CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Eva Castillo and her daughter Claudia are co-owners of a piece of property in Imperial County. Plaintiff's counsel initially filed an action with respect to that property on behalf of Claudia. Defendants successfully demurred to the complaint on grounds that any claim possessed by Claudia was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which runs from the date of the denial of a governmental claim.

Plaintiff Gerald Carroll defaulted on a $1.9 million loan and sued various institutions for declaratory relief, negligence, quiet title, slander of title, unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), and cancellation of instruments. He appeals from the judgment entered following the sustaining of defendants’ demurrer to his second amended complaint for negligence and unfair business practices without leave to amend. His argument on appeal, however, is limited to the trial court’s ruling sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to the cause of action for declaratory relief alleged in the first amended complaint (FAC). Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an order striking a cross-complaint pursuant to California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).
Defendant and cross-complainant Frank Canko is the majority shareholder of Jegerman, Inc. Plaintiff and cross-defendant Chantel King is the company’s sole minority shareholder. King filed a shareholder derivative action against Canko on behalf of nominal defendant Jegerman, alleging Canko breached his fiduciary duty by seeking repayment of loans he made to the company. In response, Canko filed a cross-complaint, alleging King fraudulently induced him to make the loans to Jegerman. King moved to strike the cross-complaint as a SLAPP arising from protected activity—namely, the filing of her derivative action. The trial court granted the motion to strike.

Defendants and cross-complainants Darla and Gina Vincent (appellants) appeal from a judgment following a bench trial. Plaintiff Steven Velkei (respondent) filed a complaint against defendants for declaratory relief. Appellants filed a cross-complaint for quiet title. All parties sought an interpretation of a 1958 grant deed as it applied to an easement across plaintiff’s property. Appellants asserted the easement was exclusive for their use, which respondent disputed. Following trial, including testimony by the parties’ expert witnesses, the court found in favor of respondent.
Among other contentions, appellants assert the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 1958 grant deed. We affirm.

The Vallejo Police Officers Association (VPOA) petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate alleging that the City of Vallejo (City) engaged in bad-faith bargaining in violation of state law and then unilaterally imposed contract terms that impaired VPOA members’ vested rights to retiree medical benefits that covered insurance premiums up to the full cost of a Kaiser health plan. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that VPOA had not shown its members had a vested right to the full Kaiser premium and that the City had not bargained in bad faith; the court therefore declined to order the City to start new contract negotiations or to reinstate retirement medical benefits at the level previously provided to VPOA members. We will affirm.

Defendant Robert Eugene Williams, an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison, grabbed a correctional officer’s testicles while being escorted to an inmate classification hearing. He was convicted by jury of battery by a prisoner on a non-confined person (Pen. Code, § 4501.5) and resisting an executive officer by use of force or violence (§ 69). Following a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a strike offense within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced him to serve a term of six years in state prison.

A jury found defendant Shaquille Jerrell Williams guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and found true the gang enhancement allegations under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 13 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to establish the “criminal street gang” element of the gang enhancement. Defendant further contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury in accordance with the principles set forth in People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59 (Prunty). We affirm.

Defendant Bub Tahchahlah Bamford pleaded no contest to felony driving under the influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5) with a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) in case No. 13F2842, felony failure to appear (FTA) (§ 1320), subd. (b)) with an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) in case No. 13F2661, and 12 felony FTA counts in case No. 14F3951. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. When probation was later revoked, the trial court sentenced defendant to a six-year eight-month state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends the on-bail enhancement should have been stricken because the underlying felony was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. He also contends that those felony FTA offenses based on felonies that were subsequently reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to section 1170.18, should have been reduced to misdemeanors as well. We shall affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anderson Lavarn Swift asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) However, because defendant has not appealed from an appealable order, we will dismiss the appeal.
On August 7, 2015, in exchange for a stipulated term and the prosecution’s agreement not to seek the death penalty, defendant pleaded guilty to and admitted to numerous counts and enhancements, including murder with special circumstances. The trial court imposed an aggregate term that included life without the possibility of parole.
The court also ordered $21,198.14 in restitution, consisting of $4,196 to the victim’s compensation program, and $8,150.64, $5,851.50, and $3,000 to individual victims. Defendant did not appeal from that sentence.

We granted Frederick J. Struck’s petition to transfer his appeal of a judgment finding him guilty of two traffic infractions from the appellate division of the Contra Costa Superior Court to our court in order to consider his claim that the trial court denied him his right to be present at his trial for these infraction charges. We agree with Struck that the court erred in proceeding with his trial in his absence because it did nothing to ascertain whether he voluntarily and knowingly absented himself from trial. However, Struck has not shown that the trial court’s error was prejudicial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant James Edward Strawn guilty of inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), torture (§ 206), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the corporal injury offense. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of life in prison on the torture offense, plus a consecutive determinate term of eight months on the firearm offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of eight years on the corporal injury offense and stayed sentence under section 654.
On appeal, defendant contends his torture conviction must be reversed because the conviction is not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant further contends the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 35

A jury convicted Ryan Craig Stevens of attempted rape (Pen. Code, §§ 664/261, subd. (a)(2) ; count 1) and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 2). The trial court found true prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison for attempted rape and added a consecutive 7-year term on the prior conviction allegations.
Stevens argues the attempted rape conviction should be reversed because there is insufficient evidence of specific intent to rape the victim. We affirm.

Michael John Soto appeals from a March 7, 2017 postjudgment order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In 1999, appellant pled guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and admitted that he was a principal armed with, and used, a firearm which resulted in causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) - (d)). The record reflects that appellant and a gang cohort went on a three-hour crime spree that spanned four cities. Appellant yelled gang slogans at a man and shot him in the chest with a sawed off rifle. The trial court sentenced appellant to 30 years to life state prison and ordered appellant to pay victim restitution and various fines, fees, and assessments.

In 2003, a jury convicted defendant Kenyun Robinson of the 1992 murder of Matilda Martinez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that the murder was committed while he was engaged in a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder plus four years for the firearm use. Defendant appealed, arguing error in the admission of his statements to police. We affirmed the judgment of conviction. (B264801.)