme Court directed that the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation show cause before this court why Lambert is not entitled to such relief. Having considered the petition, the Secretary’s Return, and Lambert’s Traverse, we now grant the petition insofar as it seeks relief under Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788.

In October of 2014, Perry Bloom filed a petition for breach of fiduciary duty against Life Services, the former conservator of his parents and their estates. The petition alleged Life Services had lost valuable jewelry that belonged to Bloom’s mother. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded Bloom’s claims were barred because he had failed to object to numerous accountings that did not list jewelry as an asset of the conservatorship. We affirm.

American Contract Bridge League (ACBL or the League) and the individual League members named as defendants timely appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration on the ground that no arbitration agreement exists between the League and plaintiff Blakely, also a League member. The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is an appealable order. (Valentine Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Agahi (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 606, 612, fn. 5.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order. We affirm.

Appellant Rogelio Zaragoza (full name Rogelio Carlos-Zaragoza) (appellant) appeals from a sentence of 75 years to life in state prison imposed following his conviction by a jury of kidnapping to commit the rape of Jane Doe 3 (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), forcible rape in concert against Jane Doe 3 (§ 264.1), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury against Jane Doe 3 (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), forcible rape in concert against Jane Doe 2 (§ 264.1), and forcible rape in concert against Jane Doe 1 (§ 264.1). The jury also found true as to each of the three rape in concert counts that the victims had been kidnapped for rape (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)).
Appellant argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by finding Jane Doe 3 unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240 and permitting her testimony from a prior trial to be read into evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2). We hold th

The juvenile court terminated petitioner, A.S., Sr.’s (Father), reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. In this petition, Father’s attorney contends there is insufficient evidence that real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), offered Father reasonable services. We dismiss the petition.