CA Unpub Decisions

Ayana M. (mother) and her two children, R.J. (born in February 2013) and Remy J. (born in September 2014), appeal from a juvenile court order made at the six-month review hearing. Mother and the children urge that in addition to granting six months of additional reunification services, the juvenile court also should have made a finding that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to provide the family “reasonable services.” We conclude appellants lack standing because they are not aggrieved, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.

Mother Monika B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and setting adoption as the permanent plan for her seven-year-old daughter, I.B. (minor). Mother challenges the court’s finding that the beneficial parent child relationship bar to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) does not apply. The court determined that although mother consistently visited the minor during the four and one half years of the dependency proceedings and the two have a loving and affectionate bond, the benefit of maintaining the parent child bond does not outweigh the benefit adoption would provide the minor in this case. That finding, which rests not only upon the written reports from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) but also upon testimony by mother and the minor’s long term therapist, is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendants and appellants D.W. (Father) and N.O. (Mother; collectively, Parents) appeal after the termination of their parental rights for G.W. and E.W. (collectively, the Children) at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.
Father claims on appeal the juvenile court erred when it denied his section 388 petition without a hearing. Mother makes the following claims on appeal, in addition to joining in Father’s arguments: (1) the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 petition because she showed changed circumstances, and it was in the Children’s best interests to be returned to her, or that she receive additional reunification services; (2) the juvenile court erred by finding the parental bond exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply; and (3) the juvenile court should have ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship rather than adoption.

Appellants Nadia A. (Mother) and William S. (Father), parents of Ava and Hank S., appeal the juvenile court’s order limiting their educational rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. Appellants contend the court deprived them of their due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to issuing the order. We agree and reverse.

P.V. (mother) appeals from an order in which the juvenile court declined to return her children L.V., V.V., J.V. and A.V. to her custody after her 18-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22) and found it was in the children's best interests that she be provided with an additional six months of reunification services. Mother contends the court's finding is not supported by substantial evidence; that the evidence shows returning the children to her custody would not be detrimental because she had actively participated in reunification services, was capable of meeting the children's special needs, and had resolved the issues that brought the children into the dependency system. We conclude the court did not err; that evidence of the children's special educational, developmental, and mental health needs, the social worker's conclusions as to mother's present inability to care for those needs, and mother's questionable judgment generally, supports

After G.M. (Father), was arrested in 2013 on multiple charges including possession of drugs for sale, being a felon in possession of a firearm and willful cruelty to a child, he agreed that his sister A.A. and her husband D.A. (Guardians) would be guardians of his child B.M. (Minor), then four years old. Father was sentenced to a year in prison, and after his release, Guardians petitioned in October 2015 to terminate his parental rights so they could adopt Minor. Father, who had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse, was hopeful that before March or April 2016 he would be at a point in his recovery where he could seek to terminate the guardianship, and opposed the petition. But as late as July 2016, more than two years after the guardianship began, and less than a month after a positive drug test, Father conceded that it would be at least several more months, and perhaps a year, before he was prepared to take custody of Minor.

Plaintiff and appellant Rosemary Fuentes appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend in favor of defendant and respondent Callisto Group, Inc., doing business as Metro Lending Services, in this action arising from foreclosure proceedings. On appeal, Fuentes contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint, (2) the statements in recorded documents that Callisto was the lender were false, (3) her fraud causes of action are not barred by the statute of limitations, and (4) her loan documents should be cancelled because they are void. We conclude that the record on appeal is inadequate for review, because it lacks a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the demurrer or a suitable substitute, such as a settled statement under California Rules of Court, rule 8.137.

In September 2013, and pursuant to a stipulation among the parties, the trial court partitioned real property jointly owned by plaintiffs and respondents Five Points Temescal, LLC (Five Points) and Temescal Ranch Limited Partnership (Temescal Ranch) (plaintiffs); a third party, Hathaway Temescal, LLC (Hathaway); and defendant and appellant Merrie Hathaway (defendant). Roughly 16 months later, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking partition of an adjacent piece of real property owned by the same parties, and the trial court declined to consolidate the later-filed action with the earlier case resulting in the partition judgment. Instead, the court deemed the cases related and separately ordered partition of the adjacent property. We consider whether the trial court erred by declining to consolidate the two cases.

Petitioner Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (the Department) issued a 45-day suspension of an on-sale general public premises license held by real party in interest BMGV, LLC, doing business as “Atmosphere” (BMGV). The discipline was imposed based on a sustained accusation that BMGV was maintaining its premises, known as Club Atmosphere, as a disorderly house (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 24200, subd. (b), 25601 ), and creating a law enforcement problem such that the continuation of the license would be contrary to public welfare or morals (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; § 24200, subd. (a).) Respondent Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (the Board) annulled the Department’s decision and recommended dismissal of the accusation on the ground of insufficient evidence. In light of its decision, the Board did not address BMGV’s additional argument that dismissal was warranted on the ground of selective or discriminatory prosecution or BMGV’s challenge to the imposed dis

This matter comes before us on remand from the California Supreme Court, which granted review of our previous nonpublished decision in this case, but deferred further action pending consideration and disposition in a case involving nearly identical facts and legal issues. (See Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241 (Weatherford).) In Weatherford, the Supreme Court interpreted Code of Civil Procedure 526a, under which certain individuals and corporations have taxpayer standing to pursue legal actions enjoining wasteful or illegal expenditures by government entities, holding that a person’s standing to sue under section 526a did not require payment of a property tax. (Weatherford, at p. 1245.) Instead, “[a]n allegation that the plaintiff has paid an assessed tax to the defendant locality is sufficient under section 526a.” (Ibid.) After issuing its opinion in Weatherford, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration in light

Plaintiff California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN), a nonprofit taxpayer and voter organization that has “filed suit in order to protect the interests of taxpayers and voters by preventing the levy of an illegal special tax,” appeals from the dismissal of the action as barred by the statute of limitations. The action challenges a resolution adopted by the City of Rohnert Park (the city) establishing a community facilities district and authorizing the levy of a special tax on real property within the district to cover the cost of services and incidental expenses of the district. In accordance with the provisions of the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, Government Code section 53111 et seq. (the Act), because there were fewer than 12 registered voters residing within the district, the levy was approved by the vote of the single landowner within the district. CTAN contends the approval was invalid under California constitutional provisions requiring a two-thirds vote of t

Petitioner C.H. (mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 8.452 challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to her child, J.P. (the child), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother argues that: (1) she was not provided with reasonable reunification services; and (2) the court erred in finding there was no substantial probability the child would be returned to her care within the statutory timeframe. We deny the writ petition.

Borrego Community Health Foundation (Borrego) appeals from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate that sought to overturn two audit adjustments the State Department of Health Care Services (Department) made to Borrego’s 2008 cost reports. Borrego argues the Department failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence at the administrative hearing that its audit findings were correctly made. We disagree. The Department established by a preponderance of the evidence that Borrego provided insufficient auditable documentation to support these claimed costs. Borrego also challenges two legal authorities cited by the administrative law judge (ALJ) as alternative bases for rejecting Borrego’s claimed costs: (1) section 104.10 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM) published by the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and (2) North Clackamas Community Hospital v. Harris (9th Cir. 1980) 664. F.2d 701 (North Clackamas). These collateral arguments cannot overc

Richard J. Annen appeals from an order granting a special motion to strike under the anti SLAPP statute (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16) in favor of defendants Butz Dunn & DeSantis, Douglas Butz and Bradley Lebow. We conclude that Annen's challenge to the trial court's order granting the special motion to strike is without merit, and we accordingly affirm the order.