CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Jose Manuel Amaro of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246), and witness intimidation (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). The jury also found true allegations that Amaro perpetrated the murder by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm when he committed the murder and shooting (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personally used a firearm when he intimidated a witness (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to life in state prison without the possibility of parole on the murder, a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the discharge of a firearm allegation, and a consecutive term of 10 years on the remaining charges and allegation.

Defendants Floyd Mutrux, Northern Lights, Inc., and John Dough, Inc. appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Cleopatra Records, Inc., Brian Perera, and Yvonne Perera following a bench trial. Defendants argue the court’s findings regarding mistake do not support rescission and that rescission was improper without evidence of fraud. We affirm because the trial court’s judgment rescinding the contract was supported by its finding that the parties made a mutual mistake of fact regarding the meaning of material contract terms.

Attorneys owe undivided loyalty and confidentiality to their clients. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e); Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(C) & (E).) An attorney may not, without the informed written consent of the former client, accept employment adverse to the former client where, by reason of the representation of the former client, the member “obtained confidential information material to the employment.” (Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(E).) And the duty of loyalty prevents any attorney from doing “‘anything which will injuriously affect [the] former client in any matter in which [the attorney] formerly represented [the client]. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Oasis West Realty).) A former client may seek to disqualify counsel from representing an adversary in violation of these rules. (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 847 (Cobra).)

A family court adjudicating a marital dissolution found that a husband’s business no longer held an interest in its sole venture, and on that basis declined to award the wife any compensation for that business. After the dissolution became final in 2007, the husband sued his business partner for not splitting the venture’s profits with him. Once wife learned that husband had not been truthful during the dissolution case regarding his continuing interest in the venture, wife (1) moved to reopen the dissolution case, and (2) filed a civil lawsuit against husband, his partner, and his partner’s spouse. The civil suit eventually went to trial in 2015, and was dismissed. Wife appeals. We conclude that the civil suit was properly dismissed, but that wife’s motion to reopen the dissolution case was properly filed and remains to be litigated. We remand the dissolution case to the family court for further proceedings.

A defendant in this civil case has filed 26,652 words of briefing and 5,172 pages of record in this appeal, which is aimed solely at overturning a $10,000 discovery sanctions award. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing this award, and affirm.

Christopher Michael Brewer appeals a judgment following conviction of second degree murder (count 1) and felony dissuading a witness by force or threat (count 2), with findings that he personally used a deadly weapon (knife), committed the criminal offenses to benefit a criminal street gang, and served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 136.1, subd. (c)(1), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).)
Brewer contends in part that the prosecution street gang expert witness improperly testified regarding testimonial hearsay. In a nonpublished opinion, we rejected this contention, among others. (People v. Brewer (Nov. 5, 2015, B257185).) On February 3, 2016, our Supreme Court granted Brewer’s petition for review, but deferred consideration pending its decision in People v. Sanchez, review granted May 14, 2014, No. S216681.

Defendant Michael Lee Weible was convicted in 2003 of first degree burglary and other offenses, and sentenced to 13 years in state prison. In 2005, his conviction was reversed and, in 2006, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years in state prison. In 2008, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation notified the trial court of an error in the sentence. The trial court held a hearing in response to this notification and resentenced defendant to seven years eight months. On November 4, 2016, defendant having been released after serving this sentence, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in superior court challenging the proceedings at the 2008 hearing in response to the department’s notification. He claimed his attorney improperly waived his personal appearance at the 2008 hearing and that because the sentence initially imposed based on his plea agreement was illegal, his plea should have been set aside, and that he did not waive his right to a trial

Defendant Michael Lafkas was convicted by a jury of committing multiple sexual offenses against several minor girls. He appeals his two convictions under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) and his one conviction under section 288, subdivision (c)(1) for committing lewd acts on his minor stepdaughter, Jane Doe (Jane). He argues these convictions resulted from incorrect and cumulatively prejudicial evidentiary rulings and that one of them was not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends the trial court erred by declining to suspend the criminal proceedings to hold a competency hearing. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Thomas Devous pleaded guilty to one count of possession of metal knuckles and admitted he had one strike prior and one prison prior. Devous was sentenced to seven years in prison. Devous argues his conviction and sentence must be reversed because the trial court’s failure to order a competency evaluation at the time of sentencing was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. We reject this contention. Devous further argues that the trial court misconstrued the plea agreement in sentencing him to seven years. We agree with Devous on this point and will vacate his sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

In three separate cases that were eventually consolidated for trial, Ramanjit Singh Hundal was charged with and convicted of two counts of murder, attempted murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, shooting from a vehicle at a person, assault with a semiautomatic firearm and street terrorism. Various street gang and firearm enhancements were found true. The trial court sentenced Hundal to a total prison term of 39 years, plus 90 years to life consecutive, plus two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
On appeal, Hundal contends there is insufficient evidence to prove he knew and shared the shooter’s intent in one of the murders. He also contends the trial court erred when it failed to give CALCRIM No. 225; when it imposed and stayed, rather than struck, gang enhancements associated with various counts; and when it found true more than one multiple-murder special circumstance.

M.G. was removed from her mother but placed with her father shortly after she was born with a positive toxicology screen for drugs. Approximately three months after placement with her father and his wife, a supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387) was filed and the minor was removed from father’s custody due to his mental health problems and failure to cooperate with San Bernardino County’s Children and Family Services (CFS), respecting the family maintenance plan. Father was given reunification services but those services were terminated at the six-month status review hearing, and father’s parental rights were subsequently terminated. Father appealed.
On appeal, father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child based on the absence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B(i). We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Leticia Catlina Mendez pled guilty to one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (§ 1170.18.) Defendant filed a petition for resentencing, pursuant to section 1170.18. A trial court found her ineligible for relief and denied the petition. Defendant now appeals. We affirm.

By opinion dated April 27, 2016, we affirmed the judgment. We held that defendant’s offenses of entering the office of a temporary employment agency on three separate occasions, on three separate dates, while identifying himself as the victim, and requesting the victim’s paychecks in the amounts of $231.83, $178.86, and $128, respectively, did not qualify for reduction from second degree burglary to misdemeanor shoplifting because the office of a temporary employment agency did not qualify as a “commercial establishment” within the meaning of section 459.5. The California Supreme Court, by order filed on June 28, 2017, transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of the decision in People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858 (Gonzales). We have now done so. The order is reversed.

H.J. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends the juvenile court erred when it found that active efforts had been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts had proved unsuccessful. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); § 361.7, subd. (a).) H.J. also contends the court's finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to him is not supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition.