CA Unpub Decisions

On June 23, 2016, at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.21. subd. (e)), the juvenile court terminated appellant Dana S.’s reunification services as to her then 16-year-old daughter, H.G., and 14-year-old son, K.G., pursuant to section 388, subdivision (c)(1) and set a section 366.3 hearing. On July 30, H.G. tragically died, and in October, the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over her. In the interim, Dana appealed the juvenile court’s findings and orders as to both minors. She contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that Stanislaus County Social Services Agency (Agency) provided her with reasonable reunification services; and (2) the court erred in granting the Agency’s petition to terminate her reunification services on the ground she failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in her court-ordered case plan. Respondent contends any issues as to H.G. are moot in light of

Defendant Fred Warren Dean, Jr., was admitted to probation on July 30, 2015, after pleading no contest to one felony count of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). Among other conditions of his probation, defendant was ordered not to have any contact with the complaining witness, M.D., and to stay more than 100 yards away from M.D.’s residence and place of employment.
Defendant subsequently admitted to multiple violations of his probation, however, he contested an allegation alleging he had contact with M.D. and he had been within 100 yards of her residence. Following a contested hearing, the court found true the allegation. Defendant was sentenced to a term of four years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant claims certain text messages admitted at the hearing to show defendant had contact with M.D. were not properly authenticated. As a result, he contends the trial court erred in relying on the text messages in imposing his sentence. We affirm.

Defendant Douglas Edward McKenzie was convicted by guilty plea of several drug-related charges in three cases. On appeal, he contends (1) he was entitled to three more days of custody credit, and (2) the trial court erred in staying prior felony drug conviction enhancements and prior prison term enhancements. We modify the judgment and affirm as so modified.

Defendant Mark Anthony Martinez entered into a plea bargain on July 24, 2014, waiving his rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. Defendant entered a plea of no contest to commission of one count of felony spousal abuse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), admission of two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law, and admission of a prior prison term enhancement. Under the terms of the agreement, the court would dismiss the two prior serious felony convictions and impose and stay a prison term of five years.
At the sentencing hearing on August 25, 2014, the trial court dismissed the two prior strike allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of four years plus a consecutive term of one year for the prior prison term enhancement, for a total prison term of five years. The court stayed execution of defenda

Plaintiff and respondent Latricia Mims sued defendant and appellant Park Hill on Pepper Avenue Community Association (Park Hill), and others, for (1) injunctive relief; (2) unfair trade practices; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6) failure to make necessary disclosures; and (7) declaratory relief. Mims dismissed Park Hill as a defendant. Park Hill moved for an award of attorney’s fees. The trial court denied Park Hill’s motion. Park Hill contends the trial court erred. We affirm the order.

Chandler Law Firm, Robert C. Chandler, Carla R. Kralovic, Floyd F. Fishell, and Christopher L. Nelson for Cross-defendant and Respondent Kivett Realtors, Inc.
This action arises out of a heart-rending accident in which a child was severely injured after crawling through a doggie door and nearly drowning in a swimming pool at his new house.
Robert Sundback and Nichole Watson (collectively the Sundbacks) were former owners of the house; they installed the doggie door. They then sold the house to Sreenivasa Nakka and Hemalatha Nakka (collectively the Nakkas). Finally, the Nakkas rented the house to the child’s family. Thus, when the child and his siblings sued the Nakkas, the Nakkas cross-complained against the Sundbacks (and others who were allegedly vicariously liable).

On February 28, 2014, a first amended information charged defendant and appellant Lionel Wright with robbery under Penal Code section 211 (count 1), and attempted robbery under sections 664 and 211 (count 2). The information also alleged that defendant had two prison priors, and two prior strikes for two convictions for first degree burglary under section 459.

One-year-old T.D. was removed from her mother's care in April 2014 after having suffered burns resulting from her mother spilling hot oil on her. At the time of the incident, T.D.'s mother N.D. was under the influence of multiple controlled substances. Upon sustaining a petition filed on T.D.'s behalf, the juvenile court declared T.D. a dependent and placed her in foster care.

