CA Unpub Decisions

Alex David Stewart entered a pawn shop and sold a stolen computer for $250. He subsequently pleaded guilty to felony burglary under Penal Code section 459.
After the passage of Proposition 47, known as the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, pp. 70–74), Stewart petitioned under new section 1170.18 to recall his sentence and to be resentenced for misdemeanor shoplifting under new section 459.5, subdivision (a). The trial court entered an order denying the petition, finding Stewart had not established his burglary conviction qualified for reduction to shoplifting. We affirmed the order. (People v. Stewart (Mar. 14, 2016, D067967) [nonpub. opn.].)

A petition filed April 25, 2016, alleged the minor, S. O., came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed felony vandalism.
On November 8, 2016, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held. Around 1:00 a.m. on January 1, 2016, 17-year-old Jacob D., 15-year-old Rylan F., Crystal B., Amber B., Malik U., Jessie J., and the 17-year-old minor drank alcohol and walked around Oroville. Rylan denied that he had been drinking. When the group saw a car parked in a county parking lot, the minor jumped on the car, shattering the windshield. Jacob admitted he jumped on the car as well. Rylan, who told the group not to do it and walked away when the jumping started, thought the minor, Jacob, Malik, and Jesse had jumped on the car. The group then went to Jacob’s house for the night. The next morning, 15-year-old Erik B. arrived at Jacob’s house. Erik thought that the minor, Malik, Amber, and Crystal were present besides Jacob and Rylan.

In this appeal, the People challenge the trial court’s granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by defendant Jonathan Hampton. In 2009, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), and the conviction was upheld on appeal. Following the denial of defendant’s state and federal habeas corpus petitions, he filed the current habeas corpus petition in the trial court. In the current petition, defendant argued for the first time that his prior trial was unfair for lack of a jury instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder. As the current trial court noted, defendant’s current petition presents three issues for decision: (1) whether defendant’s original trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request that the jury be instructed with CALCRIM No. 570 regarding provocation and heat of passion theories of voluntary manslaughter, (2) whether the trial co

Defendant Brenda Armstrong pled no contest to one count of first degree murder and one count of arson, and was sentenced to 30 years to life. She appealed. We have conducted an independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and conclude that no arguable issues exist. We therefore affirm.

Plaintiff Eunhee Chang’s retail store caught ablaze after a fire of unknown origin started at the neighboring warehouse operated by defendant Fine Discount No. 1. The fire reduced both businesses to roofless, crumbling structures filled with debris. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence both in starting the fire and in causing the fire to spread to her building. The court granted nonsuit on the first cause of action for starting the fire and the jury found in favor of defendant on the second cause of action.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment arguing that the court erred in granting nonsuit as to her first cause of action. Plaintiff also asserts the court erred by preventing her from pursuing a negligence per se theory of liability on the second cause of action. Finally, she contends the court abused its discretion in admitting photographic evidence and a declaration by defendant’s counsel about costs. We affirm on all grounds.

The juvenile court found that 14-year-old A.N. committed felony robbery. On appeal, A.N. contends that the admission of the victim’s identification violated due process. We disagree and affirm.

Father appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition order removing his infant child from his custody. Father argues that he posed no present threat of harm to the child. We affirm because ample evidence of father’s alcohol-fueled domestic violence supported jurisdiction. We also conclude that father’s challenge to the disposition order is moot because father has since regained custody of the child.

Scotty Duane Wilson, an inmate serving a state prison term of 18 years to life at the Lancaster Prison Facility, was convicted of resisting an executive officer with force or violence and two counts of battery by a prisoner after he refused to follow the orders of a correctional officer and resisted efforts to restrain him. Wilson contends on appeal the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecutor to impeach two inmates who testified in his defense with their decades-old convictions; there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting an executive officer; or, in the alternative, the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of resisting without force or violence. We affirm Wilson’s convictions on the battery counts but conditionally reverse his conviction for resisting an executive officer with force or violence.

A jury convicted defendant Raul Olmedo of felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years in state prison. On appeal defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor or grant probation. We affirm.

This appeal involves the attempted enforcement of a judgment by Gary V. Hixon, as assignee of judgment creditors/plaintiffs Taylor Concrete Pumping Corp. and Taylor Transportation, Inc. (collectively, Taylor), against judgment debtors/defendants Zippy’s Currency X-Change, Inc., Mark J. Zippert, and Carol Zippert (collectively, the Zippert defendants), and the Zippert defendants’ ultimately successful attempts to end Hixon’s attempted enforcement, based upon an agreement between Taylor and the Zippert defendants regarding satisfaction of the judgments in this case and a related case. That agreement (the stipulation) required Taylor to file a satisfaction of judgment as to the Zippert defendants in both this case and the related case if certain payments were made within specified time limits.

Parties to a settlement agreement can enforce that agreement in at least two ways; with a breach of contract action, or, if the trial court has retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, by a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Here, Shawn and Evan Libaw attempted via section 664.6 to enforce their settlement agreement with their sister, Patrice Libaw Nikopoulos. Patrice appeals from the resulting probate court judgment entered in her brothers’ favor. Among other points of error, Patrice contends the probate court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement after she voluntarily dismissed her case. Evan and Shawn cross-appeal, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded less attorney fees than they requested. Because we find the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, we reverse.

Following a trial at which Centia Renee Martin represented herself and did not testify, a jury convicted Martin of first degree murder and found true an allegation she personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense. Martin argues the trial court erred by initially denying her request under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to represent herself. Martin also contends the trial court violated her right to testify by denying her request to play a video recording of her post-arrest police interrogation in lieu of live direct testimony.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Martin’s initial request to represent herself because her request was not unequivocal. We also conclude the trial court did not violate Martin’s right to testify because the court properly excluded the video recording as inadmissible hearsay and Martin, despite receiving every opportunity to testify at trial, chose not to do so. Therefore, we affirm.

Sean and Michelle Park filed this action for wrongful initiation of foreclosure, fraud, negligence, unfair competition, and other causes of action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. also known as Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, formerly known as World Savings Bank FSB (Wells Fargo), Wells Fargo Bank Home Mortgage, Golden West Savings Association Service, Co. (Golden West), Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) as trustee of World Savings Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 31 Trust, and Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation (Cal-Western), for their alleged involvement in the foreclosure on the Parks’ property. The Parks appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer of Wells Fargo, BNYM, and Golden West to the Parks’ first amended complaint without leave to amend.

A defendant in this civil case has filed 26,652 words of briefing and 5,172 pages of record in this appeal, which is aimed solely at overturning a $10,000 discovery sanctions award. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing this award, and affirm.