CA Unpub Decisions

David Bulmer appeals a restraining order, support orders, and order to pay respondent Alicia Michelle Bulmer $10,000 attorney fees (Fam. Code, § 271) in a consolidated marital dissolution (case no. D371883) and domestic violence action (case no. D371776). We dismiss as untimely David’s appeal of the October 5, 2015 restraining order and December 7, 2015 orders for temporary support. With respect to the September 16, 2016 orders entered after trial, we affirm.

Plaintiffs Elizabeth Lizarraga, Angel Peralta, and Angela Peralta brought a wage and hour action against defendants Crystal Property Management, Inc. (CPM) and Paul Yeager. Yeager demurred to their original complaint, and plaintiffs responded by untimely filing an amended complaint. The court struck the untimely filed amended complaint and gave plaintiffs leave to refile it. Plaintiffs did not do so. However, all parties to the case behaved as though they had—CPM answered the (stricken) amended complaint and propounded discovery, and Yeager demurred to the (stricken) amended complaint.

Petitioners L.H. (Mother) and R.T. (Father), parents of six-year-old C.T. and one-year-old L.T., challenge the Contra Costa County Superior Court’s May 25, 2017 order terminating family reunification services and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 (366.26 hearing). They contend there was no clear and convincing evidence that either of them had failed to participate in court-ordered treatment. Father also contends the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) did not provide reasonable services and that the court erred by reducing his visitation when it terminated reunification services. For the reasons given below, we deny their petitions.

The juvenile court found Victor T. had violated the house arrest condition of his probation and ordered an extension of his time on probation. He appeals, claiming the juvenile court’s finding and order were based on inadmissible evidence. We affirm.

D.S. was a nonminor dependent who seemed to be on the road to success. In her last year in the nonminor dependent program, however, she, as the trial court described it, “went from [a] smiling, engaging self-advocate to a withdrawn and depressed young woman.” Approximately six months before her 21st birthday, D.S. decided to drop out of the nonminor dependent program. On appeal, she contends she dropped out because her social worker provided inadequate services, leaving her feeling overwhelmed with her work and school obligations. In particular, her social worker failed to advise her she could have cut back on either school or work and still have maintained eligibility for funding. She also contends the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to provide her counsel with notice that nonparticipation in her case plan had rendered her ineligible for continued funding.

J.W. (Mother) and Andrew D. (Father) appeal from orders of the juvenile court on juvenile dependency petitions filed by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) on behalf of their minor children, D.D. (born 2012) and A.D. (born 2015). Father contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the jurisdictional and dispositional findings because he was denied his due process and statutory rights to notice of the proceedings. Mother contends the Agency failed to make a proper inquiry of the children's Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We reverse the jurisdictional orders with directions.

R.H., the presumed father of A.H., appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights and freeing A.H. for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Appellant contends that the trial court failed to enforce a visitation order and that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception bars A.H.’s adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Prior to terminating A.A.’s (Minor) parents’ parental rights, the juvenile court denied appellant, T.S.’s, the paternal aunt (PA), request for placement of Minor. On appeal, PA contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her an evidentiary hearing on her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting the court to reconsider its order denying her placement of Minor. We affirm.

Plaintiff Abdul Hamidi appeals a judgment dismissing his amended complaint seeking to prevent the nonjudicial foreclosure of his home following an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The trial court sustained the demurrer on two grounds—that the securitization of plaintiff’s loan did not deprive Wells Fargo as the successor in interest to the initial lender of the right to foreclose on the loan, which is the premise of each of plaintiff’s claims, and that each of plaintiff’s claims is preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), 12 United States Code section 1461 et seq. The latter contention was the principal thrust of Wells Fargo’s demurrer, to which the major portion of the trial court’s order is directed, and plaintiff’s appellate brief addresses only that issue. Because there clearly is merit to the first ground, which plaintiff does not even mention in the single appellate brief he has

Here, a probate court awarded $101,787.26 attorney fees and costs to a residual trust beneficiary, Maureen Gorman (Gorman) in a trust accounting dispute. The fees and costs were incurred to protect and recover trust assets caused by appellant’s, Michael Lavery, mismanagement of the family trust. After the breach of trust claim settled for $975,000, the probate court found that the “lion’s share” of Gorman’s fees and costs should be borne by appellant. The court ordered the trust to pay Gorman’s fees and costs, and ordered that 80 percent of the fees and costs be allocated to appellant’s future trust distributions as residual beneficiary. Lavery appeals, contending that the probate court abused its discretion and that the surcharge order is barred by the $975,000 settlement agreement. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Patricia and Manuel Fernandez appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the demurrer of defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (Chase) to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ attorney withdrew from representing them when the demurrer was pending, but the attorney served the order granting the motion to withdraw by mailing it to plaintiffs at an incorrect address. As a result, plaintiffs did not learn that they were self-represented until shortly before the demurrer hearing, having failed to file opposition or retain new counsel. Plaintiffs filed a case management statement requesting a continuance and appeared at the hearing, but the court failed to address the continuance request and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We conclude that the failure to grant the continuance was an abuse of discretion that denied plaintiffs their right to be heard. We accordingly reverse.

Appellant, Gary C. Clawson, as trustee of his deceased mother’s trust, filed suit against respondents, Donald L. Fulbright, Castlewood Development, Inc. and Castlewood Partners, Inc., to collect on loans the decedent made to respondents as investments. Appellant personally served respondents with the complaint on February 2, 2015. Accordingly, a written response to the complaint was due on March 4, 2015. When that time passed without a response, appellant requested, and the superior court clerk entered, a default against respondents on March 13, 2015.

Michael Cayton sued the Stockton Unified School District (the District), alleging four violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. (FEHA)). Specifically, Cayton asserted causes of action for racial discrimination, gender discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination/harassment, and retaliation. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. Cayton appeals from the judgment entered thereon.

Richard Scott Brooks appeals his conviction, by jury, of 19 offenses arising out of his sexual assaults on, and sexual exploitation of the then 17-year-old victim, Jane Doe. The jury found appellant guilty of: four counts of oral copulation with a person who is under 18 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288a, subs. (b)(1), counts 1 through 4) ; oral copulation of an intoxicated person (§ 288a, subd. (i), count 5); oral copulation of an unconscious person (§ 288a, subd. (f), count 6); rape by force or fear of a minor who was at least 14 years old (§ 261, subd. (a)(2) count 7); sodomy by force or fear of a minor who was at least 14 years old (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C), count 11); two counts of sodomy of a person under 18 years of age (§ 286, subd. (b)(1), counts 12 and 13); sodomy of an unconscious person (§ 286, subd. (f), count 14); human trafficking by causing, inducing or persuading a minor to engage in a commercial sex act by means of force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, duress, or