CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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James Mason, James Phan, and Charles M. Farano (collectively referred to as Mason unless the context requires otherwise) appeal from an order denying his special motion to strike Thuy Thanh Vo’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (special motion to strike) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Mason argues the trial court erred by denying the special motion to strike because the conduct arose from the right of petition and Vo did not establish a probability of prevailing on her state constitutional invasion of privacy cause of action. We disagree and affirm the order.
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In 2016, plaintiff Susan L. Uecker filed a motion for summary judgment to collect on a note and guaranty executed by defendants Barney J. Ng and Wild Game Ng, LLC (Wild Game). The parties did not dispute that Ng and Wild Game executed the note and guaranty, or that the $1 million amount had not been repaid. Instead, Ng and Wild Game submitted evidence demonstrating the note and guaranty were part of a scheme to avoid licensing requirements by the Nevada Gaming Commission and, in fact, represented an equity investment in Wild Game rather than a loan.
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Robert Lee Tran Truong appeals from the judgment entered against him after the trial court sustained a demurrer, without leave to amend, to his complaint for defamation. The court concluded the complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (c) (section 340(c)).
Although Truong does not contend he filed his lawsuit within one year of when the allegedly defamatory statements about him were published in newspapers, he argues the judgment should nonetheless be reversed because he has been gravely wronged by the slander alleged in his complaint. He asks that we “disregard[] the ‘normal interpretations’” of the statute of limitations so that he may prove the merit of his complaint. We cannot do that. Section 340(c) requires that all lawsuits for defamation be filed within one year, no matter how egregious the statement, or how much harm it has caused. We have no power to change the statute, nor can |
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Homeward Residential, Inc., formerly American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (Homeward) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) appeal from an order denying their motion for attorney fees. Homeward and MERS argue the trial court erred by denying their attorney fee motion because the deed of trust (DOT) authorized such an award. We disagree and affirm the order.
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No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Robert Samir Zuleta, of battery by a prisoner on a nonprisoner. (Pen. Code § 4501.5; count 2.) Defendant thereafter waived a jury trial and admitted an allegation that he had suffered a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment, consisting of the following: the midterm of three years on the substantive count, doubled pursuant to the strike prior. After defendant’s counsel below filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the facts, a statement of the case, and identifying three potentially arguable issues: (1) whether there were any arguable issues related to jury instruc |
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A jury convicted Robert Young of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). In a bifurcated proceeding, Young admitted a prior conviction for battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) in 2013 as a prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12), and a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)). He also admitted a true finding in a 2006 juvenile matter for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) as a prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668) and a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12). The court exercised its discretion to strike the juvenile strike. The court sentenced Young to 15 years in state prison based upon the upper term of five years for count 1, which was doubled for the strike prior, plus five years for the serious felony prior. The court imposed a sentence of two concurrent years for count 2
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Defendant Michael Lee Weible was convicted in 2003 of first degree burglary and other offenses, and sentenced to 13 years in state prison. In 2005, his conviction was reversed and, in 2006, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years in state prison. In 2008, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation notified the trial court of an error in the sentence. The trial court held a hearing in response to this notification and resentenced defendant to seven years eight months. On November 4, 2016, defendant having been released after serving this sentence, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in superior court challenging the proceedings at the 2008 hearing in response to the department’s notification. He claimed his attorney improperly waived his personal appearance at the 2008 hearing and that because the sentence initially imposed based on his plea agreement was illegal, his plea should have been set aside, and that he did not waive his right to a trial
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Antoine Thomas appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126, a provision of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 that was enacted pursuant to Proposition 36 (the Act or Proposition 36). Appellant contends the order must be reversed because the trial court’s finding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was legally flawed and factually unsupported.
Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply the legal standard for assessing dangerousness set forth in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), which was enacted pursuant to Proposition 47. We reject this contention in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 (Valencia). Alternatively, appellant contends the trial court erred by imposing the burden on him to prove that he is not currently dangerous. However, the record shows otherwise. Finally, appellant contends th |
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Monica Pollard was charged with one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)).
Criminal proceedings were suspended and Pollard was found incompetent to stand trial (§ 1368). He was committed to a state hospital for treatment. In July 2016, the court found Pollard's competency had been restored. Following a Marsden hearing the case proceeded to jury trial. The jury found Pollard guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. Pollard was sentenced to four years in prison. Pollard filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating he has not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record as mandated by Wende. We offered Pollard the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal but he has not respond |
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This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
A complaint deemed an information charged defendant Derrick O’Neal Osby with corporal injury to a person with whom he had a dating relationship. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) As jury trial was about to begin, defendant entered a plea of no contest, with the possibility of reducing the charge to a misdemeanor at sentencing. The parties stipulated that the factual basis for the plea could be taken from the police report or probation report. The probation report stated that on December 9, 2015, the victim, who was bleeding from the left ear and had bright red scratches on her arms, told law enforcement that defendant, with whom she had had an on-again, off-again romantic relationship for the past six years, had assaulted her and repeatedly punched her. She was taken to the emergency room. |
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Raciel Mateos appeals an order imposing $16,635 in victim restitution as a condition of probation after his convictions for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.08 percent and misdemeanor hit and run. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 20002, subd. (a).) Mateos contends there is insufficient evidence to support the restitution award. We affirm.
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Appellant Timothy Joel Holloway stands convicted of animal cruelty, a violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a), and residential burglary, a violation of sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a). It also was found true that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), in committing the animal cruelty charge. Holloway had moved to dismiss the burglary charge and the weapon allegation, asserting vindictive prosecution; the trial court denied the motion. Holloway contends the trial court erred in denying his motion. We affirm.
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Defendant Kevin Andrew Henriquez was convicted by plea of three counts of lewd conduct upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of contacting or communicating with a minor with the intent to commit a sex offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. After defendant indicated his objection to some of the probation conditions, the court stayed most of the conditions and scheduled the matter for a further hearing. In a subsequent October 30, 2014 hearing, the court rejected defendant’s objections and imposed the probation conditions that had previously been stayed.
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