CA Unpub Decisions

In this malicious prosecution action, plaintiff and appellant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Jaguar) appeals orders granting special motions to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) brought by defendant and respondent Vagram Bagdasaryan (Bagdasaryan) and his attorneys, defendants and respondents Lucy Kasparian (Kasparian) and California Lemon Law Center, Inc. (Center), and awarding Kasparian and Center their attorney fees.
Kasparian and Center cross-appeal insofar as the trial court awarded them attorney fees and costs in the sum of $4,027.50, which they contend is inadequate.

Defendant sexually assaulted 14-year-old N.G. During the trial, the court admitted evidence of prior acts of sexual abuse pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. Defendant contends the trial court violated his due process rights by instructing the jury under CALCRIM former No. 1191 (hereafter CALCRIM No. 1191) that it could use the uncharged prior sex crimes, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, to show criminal propensity in establishing guilt of the charged sex crime. Rather, he argues the uncharged sex crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt because they are a link in the direct chain of proof of defendant’s guilt. Having considered defendant’s contention, we affirm because the instruction did not dilute the prosecution’s burden of proof with respect to the charged sex crime.

Defendant Jorge Martinez Valencia (defendant) appeals from a final judgment after his no-contest plea to transporting methamphetamine for sale and resisting an officer. He challenges two of the conditions imposed by the trial court in its order of formal probation, arguing that they are invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. The first challenged condition requires defendant to receive prior written approval from his probation officer before leaving the state (travel condition); the second requires him to “take all medication as prescribed” (medication condition). We conclude that the travel condition is valid under Lent and within constitutional bounds, but the medication condition is not. Therefore, we will strike the medication condition and otherwise affirm the judgment and probation order.

In this appeal, counsel for defendant has filed a declaration stating she has reviewed the record in this case and decided to file a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. She has written defendant and advised him of this conclusion. Counsel advised defendant he may file a supplemental brief with this court raising any issues Gipson believes should be presented. More than 30 days have passed and no supplemental brief has been received.
However, as an appellate court, we elect not to consider this as a Wende appeal. Instead, we find the particular issues presented here allow us to conclude the matter is improperly before us and we therefore dismiss the pending appeal.

Dylan Blaine Streeter (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant contends the court erred in (1) failing to reassign the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence to another judge and (2) denying his motion to suppress. We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.

Andy’s BP, Inc., Dixon Gas Club, LLC, and R.A.T. Oil, Inc., appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the court sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrers to their complaint for relief under the Unfair Practices Act (UPA; Bus. & Prof. Code § 17045 et seq.). Appellants had alleged that a program between respondents Safeway, Inc. (Safeway) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), by which certain Safeway customers could obtain gas at Chevron stations at a reduced price, constituted an agreement for secret rebates in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17045 (section 17045). The court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed to allege actionable price discrimination. Appellants contend the court erred because section 17045 is not limited to price discrimination for vertical competitors. We will affirm the judgment.

A series of disputes among family members and related family entities resulted in two judgments, one in favor of Robert Lalanne against Lalanne LLC (a real property investment venture; hereafter LLC) and a second judgment against Lalanne in favor of Lalanne Ranch Partnership (the Ranch Partnership). Both judgments were assigned. Lalanne assigned the first judgment to his attorney, appellant Christopher Andreas, in partial satisfaction of an attorney fee lien arising from the litigation. The Ranch Partnership assigned the second judgment to LLC. LLC obtained an order from the superior court allowing offset of the second judgment against the first, thereby relieving it of any further liability under the first judgment. Andreas challenges the order granting the offset and we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Gualberto Figueroa of three charges for the unlawful possession of three firearms and found a Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancement true for each charge. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the firearm convictions. It also imposed and stayed multiple one-year sentence enhancements for prior prison terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court declined to dismiss a felony strike for an additional five-year enhancement.
On appeal, Figueroa contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancements; (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the consecutive sentences for the firearm convictions; (3) the court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss his prior strike; and (4) the court erred by staying rather than striking the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.

A jury tried and convicted Daniel Hernandez of two counts of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 and one count of oral copulation with a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subds. (a), (b)). The trial court sentenced Hernandez to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in state prison. Hernandez appeals, arguing (1) his admissions to police were involuntary and should have been suppressed; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the victim with a prior inconsistent statement; (3) the trial court committed Marsden error; (4) in camera proceedings and records relating to pretrial discovery should be reviewed; and (5) cumulative error. We affirm.

As a condition of parole, Ronald Rivers was required to participate in psychotherapy. His therapist and her supervisor notified his parole officer that Rivers might be suicidal. Rivers then sued the therapist, her supervisor, two additional therapists and their employer Sharper Future, a division of Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc. (Sharper Future) for, in essence, defamation, breach of contract, and professional malpractice. Demurrers were sustained without leave to amend as to the defamation and breach of contract claims, and the court granted summary judgment on Rivers’s cause of action for malpractice.

Zion Joshua Crawford was charged with, and convicted of, six counts of attempted delivery of harmful matter to a minor (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288.2, subd. (b) ) and one count of attempted luring to commit lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor (§§ 664, 288.3, subd. (a).) On appeal, he challenges the conviction on the luring count, contending there was insufficient evidence to convict him of that offense, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact regarding the victim’s age, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request that instruction. We find no merit in these contentions and therefore affirm.

Appellant Anthony McCune appeals from his convictions after a jury trial on three charges arising from a domestic violence incident. McCune claims that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to prosecutorial error during the trial and (2) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by sentencing him to consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment, but correct McCune’s sentence as to counts 2 and 4.

In 2012 the City of Alameda Health Care District, doing business as Alameda Hospital (Alameda), acquired a 120-bed skilled nursing facility (the Facility or the Waters Edge Facility) from The Waters Edge, Inc. (Waters Edge). The completion date of the transaction, marking the transfer of operation of the Facility, is governed by a contractually defined term—“Closing Date”—the meaning of which is at the heart of this appeal. As defined in the acquisition documents, the Closing Date was not a date certain, but was to be triggered by the fulfillment of certain conditions, including, most importantly here, Alameda’s receipt of a regulatory approval known as “Distinct Part” certification (DP certification), which was necessary for it to charge Medi-Cal reimbursable rates.

Defendants Calvin Deprese Packard, Corderick Dewayne Gage, and Clifton DeWayne Thomas, Jr., were convicted, inter alia, of three counts of robbery of people inside the American Green Farmers marijuana dispensary and two counts of assault with a firearm. Packard, who was the getaway driver, contends the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury to appraise a codefendant’s alibi defense with caution. Packard argues there was insufficient evidence he delayed an officer prior to his arrest. Gage contends the judge demonstrated bias against his counsel during voir dire, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain admissible phone records used as part of his alibi defense. Defendants argue there was not substantial evidence Shanta Jones was robbed because she was not near the stolen property and had no control over it.