CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jorge Reyes was charged with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), with gun use (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) allegations.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant waived his trial rights, pled guilty to the robbery charge and admitted the gun use allegation. The parties agreed to a twelve-year prison sentence.
Prior to sentencing, appellant sought to withdraw his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his prior counsel failed to do an investigation, and that subsequent counsel’s investigation supported a defense of accidental shooting.

Defendant Martin Martines (a.k.a. Arturo Lara-Aguilera) appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate his plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5. He contends he was improperly advised of the immigration consequences of his plea and suffered prejudice as a result. We affirm.

Jeffrey George Shary appeals from the denial of his petition to recall his sentence under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18), which reduced certain theft-related and drug-related felonies to misdemeanors. The trial court properly found that appellant’s conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) was not eligible for reduction under Proposition 47. Therefore, we affirm.

J.R., a minor coming under the juvenile court law, appeals orders of the juvenile court sustaining two Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and finding that she committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), unlawfully used tear gas as a weapon (§ 22810, subd. (g)(1)), and committed battery on a school employee (§ 243.6).
We appointed counsel to represent her on this appeal. After examination of the record, her counsel filed an opening brief requesting the court to make an independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

In the underlying action, the trial court denied appellant Ronald Dave Renteria’s motion under Penal Code section 1170.126, which permits specified defendants sentenced as three strike offenders to be resentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act). After an appeal was noticed from that ruling, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues, and appellant submitted a supplemental brief. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude that no arguable issues exist, and affirm the denial of the petition for resentencing.

In this Wende appeal, defendant Adrian Salcedo challenges the order revoking and reinstating parole. The order is affirmed.
While on supervised parole, defendant was arrested for domestic violence (spousal battery) on September 6, 2016. As a result of that arrest, the Division of Adult Parole Operations filed a petition for revocation of parole, alleging that defendant violated the terms and conditions of parole when he committed spousal battery. (Pen. Code, §§ 3000.08, 1203.2.) The matter was set for a combined probable cause and parole revocation hearing.

Jessie Joe Adams appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion for modification of his sentence under Proposition 57 and the California Constitution. Appellant’s counsel on appeal filed a Wende brief (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende)) requesting that we conduct an independent review of the record. We have done so and conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal is from an order denying a petition by defendant and appellant Ricky Howard for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 and Proposition 36 (the “Three Strikes Reform Act,” hereafter “the Act”). Defendant was sentenced under the three strikes law in 2000 to an indeterminate term of 53 years to life following his convictions for receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), with true findings that defendant had suffered three prior robbery convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)), and had served three prior prison terms without remaining free of custody (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Appellant Melissa B. appeals the juvenile court’s orders summarily denying two petitions for modification seeking additional reunification services or custody of her three minor sons, Bryan R., Angel B. and Dominick Z., and its order terminating parental rights over Dominick. Mother contends she made a prima facie showing sufficient to support a hearing on her petitions, and that the evidence established both a benefit to Dominick to continuing the parental relationship and a strong sibling bond in danger of loss. Finding no error in the court’s summary denials or its order terminating parental rights, we affirm.

Jennifer W. appeals from jurisdictional findings and disposition orders declaring her daughter, Hannah W., a dependent of the juvenile court, and removing the child from her custody. Jennifer W. argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that her mental illness placed Hannah W. at substantial risk of physical harm, and that placing Hannah W. with her father would not be detrimental to the child’s well-being. We affirm.

As part of a plea bargain, defendant Earvin Ferguson agreed that he would appear for sentencing on a later date pursuant to a Cruz waiver. However, between the entry of his plea and the date set for sentencing, defendant was taken into custody on another matter, and failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion, and violated his right to due process, when it found his failure to appear was willful, and imposed a sentence greater than the agreed upon disposition. We agree, and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a suitability hearing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, enacted by the voters as Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126), the trial court found Kenneth Ray Jackson posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and denied his petition for recall of his prison sentence and request for resentencing. On appeal Jackson contends the court abused its discretion in concluding he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Patrick Diron Johnson of child abuse (count 1; Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and assault on a child under eight years of age resulting in coma or paralysis (count 2; § 273ab, subd. (b)). Further, the jury found as to both counts that Johnson personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on a child under five years of age. (§ 12022.7. subd. (d).) The trial court thereafter found that Johnson had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior serious or violent felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior felony convictions with a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Plaintiff Raymond Frazier appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition under Government Code section 946.6 for relief from the claim filing requirements of section 945.4, so he may pursue his claims against defendant City of Los Angeles. (Defendant County of Los Angeles has been dismissed from the appeal.) Plaintiff was struck by a car on a City-maintained road, and had no recollection of the exact location of the accident. He did not file his claim with the City until nearly nine months after the accident. His claim, and his request to file a late claim, were denied by the City. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding there was no mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect on the part of plaintiff or his attorney, and in finding that plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date of the accident. We affirm the order.