CA Unpub Decisions

Anabel C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order finding the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services had provided reasonable services to meet the needs of her son, Eduardo A. Because this finding is not appealable, we dismiss her appeal. We also deny Anabel’s request that we exercise our discretion to treat her appeal as a petition for writ of mandate because such a petition would be moot.

Defendant Kenneth Ray Johnson along with a codefendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with findings the murder was committed during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole on the murder count, plus an additional year for the firearm allegation.

Jesse A., father of two-year-old Roselyn R.A., appeals the juvenile court’s March 21, 2017 order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating his parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for Roselyn. Jesse contends the juvenile court erred in ruling he failed to establish the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We affirm.

A jury found defendant Jesus Lopez-Ramirez guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) and three counts of arson of an uninhabited structure or forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for a term of four years with various conditions, including the condition he serve 360 days in county jail.

Defendant Jay McCurry appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition under Proposition 47 for recall of the felony sentence imposed on his burglary conviction and for resentencing to a misdemeanor term for shoplifting. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (a).) The trial court concluded resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, i.e., an unreasonable risk that he will commit one of the “super strikes” listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), one of which is “[a]ny serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).) The trial court reasoned that because of defendant’s drug abuse and criminal history, including three juvenile strike adjudications, he posed an unreasonable risk of committing another strike “of any variety” that would qualify him for a life sentence under the three strikes law. In other words, under the trial court’s reaso

Defendant Jay McCurry appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition under Proposition 47 for recall of the felony sentence imposed on his burglary conviction and for resentencing to a misdemeanor term for shoplifting. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (a).) The trial court concluded resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, i.e., an unreasonable risk that he will commit one of the “super strikes” listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), one of which is “[a]ny serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).) The trial court reasoned that because of defendant’s drug abuse and criminal history, including three juvenile strike adjudications, he posed an unreasonable risk of committing another strike “of any variety” that would qualify him for a life sentence under the three strikes law. In other words, under the trial court’s reaso

On December 4, 2015, defendant and his wife argued throughout the day. Defendant also was drinking alcohol throughout the day. The arguing escalated to a physical altercation when defendant, now intoxicated, grabbed his wife and threw her to the ground. She tried to stand up but he pushed her back down and “held her by her throat and her face.” Their children, ages 11 and 12, came to their mother’s aid but defendant yelled for them to leave. Defendant then lifted his wife off the floor and pushed her toward the front door. Defendant’s wife and children left the house and went to a Motel 6 where they met with law enforcement officers.
The People charged defendant with one count of injuring a spouse and two counts of cruelty to children (one for each of his children). Those charges were consolidated with an unrelated charge of assault with a deadly weapon.

On February 16, 2016, counsel for plaintiffs and appellants Charlene and Robert Headrick (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint on their behalf, seeking damages for personal injuries from an automobile accident involving defendant and respondent Kyle Curtis Dubois (Defendant). They alleged the accident took place on January 18, 2014.
In response, Defendant demurred to the complaint on the basis that it was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Defendant argued the apparent defect could not be cured.

In a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the prosecution alleged that David S. committed felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)) and misdemeanor vandalism (id., § 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)). After David denied the allegations, the juvenile court placed him on informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. The court "reserve[d] jurisdiction" over the issue of restitution to the victim. Several months later at a restitution hearing, it heard testimony from the victim. The court set restitution at $1,100 and ordered David to pay that amount as a condition of his informal supervision.

On October 30, 2013, the People filed an information, alleging in count 1 defendant had earlier that year burglarized an “inhabited dwelling house” in Lake Elsinore. The information further alleged in count 2 that defendant then burglarized a Lake Elsinore jewelry store by entering it “with intent to commit theft and a felony.”
On October 14, 2014, defendant pled guilty to these two counts. As a factual basis for count 1, the trial court found defendant had entered an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of the burglary statute, and so had committed a “residential burglary.”

On October 30, 2013, the People filed an information, alleging in count 1 defendant had earlier that year burglarized an “inhabited dwelling house” in Lake Elsinore. The information further alleged in count 2 that defendant then burglarized a Lake Elsinore jewelry store by entering it “with intent to commit theft and a felony.”
On October 14, 2014, defendant pled guilty to these two counts. As a factual basis for count 1, the trial court found defendant had entered an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of the burglary statute, and so had committed a “residential burglary.”

Defendant and appellant L.S. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s order sealing her juvenile records under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 786. Specifically, minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that it would promote her successful reentry and rehabilitation to order the Moreno Valley Unified School District (MVUSD) to seal its records related to her arrest for marijuana possession, but declined to apply the order to the school districts to which she subsequently transferred. We conclude that the desired promotion of minor’s successful reentry and rehabilitation would be frustrated if school districts to which minor subsequently transferred are not ordered to seal these records.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.