CA Unpub Decisions

In this consolidated appeal from an order terminating mother’s parental rights, mother contends the juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to provide notifications required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. and Inst. Code § 224 et seq.). Mother maintains her initial assertion that the children might be eligible for membership in the “Cherokee” tribe was sufficient, without more, to mandate ICWA notification, notwithstanding statements she made in response to the juvenile court’s later inquiry that indicated she lacked a reasonable factual basis for her assertion. We conclude the court satisfied its affirmative duty to inquire about the children’s possible Indian status, and the court’s finding that it had no reason to know Indian children were involved was supported by the evidence. We affirm.

Plaintiff Kamilah Smith appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents Anacapa Partners LP (Anacapa) and Strategic Acquisitions. Plaintiff entered into a real estate purchase agreement with Anacapa. After Anacapa canceled the purchase agreement and sold the property to Strategic Acquisitions, plaintiff filed the instant breach of contract suit seeking specific performance of the agreement.
Resolution of the issues on appeal depends upon whether Anacapa’s “Notice to Buyer to Perform” triggered plaintiff’s obligation to perform within a certain time, and whether Anacapa’s subsequent cancellation of the purchase agreement was effective. We conclude the notice to perform was valid and effective. Further, because plaintiff failed to perform within the time required by the notice to perform, Anacapa had the contractual right to cancel the agreement and it did so effectively. We therefore affirm the judgment in Anacapa’s favor.

Appellant Ignacio Perez appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with findings that he personally used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). We affirm.

Defendant Arturo Plascencia was convicted of one count of kidnapping his girlfriend Andrea. On appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence and that the court improperly excluded evidence of Andrea’s drug use. We affirm.

Petitioner C.J., the biological paternal aunt and prospective adoptive parent of minor S.J., files this petition for extraordinary writ challenging an order continuing S.J.’s placement in the home of her de facto parents with her half-siblings. She claims the evidence did not show the placement was in S.J.’s best interests. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Ralph Peterson defaulted on his home mortgage. More than five years after his property was sold at a trustee’s sale, he sued some of the entities involved. The trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants Capital One, N.A. (Capital One) and T.D. Service Company (TD Service) to Peterson’s first amended complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, Peterson argues that the court erred, but we disagree and conclude that the demurrer was properly sustained based on the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm.

The City and County of San Francisco (the City) approved construction of a three-unit condominium project proposed by real parties in interest Jeremy Ricks, Tracy Kirkham and Joe Cooper on Telegraph Hill at 115 Telegraph Boulevard. Appellant Protect Telegraph Hill argues that the approval was unlawful because an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the project should have been prepared under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). We conclude no review was necessary under CEQA because the project was categorically exempt from review and no unusual circumstances exist to override the exemption on the basis the project will have a significant effect on the environment. We also conclude the city permissibly approved a conditional use authorization for the project. The superior court’s order denying a petition for writ of mandamus is affirmed.

Plaintiff Nathan Hall, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison (San Quentin), sued the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Dr. George Beatty, his treating physician, alleging professional negligence in connection with medical treatment he received for pneumonia. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied a motion by Hall for reconsideration. Hall, in propria persona, raises three issues on appeal. He contends the trial court (1) erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (2) abused its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration, and (3) erred in admitting medical records from San Quentin pursuant to the business records exception (Evid. Code, § 1271). We affirm.

Nicole Nollette brought this action against LRICO Services, LLC (LRICO) and its subsidiary Distillery No. 209 Ltd. Napa, California (D209) (collectively, Respondents) after they terminated her employment. Hired as president of D209 in 2010 and fired in 2012, Nollette contends Respondents induced her to leave a higher paying job with false promises of equity in D209 and then fired her in retaliation after she objected. She alleged claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and Nollette now appeals. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Godfrey Jamal Jackson of the second degree murder of MiAndrew Rachal and related charges and enhancements. The trial court sentenced him to 60 years to life in prison. On appeal, Jackson contends the court erred by (1) failing to grant a mistrial or admonish the jury after the prosecutor allegedly committed misconduct during closing argument, (2) giving erroneous jury instructions on the homicide charges at issue, (3) admitting into evidence a statement obtained in violation of Jackson’s Miranda rights, and (4) declining to continue the sentencing hearing to permit further defense investigation. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Bernardo Camacho of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2). As to the murder, the jury found true two special circumstances: that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of a drive-by shooting (§ 190, subd. (a)(21)) and that defendant intentionally killed the victim while defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang (id., subd. (a)(22)). The jury also found true an allegation that defendant committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) and an allegation that in the commission of the murder defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Defendant admitted that he committed the crimes while on bail for another felony offense (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). The trial cour

Defendant Jose Manuel Cruz was convicted by plea of possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions.
On appeal, defendant challenges the probation conditions (a) requiring waiver of any privilege against self-incrimination, participation in polygraph examinations, and waiver of any psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of his participation in a sex offender management program; (b) restricting his Internet access; and (c) prohibiting possession of pornography.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.

Appellant J.R. was the subject of multiple sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions. Eventually, J.R. was committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities for a maximum period of confinement of eight years and ten months. J.R. appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Adam Jose Robledo stands convicted of two counts of battery by a prisoner on a nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5), attempted gassing of a peace officer (id., §§ 664, 4501.1, subd. (a)), and resisting an executive officer (id., § 69). Robledo admitted two prior strike convictions. Robledo contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 when it excluded from evidence complaints and lawsuits alleging use of excessive force by one of the correctional officers he was convicted of battering. We affirm.