CA Unpub Decisions

Nicholas W. (father) filed a Family Code section 7822 petition seeking to have his daughter, Serenity W., declared abandoned by her mother, L.S. (mother). The family court granted the petition. Mother appeals, contending substantial evidence does not support the family court’s finding that she abandoned Serenity. We affirm.

In this appeal, the paternal grandmother of R.B. contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her petition, brought pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 388 (all further statutory references are to this code) without a hearing. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Ara Hunanyan appeals from the trial court’s order directing the sale of a rental property to finance the parties’ litigation in this family law proceeding. The parties do not dispute the sale of an asset is needed to finance their litigation, but disagree which asset should be sold. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing a property. We affirm the order.

Adrian C., a noncustodial father, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders denying him custody of his seven- and 10-year old daughters, Mariah C. and Angelica C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, and requiring him to complete a domestic violence evaluation and recommended treatment as part of his case plan. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s detriment finding and the juvenile court erred when it required him to complete a domestic violence evaluation and recommended treatment as part of his case plan. We affirm.

Angel O., born in March 2003, is the child of Guadalupe B. (mother) and Lauro O. (father). In September 2016, the juvenile court declared Angel a dependent child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered him removed from mother and placed with father. Mother has appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.
As we now discuss, although there is evidence that mother uses methamphetamines, there is no substantial evidence that Angel “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” as result of mother’s drug use. (§ 300, subd. (b).) We therefore reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.

Plaintiff and appellant Defenstech International, Inc. appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Edward Robert Fyfe (Fyfe), Hexcel-Fyfe Co, LLC, Fibrwrap Construction, L.P., Fibrwrap Construction, Inc., Fyfe Group, LLC, and Fyfe Beta, Inc. (collectively defendants). Plaintiff contends the court committed structural error by prohibiting it from presenting certain evidence and unduly delaying issuance of the judgment. Plaintiff also argues the judge was so unfair as to deprive it of a fair trial.

Jerry Pano Concha brought this action against Robin Resovich for custodial interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court entered default against Resovich after denying her motion to quash service of summons. Following a default prove-up hearing, the trial court determined that Concha was not entitled to damages and entered judgment for Resovich. On appeal, Concha argues that he established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence at the prove-up hearing to support an award of damages. The record does not support Concha because he did not carry his burden to affirmatively show error. Moreover, because his complaint did not specify the amount of damages, it could not support a default judgment in any amount. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a); Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 327 (Stein).) We therefore affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied defendant Juan Jose Ruiz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Before pleading guilty, defendant was aware that the prosecution was relying, in part, on testimony from informants who were placed in defendant’s jail cell, and to whom defendant had made incriminating statements. Defendant was provided recordings and transcripts of his conversations with the informants, and with information about the crimes of moral turpitude committed by them. Defendant was also made aware at the preliminary hearing that these informants were working on behalf of the police.
At the time he pled guilty, however, defendant was not aware that the informants were former members of the Mexican Mafia, who had been provided cash and other benefits in exchange for acting as informants, and that his constitutional rights may have been violated. (People v. Dekraai (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1110.)

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In January 2013, Ziad Goria was charged with criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422); vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a), (b)(1)) and burglary (§ 459). In October 2013, Goria was found not competent to stand trial and was committed to Patton State Hospital. Criminal proceedings were suspended. In June 2016, the court found Goria's competency had been restored.

In this case, Gregory Damon Dennis seeks to challenge his guilty plea based on his claim that some of the victim's medical records might have been withheld, and that those records might be exculpatory within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). Dennis did not bring a motion to withdraw his plea and there is no evidence in this record that any medical records were withheld from Dennis. In essence he contends that we should set aside his guilty plea and remand the case to the trial court so he can find out if any records have been withheld and what the nature of those records might be.

A jury convicted defendant Donald Darnell of carrying a loaded, concealed and unregistered firearm. The trial court sentenced him to probation for three years.
Defendant now contends (1) his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted, (2) the trial court should have dismissed all charges as a sanction for police destruction of potentially exonerating evidence, and (3) in the alternative, defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Mark Anthony Collins appeals from a judgment of conviction of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215) and second degree robbery (§§ 211-212.5, subd. (c)) following a jury trial. As to each crime, the jury found true the associated allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 13 years.
On the second day of jury selection, defendant successfully sought to replace his appointed counsel with retained counsel. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his new counsel a continuance to prepare for trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove the specific intent element of robbery, and (3) his newly retained counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

In People v. Carrasco (June 18, 2014, G047903) [nonpub. opn.] (Carrasco I), a panel of this court reversed in part a judgment against Juan Manuel Carrasco and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court resentenced Carrasco, who was not present at the resentencing hearing, to a term of 29 years in prison. The Attorney General acknowledges the trial court erred by resentencing Carrasco in his absence. The issue presented is whether Carrasco suffered prejudice from his absence at the resentencing hearing. We conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Carrasco suffered no prejudice, and therefore affirm.

Defendant and appellant Dannie Michael Bradshaw repeatedly threatened a mixed-race family that lived across the street from him. One morning, he tried to run the wife off of the road, then he threatened to kill the husband. Defendant’s threats were witnessed by a neighbor, as well as defendant’s daughter. While out on bail for making criminal threats, defendant threatened and dissuaded his daughter from testifying.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; counts 1 & 2) and one count of dissuading a witness from attending and giving testimony at trial (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he committed count 3 while he was released from custody on counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.1). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of six years. However, his sentence was suspended and he was placed on formal probation for a period of 60 months on various terms and conditions.