CA Unpub Decisions

After numerous prior attorneys for defendant were replaced, Alvon Shoner Surrell made a motion under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) to represent himself. On the first day of trial, defendant asked the trial court to reappoint counsel. The trial court denied the request. Defendant represented himself at trial and the jury found him guilty of four robberies (Pen. Code, § 211), and found true a firearm enhancement as to each robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his untimely request for reappointment of counsel. In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Surrell (Dec. 9, 2021, C090151) [nonpub. opn.].)
Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of section 1170 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 124 (Stats. 2021, ch. 695) and Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731).

Based on the limited record before us, it appears that an October 2013 complaint charged defendant Benjamin Macias with possession of marijuana for sale, unlawful cultivation of marijuana, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was arraigned on the complaint on October 10, 2013, and released on bail later that same month.
In December 2014, defendant pled not guilty, entered a general time waiver, and his case was set for a preliminary hearing in January 2015. The matter was continued several times at defendant’s request to July 16, 2015. Defendant was taken into federal custody on June 10, 2015, and his preliminary hearing was vacated.
In March 2017, defendant, who remained in federal custody, moved to dismiss this case under Penal Code section 859b. The People opposed, and the court denied defendant’s motion. Thereafter, defendant remained in federal custody awaiting trial on his federal charges.

On July 22, 2021, the trial court denied defendant Michael Mitchell’s petition to designate his felony conviction as a misdemeanor conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f), on the grounds that defendant was not eligible for such a reduction because he had a disqualifying “Super Strike” conviction for attempted murder on a peace officer with a machine gun.
On August 10, 2021, defendant filed a “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DENIED APPLICATION/PETITION FOR RESENTENCING P[U]RSUANT TO . . . SECTION 1170.18[, SUBDIVISIONS] (A) AND (F) DENIED ON 7-22-21.” Defendant contended that he had not been convicted of using a machine gun but had instead been convicted of using a semiautomatic weapon in connection with his various crimes.
On November 19, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s petition on the grounds that he was not eligible for the relief he sought.

In 1991, defendant was convicted of the first degree felony murder of Cledoaldo Clarecy Souza, attempted second degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The jury found true the felony-murder special circumstance alleged pursuant to former section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The jury was unable to reach a decision as to the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm.
Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole under former section 190.2, subdivision (a), plus a consecutive five years for the conspiracy. This court affirmed the judgment in People v. Watson (Oct. 30, 1992, B060665) (nonpub. opn.) (Watson I). That opinion summarizes the evidence presented at trial, which showed that defendant and his coconspirator, William Leon Franklin, entered into an agreement to rob drug users or Mexican-Americans.

Melina S. (Mother) and Francisco G. (Father) challenge the juvenile court’s June 3, 2021, order terminating parental rights for their son M.G. (born 2017). They contend the juvenile court did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship analysis as set out in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems improper. They urge us to reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand the matter for a new hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26 using only the correct Caden C. factors. We reverse.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), J.A. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order. He contends we must reverse the disposition order because the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the duty to inquire under section 224.2 whether his son, Juan A., is or may be an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA)). For the reasons explained below, we conclude DCFS’s failure to ask extended family members about potential Indian ancestry, as required under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was prejudicial. Therefore, we remand the matter with directions for the juvenile court to order DCFS to comply with section 224.2.

Ernesto D. III (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his five children, Ernesto IV, Damian, Darlene, Ruby, and Ryder, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Family and Children Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). We agree and conditionally affirm the order terminating his parental rights, and remand the matter with directions to ensure DCFS complies with the provisions of ICWA and related state law.

The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over A.F. (Minor) after sustaining domestic violence and mental health allegations against Minor’s mother E.R. (Mother) and father J.F. (Father). Mother noticed an appeal from the court’s jurisdiction findings but Father did not. Then, during the pendency of this appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Minor. We consider whether Mother’s appeal is moot in light of the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction.

Candace V. (mother) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over her four children, Aubrey V. (born May 2008); B.G. (born October 2009); M S.G. (born June 2012); and M.G. (born December 2014). Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order removing the children from her custody. Mother further argues that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).
We affirm the judgment and removal order.

In 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant and appellant Eric Tyrone Carter to 39 years 8 months in prison for convictions arising from his participation in a spree of armed robberies. We affirmed the convictions but, in light of the Legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620), which gave trial courts the discretion to strike firearm enhancements when imposing sentence, we remanded the case to allow the trial court to consider striking those enhancements from Carter’s sentence. The trial court declined to strike any enhancements. Carter now contends that we must remand the case once again in light of the recently enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567), which requires the court to apply a presumption in favor of selecting the lower term when imposing a determinate sentence on defendants who were younger than 26 years old when they committed their offense. The Attorney General agrees that Senate B

This appeal arises under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act). (Pub. Res. Code, § 30000 et seq.) San Luis Obispo County (County) granted the property owners’ application for a coastal development permit. On appeal, the California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the permit on the grounds that the adequacy of the on-site water well could not be determined and that the project violated visual and scenic resources policies. The property owners petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied the writ, but found that the Commission’s determination of the adequacy of the water well was not supported by the evidence. Both parties appeal. We affirm the denial of the writ and reverse the trial court’s finding as to the adequacy of the water well.

Yuki Kobayashi appeals from a civil harassment restraining order issued against him, protecting respondent Seok Chan Lee and Lee’s wife, Gwang Hwa Ju. Kobayashi asserts the order was not based on substantial evidence and that the restrictions the court placed on his First and Second Amendment rights were unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

Petitioner Brian Kakowski is currently serving a 40 year to life term in prison for multiple violent and nonviolent felony convictions, including second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)), second degree burglary (§ 459), use of another’s identifying information (§ 530.6, subd. (a)), and making criminal threats (§ 422).
On July 12, 2020, petitioner filed a petition in the superior court contending he was entitled to early parole consideration under the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). Proposition 57 added section 32, subdivision (a) to Article I of California’s Constitution. Subdivision (a)(1) reads: “Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term of his or her primary offense.”

Plaintiff Peter Kleinberg sued his former employer, Landmark Dividend, LLC, and related entities and individuals (collectively, defendants or Landmark), claiming defendants failed to pay him a commission in violation of the Labor Code and in breach of contract, and asserting numerous other causes of action based on the same facts. After a 31-day bench trial, the court issued a 33-page statement of decision rejecting all of plaintiff’s claims. Among a host of other detailed fact findings, the court found plaintiff’s testimony “was not credible in any respect.”
In his opening brief, plaintiff fails to comply with the rules of court. He presents a biased summary of facts to support his position, omitting many of the significant facts found by the trial court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)