CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Mario Montoya Zarate was sentenced to serve seven years four months in state prison after he pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The aggregate sentence consisted of a six-year term that had been previously imposed but suspended in a case in which defendant had been placed on probation, plus a consecutive term of 16 months associated with the felon-in-possession conviction.
On appeal, defendant contends the court violated his plea agreement, which he claims specified that his maximum punishment would be six years. The Attorney General argues that the six-year maximum sentence applied only to the more recent case involving the felon-in-possession conviction and that the agreement contemplated defendant receiving a separate and additional sentence for violating his probation in the earlier case. We agree with the Attorney General and shall affirm.

This appeal is part of a dispute among neighbors about the location and maintenance of an easement that serves their residences. Appellant Daniel Sohn contends a civil harassment restraining order issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 in favor of a neighboring couple was based on factual and legal error constituting an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

Pacer Cartage, Inc. (Pacer) is an intermodal logistics provider, meaning that it facilitates the movement of goods using various modes of transportation. Mario Miranda, Jesus Prieto, Jose Javier Perez, Jr., Carlos Pena Peraza, Manuel Sanchez Santiago, Alejandro Rivera, and Mauricio Vitela (together, Plaintiffs) were truck drivers for Pacer. Plaintiffs filed claims with the California Labor Commissioner, alleging Pacer misclassified them as independent contractors. They requested reimbursement for their business expenses under Labor Code section 2802. After the Labor Commissioner found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded them more than $2,000,000, Pacer appealed to the superior court. The superior court held a trial and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding they were independent contractors and were entitled to reimbursement.

Michael Miller (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of mandate. Through the writ of mandate, appellant sought to set aside the Los Angeles Community College District’s (LACCD) termination of his employment. Appellant argues that the termination is invalid because LACCD failed to comply with certain statutory requirements. Further, he argues that the termination lacks evidentiary support. If the termination is not reversed, appellant contends that he is entitled to backpay for the interim period between the issuance of a prior writ of mandamus by the superior court and issuance of an amended decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
We find no error and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant and appellant Keith F. Simpson (Simpson), an attorney, appeals an order overruling his demurrer to a second amended complaint filed by plaintiff and respondent Dalsukhbhai Patel (Patel). The basis of the demurrer was that Patel’s causes of action against Simpson for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty were subject to the prefiling requirement of Civil Code section 1714.10 [attorney-client civil conspiracy claim] and that Patel’s failure to seek a prefiling order required dismissal.
We conclude section 1714.10, by its terms, is inapplicable to Patel’s claims against Simpson because Patel’s claims did not arise from an “attempt [by Simpson] to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.” (§ 1714.10, subd. (a); Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327, 331–333 (Stueve).) Therefore, the order overruling Simpson’s demurrer is affirmed.

L.M. (mother) and Hector F. (father) challenge the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their infant son, Daniel M. On appeal, mother and father contend that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s findings that mother’s mental and emotional problems, including depression and visual and auditory hallucinations, and father’s criminal conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a child, which was distant in time, placed Daniel at risk of physical harm and sexual abuse. We find that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and thus we affirm.

Jose Alberto Hurtado appeals a judgment following his conviction of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)) (counts 2 and 3), and attempted shooting at an occupied vehicle (§§ 664, 246) (count 4). On counts 1 through 3, the jury found Hurtado personally used a firearm. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b) (count 1), 12022.5, subd. (a) (counts 2 and 3).) The trial court sentenced Hurtado to an aggregate prison term of 23 years 8 months.
We conclude, among other things, that 1) the trial court did not err by admitting motive evidence involving a prior criminal investigation of Hurtado’s brother, but 2) the court erred in sentencing by not staying count 4 under section 654. We order the abstract of judgment to be corrected for count 4. In all other respects, we affirm.

In the case of Elsa Doe, the jury found Mohr not guilty of forcible rape and guilty of the lesser included offense of battery. (§ 242.) The jury also found the special allegation of multiple victims of rape (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)) to be not true.
The trial court sentenced Mohr to the low term of seven years on the count of sexual penetration of a child over 14 years old with a foreign object, a concurrent two years on the count of rape, and a stayed term of 180 days on the count of battery. We affirm.

Defendant Brett Raymond Cooper appeals from the trial court’s order that he serve a prison term totaling nine years and eight months upon his convictions for shooting at an inhabited dwelling and for first-degree robbery with the personal use of a firearm after he pled guilty to these crimes as part of a negotiated disposition of his case.
Defendant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief that does not raise any legal issues. He requests this court independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). He also declares that he informed defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. Defendant has not done so. Upon our independent review of the record pursuant to Wende, we conclude there are no arguable appellate issues for our consideration and affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Jose Eleazar Cruz appeals, following a jury trial, from a conviction of one count of oral copulation of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), three counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)) and one count of lewd acts upon a child (id., subd. (a)), with added findings that counts 2 through 4 included substantial sexual conduct with a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, §§ 288, 288.5) and that counts 2 through 5 were committed against multiple victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)). He raises two issues on appeal. The first is that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim’s mother, who testified at the trial, was, herself, a victim of molestation. The second is that the clerk’s minutes of the sentencing hearing contain an error that requires correction, an assertion with which the Attorney General does not disagree.

Appellant Richard D. appeals after he admitted an allegation in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) that he had committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under age 14, and the juvenile court adjudged him a ward and placed him on probation. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Estella Villacorta sued for partition by sale of real property she owned jointly with Eugenie Villacorta. The court appointed a referee, Kevin Singer, to oversee the sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds. When those tasks were completed, Singer filed a motion seeking court approval of his fees and costs. The trial court approved the request in part, but refused to award any fees and costs relating to Singer’s retention of an unlicensed contractor to perform repairs on the property.
Estella appeals from the order approving Singer’s fees and costs, arguing (1) the trial court abused its discretion in making the award; (2) the court erred by requiring defendant Dulce Villacorta to pay a portion of Singer’s fees; and (3) Singer committed perjury and fraud in the course of performing his duties as referee.

A jury convicted Forrest Ray Barker of domestic battery with corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 237, subd. (a)), and attempted criminal threat (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 422, subd. (a)). The court imposed a three-year sentence.
Barker and the Attorney General agree the court misdirected the jury on the elements of attempted criminal threat. Even so we affirm the judgment because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A jury convicted Tyler Ray Bremner of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d); count 2). The jury did not find true that Bremner personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under Penal Code section 12022.7. subd. (a) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) as to counts 1 and 2. Bremner admitted he served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
The court sentenced Bremner to prison for four years.