CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered after two unsuccessful motions in the trial court: (1) a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and (2) a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Penal Code section 1018. The trial court did not err in its rulings and we affirm the judgment.

On September 6, 2013, Keon Demone Hunt entered a plea of no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and admitted a great bodily injury enhancement allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Hunt was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of five years consisting of the lower two-year term for aggravated assault plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.
The information alleged a Texas robbery conviction as a prior strike conviction under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and as a prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court did not enhance Hunt’s sentence on the basis of that conviction.

Appellants Nadia A. (Mother) and William S. (Father), parents of Ava and Hank S., appeal the juvenile court’s order limiting their educational rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. Appellants contend the court deprived them of their due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to issuing the order. We agree and reverse.

Jamie Contreras (defendant) was convicted by a jury of one count of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years in prison to be served in county jail.
Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending the trial court erred when it failed to revoke his self-representation and appoint counsel and also erred in imposing a felony sentence for his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction in the absence of evidence that the value of the vehicle exceeded $950, as required by Proposition 47. We conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting defendant’s continued self-representation and did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the trial in defendant’s voluntary absence. Further, Proposition 47 does not apply to Vehicle Code section 10851 and defendant’s felony sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Appellant Aaron G. Filler (Filler) appeals from an order granting respondents the City of Santa Monica (City), Margaret Griffin (Griffin), as an individual and in her official capacity as an Architectural Review Board member/commissioner, and John Enright’s (Enright) (collectively, Respondents) special motions to strike the first (inverse condemnation), second (qui tam action for enforcement of Santa Monica Municipal Code, part 9.04.14.110(c)), fourth (unjust enrichment), fifth (denial of equal protection), and sixth (intrinsic fraud on the court) causes of action contained in the first amended complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, hereinafter, the anti-SLAPP statute. Filler also appeals from the judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer filed by the City and Griffin, in her official capacity, to the seventh cause of action (void for vagueness challenge to land use regulation).

Defendants and appellants, Alonzo Harris and Floyd Nelson, appeal their convictions for charges arising out of a series of robberies, attempted robberies and associated crimes. The prosecution’s theory was that defendant Harris committed robberies from October to December 2007 with Glenn Boldware until Boldware was shot and killed by Los Angeles police officers on January 4, 2008. Thereafter, Harris carried out a few robberies by himself (and once with an unidentified accomplice), before being joined by defendant Nelson for the last robbery attempt on July 11, 2008, a crime which immediately led to their arrest.

Joseph Mathis (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ) and the trial court placed him on probation for three years. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

The predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff DIII Properties, LLC (collectively, DIII) granted an easement over its land to the predecessor-in-interest of defendant EDF Renewable Energy (collectively, EDF) for the purpose of allowing EDF to operate a wind farm to generate electricity. A dispute arose over the scope of the easement and whether it allowed the use of underground lines placed by EDF across a corner of DIII’s property to transmit electricity generated by wind turbines on neighboring pieces of property. DIII brought this action for declaratory relief, quiet title and trespass. The trial court concluded the written easement, as clarified by a subsequent letter agreement, did allow the placement of the line and its use to transmit off-site electricity. It accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of EDF on DIII’s claims. We affirm.

Hotel Astoria, Inc. appeals the award of attorney fees to the owners of a commercial building in San Francisco, following the owners’ successful unlawful detainer action. Finding the award of attorney fees was proper, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS
The facts are undisputed. The property is a commercial building located at the corner of Bush and Grant Streets in San Francisco. Bush-Grant, LLC and Arturo F. Tudury and Lisa A. Cordray, as trustees of the Tudury Keesing Properties Trust dated December 10, 2009 (collectively Landlord) own and lease the property to multiple businesses.

This appeal involves a dispute between two attorneys over the amount of fees to which each is entitled for services rendered in the probate of decedent Rilla Mary Webb’s estate. Objector Eugene Schneider asserts the probate court erred in failing to set an evidentiary hearing before apportioning the statutory attorney fees. He also challenges the court’s certified settled statement of the unreported hearing on his objections to the petition for final distribution. We affirm.

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant William Lloyd Nelson of attempted murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of duty. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to hold a hearing in accordance with People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) on his motion for substitution of appointed counsel, and failure to rule on his de facto motion for new trial. Defendant also seeks in camera review by this court of the record lodged with the trial court in connection with a motion he made under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) to compel the prosecution to produce certain internal police records relating to complaints against the deputy sheriff who was the victim of his crime. We affirm.

After defendant Tomas Venegas Jr. admitted to violating his probation in San Benito County superior court case No. CR-11-01912, the trial court imposed the original sentence of 14 years in prison, execution of which had been suspended pending his successful completion of probation.
We appointed counsel to represent Venegas in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts, but raises no specific issues. We notified Venegas of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed, and we have received no written argument from Venegas.

T.P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring her minor child, B.P. (son), a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage).

An information, filed on January 30, 2015, charged defendant Corey Allen Demers with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). The information alleged a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On March 8, 2016, defendant requested appointment of substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The following day, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s Marsden motion, and it denied the motion. On April 13, 2016, defendant filed another Marsden motion seeking appointment of substitute counsel. The trial court held a hearing on that Marsden motion on April 21, 2016, and it denied the motion at the end of the hearing.