CA Unpub Decisions

Christopher Grant argues that, had the trial court not erroneously admitted evidence of two prior convictions and the prosecutor not committed misconduct by referring to facts not in evidence, the jury would not have convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon and assault likely to produce great bodily injury. To the extent Grant did not preserve these issues because his trial counsel failed to object, Grant contends he received ineffective assistance. We conclude that Grant forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct argument and that, even if the court committed evidentiary error and Grant’s trial counsel was ineffective, overwhelming and virtually uncontested evidence supports Grant’s convictions. Therefore, we affirm.

In this consolidated case, the jury found defendant guilty of 29 felonies arising from three different incidents. In the first and third incidents, the police stopped defendant’s vehicle and found drugs and weapons. In the second incident, the major focus at trial, the jury found defendant tied up, tortured or beat, shot at, threatened, and robbed three men who were working for him at a marijuana grow. The trial court sentenced defendant to 98 years four months to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant raises claims of instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends the trial court erred in denying his timely motion to discharge counsel and violated Penal Code section 654 by imposing unstayed terms on both the torture and robbery charges. We find no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.

In case No. F14909812, appellant Julio Cesar Escobar pled no contest to possession of metal knuckles (Pen. Code, § 21810); in case No. F15902440, he pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).
On October 6, 2015, the court found Escobar violated his probation in both cases through his failure to complete a drug treatment program.
On October 9, 2015, the court sentenced Escobar to a four-year term in case
No. F15902440 and a concurrent two-year term in case No. F14909812.
On appeal, Escobar contends his due process right to confrontation was violated by the admission of a letter from the Salvation Army, Stockton Adult Rehabilitation Center (Salvation Army) at his probation violation hearing. We affirm.

A jury convicted Joel Coronado of second degree murder of one victim, assault with a semiautomatic firearm on another victim, and possession of a firearm by a felon. He contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on assault with a semiautomatic firearm and on self-defense and that the cumulative effect of the errors was prejudicial. We affirm.

The San Diego District Attorney filed an amended complaint charging Terry Lee Carter with arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b); count 1); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and unlawfully causing a fire that caused an inhabited structure to burn (§ 452, subd. (b); count 3). Carter pled guilty to count 3. In exchange for Carter's guilty plea, the court granted the People's motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2.
The court granted Carter three years of formal probation. As a condition of probation, Carter was sentenced to 180 days in a licensed residential treatment program with 44 days' credit for actual time served and 44 days' credit under section 4019. Among several probation conditions, the court ordered Carter not to possess fire setting tools, to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and recordable media, and to obtain probation officer approval of his employment and residence. In addition, the court

Defendant Robert Lee Caracter appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury convicted him of attempted first degree burglary with a person present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 664). The trial court sentenced him under the three strikes law to 25 years to life for his offense plus an additional 15 years for three prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court stayed sentence as to five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Caracter contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a competency hearing, denying his motion to declare a mistrial, and continuing the trial in his absence after his apparent suicide attempt. We affirm.

Dakota Blancett appeals an order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and committing him to the Department of Mental Health for involuntary treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) We reverse and hold that Blancett's waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pursuant to the totality of circumstances.
Prior to conducting a bench trial, the trial court must obtain personally from an MDO defendant a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make such a waiver. (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116, 1136.) Here the record is bereft of evidence demonstrating that Blancett was sufficiently advised of his right to a jury trial and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived that right.

E.F., the presumed father of five-year-old Z.F., concedes substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding he sexually abused his daughter on numerous occasions and its order declaring her a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (d) (sexual abuse). Nonetheless, E.F. appeals the juvenile court’s June 14, 2016 order removing Z.F. from his care and custody and releasing her to her mother, Jessica P.-F., and its June 20, 2016 order terminating dependency jurisdiction with an order granting sole legal and physical custody to Jessica. E.F. also challenges that portion of the court’s June 20, 2016 order that granted him monitored visitation with Z.F. once each week in a therapeutic setting “as long as the individual therapist for the minor is comfortable with the visits.” We affirm.

When J.M. was born in November 2015, both she and mother tested positive for methamphetamine. J.M. was premature and placed in the neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU). Mother admitted to an extensive history of drug use, using methamphetamine during pregnancy, and not obtaining prenatal checkups during pregnancy. Father also had a lengthy history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine, but stated he no longer used drugs. Both mother and father had extensive criminal records as well. Father’s criminal record included a 2007 conviction for indecent exposure. He was required to register as a sex offender and as a narcotics offender and was not permitted to be around children. Mother had previously lost custody of four other children.

Danny G. appeals from the portion of the juvenile court’s exit order requiring that visits with his son, A.G., be monitored. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364.) We affirm.

Kattina Harris appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court denied her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging a decision by the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission to sustain Harris’s discharge by the County of Los Angeles, Child Support Services Department (CSSD). Harris contends the trial court erred in ruling she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and in finding her discharge was not an abuse of discretion. We disagree with the first contention, but agree with the second. We therefore reverse and remand for the Commission to reconsider Harris’s penalty.

After G.M. (Father), was arrested in 2013 on multiple charges including possession of drugs for sale, being a felon in possession of a firearm and willful cruelty to a child, he agreed that his sister A.A. and her husband D.A. (Guardians) would be guardians of his child B.M. (Minor), then four years old. Father was sentenced to a year in prison, and after his release, Guardians petitioned in October 2015 to terminate his parental rights so they could adopt Minor. Father, who had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse, was hopeful that before March or April 2016 he would be at a point in his recovery where he could seek to terminate the guardianship, and opposed the petition. But as late as July 2016, more than two years after the guardianship began, and less than a month after a positive drug test, Father conceded that it would be at least several more months, and perhaps a year, before he was prepared to take custody of Minor.

Appellant Eric Manzanares pled no contest to possession of heroin in prison (Pen. Code, § 4573.6/count 1) and he admitted allegations that he had a prior strike within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Plaintiff Virginia De Los Santos (De Los Santos) appeals a judgment in favor of defendants San Diego Metropolitan Transit System and San Diego Transit Corporation (collectively, MTS) following the trial court's grant of MTS's summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment for MTS on the ground that De Los Santos's complaint for dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code, § 830 et seq.) was barred by the two-year limitations period for an action for personal injury (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1) and by De Los Santos's failure to timely file a government claim form (Gov. Code, § 911.2). We sought supplemental briefing from the parties regarding claim preclusion in light of the judgment in favor of MTS in De Los Santos's prior action against it arising out of the same injury. We conclude, based on the undisputed material facts, that De Los Santos's complaint was barred by res judicata and we affirm the judgment on that ground.