CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Juan Manuel Garcia guilty of one count of evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and one count of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)). Garcia admitted a prior strike (id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12), and the trial court sentenced Garcia to four years in prison.
Garcia contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in not amplifying the jury instruction on evading an officer with reckless driving to define some of the underlying traffic violations that Garcia was alleged to have committed while he was being pursued by law enforcement; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel did not object to an incorrect statement of law made by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (3) the trial court prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury regarding the lesser included offense of misdemeanor evading an officer (§ 2800.1). We conclude that Garcia's arguments lack merit, an

In a two-count amended information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Johnnie Anthony Echols was charged with driving under the influence of a drug causing injury to Paulo Rojas (Rojas) (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (e); count 1) and reckless driving on a highway causing injury to Rojas (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, subd. (a), 23105; count 2). As to both counts, it was further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Rojas (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury causing Rojas to be comatose (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (b)). The amended information further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and that he had served six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Guy Allen Dietz (appellant) was charged with the following crimes against D.M.: forcible rape (count 1: Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible oral copulation (count 2: § 288, subd. (c)(2)(A)); sexual penetration by a foreign object (count 3: § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); rape by threat to arrest or deport (count 4: § 261, subd. (a)(7)); oral copulation under color of authority (count 5: § 288a, subd. (k)); and sexual penetration by a foreign object by threat to arrest or deport (count 6: § 289, subd. (g)). It was further alleged as to all counts that: appellant was on bail in another case (§ 12022.1); appellant had a prior forcible rape conviction in violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), and that conviction subjected him to sentencing under section 667.61; the prior forcible rape conviction was a serious or violent felony that qualified appellant to be sentenced pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12); and appellant had three

A jury convicted defendant Ruben Hernandez Diaz of committing 12 counts of lewd acts upon his two stepdaughters, C.M. and L.P., in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). The jury also found: (1) as to all counts, defendant committed the crime against more than one victim, in violation of section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(4) and section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(7); and (2) as to counts 1, 2, 5 through 7, and 9 through 12, defendant had substantial sexual contact with a child under the age of 14, within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8). The trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support his convictions on counts 10 (touching L.P.’s vagina) and 12 (touching defendant’s penis), involving L.P., because the evidence was duplicative of that for counts 9 and 11, and her testimony did not sufficiently describe two separate acts of touching L.P’s vagina and touching def

A jury found defendant and appellant Marcos Cruz guilty of four counts of second degree robbery. He appealed, and his appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Gordon Will Columbus stands convicted of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm; enhancements also were found true. Columbus contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred prejudicially when it admitted a 911 call into evidence. We affirm the convictions.

Over 30 years ago, “Kimberly was working . . . in Northern California. . . . One night, Kimberly went out with one of her customers and was ‘date raped.’ During the trial for that crime, in the court hallway, Kimberly’s rapist looked in her direction and mouthed, ‘“I’m going to kill you.”’ She was terrified.” (People v. Cecil (Apr. 12, 2012, B228850) [nonpub. opn.].) Years later, Kimberly received a threatening telephone call and letter from defendant and appellant Gary Allen Cecil, the man who had been convicted of raping Kimberly. (People v. Cecil, supra, B228850, at pp. 3–4.) Following trial, a jury convicted defendant of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) and stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)). Defendant appealed, and we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Cecil, supra, B228850, at p. 2.)

A jury convicted defendant Derrick Caldwell of second degree robbery and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury after he stole a cell phone from the victim and then punched and kicked him in the face. On appeal, Caldwell claims that his assault conviction must be reversed because insufficient evidence of force likely to produce great bodily injury was presented both at trial and at the preliminary hearing. He also claims that both convictions must be reversed because in closing argument the prosecutor committed Griffin error by implicitly referring to Caldwell’s failure to testify and improperly shifted the burden of proof. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Steven Brown (defendant) admitted he fatally stabbed his children’s grandmother, Kellye Taylor. Indicted and tried for first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a) ; 12022, subd. (b)), he testified and presented evidence of self defense and mental illness. The jury convicted him. In a separate bench trial, the court found he had two prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a) & (d); 1170.12, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of 86 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends reversal is required based on multiple Faretta, Marsden and instructional errors, the refusal to appoint advisory counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, the removal of one juror, and the failure to remove another. We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Irving Barahona guilty in count 1 of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and found true the allegations that a principal personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)). The jury also found defendant guilty of receiving stolen property in count 3 (§ 496, subd. (a)) and driving or taking a vehicle without consent in count 4 (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)).

Defendants and appellants Andrew Katz (Katz) and Purser Labs, LLC, doing business as Purser Partners (Purser), and Smoking Gun Media challenge a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a complaint filed against them by plaintiffs and respondents Allen Noor, Michael Noor, and Boytone Corporation (Boytone).

In June 2013, plaintiff and respondent Gerardo Medina (plaintiff or Medina) purchased a used 2008 Audi A4 automobile (2008 vehicle) from defendant and appellant South Coast Car Company, Inc. (SCCC). Defendant and appellant Veros Credit, LLC (Veros) subsequently accepted an assignment of Medina's retail installment sales contract (RISC) (SCCC and Veros are sometimes collectively referred to as defendants). Medina in his operative complaint alleged nine causes of action against defendants and others based primarily on his contention that SCCC engaged in wrongdoing in connection with the sale of the 2008 vehicle (hereinafter, underlying action), including under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., CLRA.).

The juvenile court granted a modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)(1)) brought by the Mariposa County Department of Human Services (department) at a contested review hearing and terminated reunification services for petitioner Jennifer H. (mother) as to her now five-year-old son, Jacob. The bases for the department’s petition were the opinions of two psychologists that mother suffers from a mental disability that renders her incapable of utilizing reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).)
Mother filed an extraordinary writ petition in propria persona seeking relief from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule).) We conclude mother failed to raise a claim of juvenile court error and dismiss her petition as facially inadequate for our review.

S.F., a 15-year-old minor (age 14 at the time of her offenses), appeals from a disposition order of the juvenile court adjudging her a ward of the court, removing her from her mother’s custody and placing her in an out-of-home, secured facility after she committed a string of offenses in San Francisco and engaged in other delinquent conduct as well. The sole issue she raises in this appeal concerns an electronics search condition of probation the juvenile court imposed, which she contends for the first time on appeal is unconstitutionally overbroad. We reject her challenge and affirm the disposition order.