CA Unpub Decisions

In early 2000, appellant Jose Naraz Mata was arrested and charged with several drug-related offenses following a search of his residence executed pursuant to a warrant. Months later, he pled no contest to two felony drug charges. The trial court imposed a sentence of 180 days in jail on each count, to run concurrently. In addition, the court imposed a restitution fine and probation for a period of three years.

Appellant challenges a judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. We conclude the trial court correctly determined the settlement agreement contained all the terms of settlement that were material to the parties and those material terms were sufficiently definite or certain to be enforceable.
We therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Oscar Abraham Bon, a Norteño street gang member, was the passenger in a vehicle when he thought he saw rival gang members in another vehicle and shot at them numerous times. Bon was mistaken, as the eight occupants of the other vehicle consisted of a fellow Norteño gang member, his wife and children. Bon was convicted, as charged, of eight counts of premediated attempted first-degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) (counts 1-8) and two counts of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246) (counts 9 and 10). The jury also found true various street gang and firearm allegations (§§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1), (b)(4) & (b)(5), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d), and 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).) Bon was sentenced to a total aggregate term of 320 years to life in state prison.

In 1999, a jury found defendant and appellant Allen Keith Crenshaw guilty of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (Pen. Code, § 209.5, subd. (a); count 1) with the personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had sustained two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). After the trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike convictions, defendant was sentenced to a total determinate term of 10 years, plus an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.

Defendant and appellant Christine Laing appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering involuntary treatment at Patton State Hospital (Patton) as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2962. Defendant makes one claim on appeal: that her MDO commitment must be reversed because the statutorily required findings that her assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury conviction factually qualified as a MDO commitment offense, and that the crime was caused or aggravated by her severe mental health disorder, were based primarily on inadmissible hearsay testimony from the People’s medical experts in violation of People v. Stevens (2016) 62 Cal.4th 325 (Stevens).

In 1999, Eric Braswell was convicted of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460). In 2016, Braswell filed a petition under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18) to reduce his burglary conviction to a misdemeanor. He also sought to reduce his overall sentence by one year because the offense underlying one of his prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) had been reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition on both grounds. Braswell filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating he has been unable to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Braswell the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal but he has not responded.

Lisa L. (Mother) and M.M. (Father) are the unwed biological parents of N.Z. Not long after learning that Mother was pregnant with N.Z., Mother and Father's relationship deteriorated and Father became increasingly controlling and physically aggressive toward Mother. As a result, Mother moved to California and ceased all contact with Father before N.Z. was born. Shortly after giving birth, Mother agreed to release N.Z. from the hospital directly into the care of L. and R. Z. (the Z.'s), and consented to them adopting the child.

Appellant Michael Hucul, acting in propia persona, appeals from multiple orders of the trial court.
Hucul and his ex-wife Janet Kren divorced in Michigan. After the judgment of dissolution was entered, Kren sought and obtained a move-away order from a Michigan court that allowed her to move to California with the parties' son, J. As part of that move-away order, Kren was ordered to enroll J. at Faith Lutheran School in Vista, California. The order provided that J. was to attend that school for the remainder of his education. Although the order did not require that Kren pay 100 percent of the tuition for this school, Kren had apparently orally agreed to do so in the proceedings before the Michigan court, and she did so for two or three years. The Faith Lutheran School recently decided to close its middle school program, thereby eliminating the possibility that J. could continue to be educated there. Kren and Hucul disagreed as to where J. should attend middle school. After

Defendant Harold Joshua Powers appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his “motion for modification of sentence under California Penal Code section 1473(E)(1); (fraud).” Appointed counsel asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
On December 4, 2011, defendant shot and killed a man while showing off a gun he recently acquired.

A jury found defendant Archie Ray Proudfoot guilty on two felony counts of infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (felony spousal abuse). (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) The trial court found true allegations defendant had three prior convictions for domestic violence related crimes and sentenced him to serve an aggregate term of eight years and four months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor spousal battery, (2) reversal is required because the trial court failed to advise him of his Boykin/Tahl rights before he stipulated to his prior convictions during the jury trial phase, and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to conform to the judgment actually imposed by the trial court.

Real party in interest, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) purports to appeal from a judgment overturning a decision of the State Personnel Board (SPB) and remanding the matter for reconsideration. In remanding the matter, the trial court expressly noted nothing in the judgment “shall limit the discretion legally vested in [the SPB].” Because the judgment contemplates further administrative proceedings, it is not a final determination of the issues and is therefore not appealable. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner Orlando Jose Williams, Jr., was convicted of two in-prison offenses. The trial court sentenced him to eight years and subsequently granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding presentence credit, awarding him 90 days credit.
The Attorney General now contends petitioner is not entitled to the presentence credit. We agree. We will reverse the order granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to strike the 90 days of credit it awarded.

Pierrick Brillouet and Yong Brillouet (the Brillouets) appeal judgment after a court trial in this unlawful detainer action. They separately appeal a postjudgment order awarding attorney’s fees. The court awarded Coastline RE Holdings Corporation (Coastline) possession, $44,760.83 in damages for 10 months of lost rent, and $210,000 in contractual attorney’s fees.
Coastline filed this action as an unlimited civil action, but a superior court clerk mistakenly designated it as limited. The Brillouets contend it is a limited civil action and thus the court exceeded its jurisdiction when it awarded Coastline $44,760.83 in damages for lost rent and heard a motion for attorney’s fees more than 30 days after notice of entry of judgment. They also contend the $210,000 fee award is not authorized by contract and is excessive. We affirm.

R.N., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s February 9, 2017 disposition order after appellant admitted violating probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777.) Appellant was on probation for theft related offenses and violated probation when he was suspended from school for gang-related activity. The juvenile court terminated home on probation, found that appellant was a person described by section 602, and placed appellant in the care, custody, and control of the probation department for suitable placement. The court determined that the maximum confinement time was one year and awarded 215 days custody credit.