CA Unpub Decisions

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On July 29, 2016, an information charged defendant and appellant Dwayne Stark with corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(10), a felony (count 1); and failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320.2, a felony (count 2). On October 5, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
On November 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years: the middle term of three years for count 1 (cohabitant injury) and the middle term of two years for count 2 (failure to appear), to be served concurrently.On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over the four children of Susan S. (mother) and Brian E. (father) after finding that mother had repeatedly engaged in conduct that emotionally and physically traumatized the children. However, because the court’s orders removing the children from mother, awarding father sole legal and physical custody of the children, and restricting mother’s visits with the children to a therapeutic setting with a professional intermediary eliminated mother’s opportunities to further traumatize the children as well as the need for further dependency court supervision, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction with an “exit order” that would become part of the still-pending family court case between mother and father. In this appeal, mother attacks the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction.

A car owner sued under our State’s “lemon law” and lost. The trial court awarded costs to the car manufacturer who prevailed in the amount of $23,329. The car owner raises a number of challenges to the cost award. One of those challenges has merit; the rest do not. Accordingly, we reduce the cost award by $4,200, but otherwise affirm.

Appellate review does not encompass a retrial or review of credibility findings. In this case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that appellant Mark Chisom, a peace officer who was terminated as a parole agent, was not credible. The ALJ concluded that Chisom was negligent and dishonest, and that respondent Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation properly terminated him. The ALJ’s conclusions subsequently were adopted by the State Personnel Board (Board).

In 1990, petitioner Sekou Kwane Thompson was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), exploding or igniting a destructive device causing death (former § 12310, subd. (a)), and exploding or igniting a destructive device causing bodily injury (former § 12309). He was sentenced to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that “an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and that “his or her liability for that crime must be based on direct aiding principles.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158-159 (Chiu).)

A wealthy woman died, placing one of her assets in a trust that named her then-husband as the income beneficiary and her children from prior marriages as the residual beneficiaries. She named two of those children as the trustees responsible for administering the trust. This has led to nearly 15 years of litigation. In this appeal and cross-appeal, the successors to the income beneficiary and the trustees (collectively, the parties) present three substantive issues: (1) did the trustees properly allocate the trust’s receipt of $304,000 to the trust’s principal rather than its income beneficiary; (2) did the trustees properly apply the terms of a 2005 settlement between the parties when calculating (and charging the income beneficiary) the expenses incurred in litigating an arbitration proceeding in New York; and (3) did the trustees properly hold in reserve the undistributed income held by the trust on the date the income beneficiary died? The trustees also claim that the firs

Samantha Faulkner and Dale Sefarian appeal from an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings against them and in favor of Alexander Hughes on their petitions to be appointed as successor co-trustees to the Mark Hughes Family Trust. We reverse.