Sergio Caballero appeals from the family court's judgment on reserved issues in the dissolution of Caballero's marriage to Maria Del Carmen Dearcia, in which Caballero was found to be the father of a child born in 2005 during the parties' marriage (the Child). Caballero contends (1) the paternity finding is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) his right to due process was infringed because the hearing on reserved issues was not reported by a court reporter and the family court's order containing the paternity finding lacked detail.
We conclude that Caballero's contentions lack merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment on reserved issues.

Cortney Pimpo filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Fitness International, LLC, alleging, inter alia, she was sexually harassed by a coworker. Fitness International filed a motion to compel arbitration. The superior court denied the motion. Fitness International contends the superior court erroneously concluded: (1) the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and (2) the motion could be denied under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c).
We affirm. The arbitration agreement was contained in an employment application Pimpo submitted electronically. By its own terms, the application expired before Pimpo filed suit; thus, Fitness International could not rely on the arbitration agreement to compel arbitration. In addition, we agree with the superior court that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Therefore, the court properly denied Fitness International's motion for that reason as well.

Floyd M. Chodosh, Susan Eicherly, Bonnie P. Harris, Myrle A. Moore, Ole Haugen, and Chris McLaughlin (together, plaintiffs) sued the Honorable John R. Trotter (retired) and JAMS, Inc. (together, defendants) on numerous grounds, based on Justice Trotter's mediation of plaintiffs' litigation against the Palm Beach Park Association (the Association). Defendants filed a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The trial court found defendants' conduct was protected litigation-related activity, and that plaintiffs could not meet their burden in opposing the motion due to mediation confidentiality, quasi-judicial immunity, and the litigation privilege. The court granted the motion, awarded attorneys' fees to defendants, and dismissed the action.

The day before Todd Crooks was scheduled to be evicted from his residential hotel room, he used a hammer and crowbar in a failed attempt to open the locked front door of his room. After his eviction, hotel management observed Crooks had "gutted" the interior of his rented room. Crooks was charged with two felonies: vandalism over $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), and grand theft of personal property in excess of $950 (§ 487, subd.(a)). Following a bench trial, the court found Crooks guilty of vandalism, but not guilty of theft. The court denied Crooks's motion to treat the vandalism conviction as a misdemeanor, and sentenced him to serve three years of formal probation and 365 days in local custody. As a condition of probation, the court ordered Crooks to pay restitution of $5,175.43 to the hotel owner.
On appeal, Crooks challenges the restitution condition because it purportedly includes amounts attributable to the theft count of which he was acquit

Edward Craig Coleman II entered a fast food restaurant, went into the employee breakroom, and took $15 from an employee's purse. He subsequently pleaded guilty to felony burglary under Penal Code section 459.
After the passage of Proposition 47, known as the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, pp. 70–74), Coleman petitioned under new section 1170.18 to recall his sentence and to be resentenced for misdemeanor shoplifting under new section 459.5, subdivision (a). The trial court entered an order denying the petition, finding Coleman had not established his burglary conviction qualified for reduction to shoplifting. We affirmed the order. (People v. Stewart (Mar. 14, 2016, D067967) [nonpub. opn.].)

Leila Nicole Penman entered a department store and used a stolen debit or credit card to purchase a $50 gift card. She subsequently pleaded guilty to felony burglary under Penal Code section 459.
After the passage of Proposition 47, known as the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, pp. 70–74), Penman petitioned under new section 1170.18 to recall her sentence and to be resentenced for misdemeanor shoplifting under new section 459.5, subdivision (a). The trial court entered an order denying the petition, finding she had not established her burglary conviction qualified for reduction to shoplifting. We affirmed the order. (People v. Stewart (Mar. 14, 2016, D067967) [nonpub. opn.].)