CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court granted Yauntanell K. Whatley’s petition to renew a domestic violence protective order against Melvin Van Whitticker Johnson, Jr. Johnson appeals this order. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

As the trial court noted, “[T]his action arises from a home improvement contract of under $4,000.” The contract involved the installation of two sliding glass doors at appellant George M. Plyley’s residence. The installer was respondent Renovating Specialist, Inc. (RSI). RSI’s salesperson was respondent Jay Steven Nudelman. The new doors worked properly and passed inspection, but appellant claimed they did not meet the contract’s specifications and building code requirements. Making a mountain out of a molehill, appellant filed a 42-page complaint consisting of 10 causes of action.
After a six-day court trial, judgment was entered in respondents’ favor on all 10 causes of action. The judgment awarded respondents their costs of $1,223 and awarded RSI its reasonable attorney fees of $95,531.68.
Appellant appeals from the judgment. We affirm.

This litigation arises out of a contractual dispute between plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent Scott Duncombe (Duncombe) and defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Barfresh Food Group, Inc. (Barfresh). Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Duncombe and cross-defendant and respondent Givemejust10 PTY Ltd. (G10) (collectively, Duncombe and G10 are referred to as respondents). Duncombe was thereafter awarded attorney fees, and both respondents were awarded costs. Barfresh appeals, arguing: (1) The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute; (2) The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Duncombe attorney fees; and (3) The trial court erred in awarding respondents their costs.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Nicholas Anthony Munoz of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and two counts of premeditated attempted murder, with gang and firearm enhancements. Munoz appealed, contending: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the attempted murders were willful, premeditated, and deliberate; (2) the trial court committed instructional error regarding the premeditation allegation; and (3) the matter had to be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements pursuant to then-recent amendments to Penal Code section 12022.53. This court affirmed the judgment in 2018, but vacated Munoz’s sentence and remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements. The California Supreme Court granted review and, after passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), transferred the matter back to us

Thomas Allman filed a petition seeking civil harassment restraining orders against Adam Aldrich, and then dismissed the petition while Aldrich’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike was pending. Aldrich sought fees under the anti-SLAPP statute and other relief, all of which the trial court denied. Aldrich now appeals from the denial orders, and we shall affirm.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant Eamon Farakesh pleaded no contest to a single felony count of taking or unauthorized use of a vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). As provided for in the plea agreement, the trial court granted Farakesh three years of probation.
On appeal, Farakesh raises two issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by finding a factual basis for his no contest plea based on defense counsel’s stipulation; and (2) this court should remand the matter to the trial court to reduce his probationary term under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019 2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950). The Attorney General maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a factual basis. He concedes that remand is appropriate so that Farakesh may be resentenced.
We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a factual basis.

L.R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting custody of A.T. or further reunification services. She also appeals from the court’s judgment terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 366.26 (.26). We find no error and affirm the court’s orders.

Petitioner Ashley K. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued on March 15, 2022, at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing for July 6, 2022, as to her now four-year-old son, Matthew S. Mother challenges the court’s decision to terminate her reunification services for Matthew when at the same hearing it continued services for her in the case of his sibling, Macy. She seeks an order returning Matthew to her custody. We deny the petition.

Defendant Arthur Delacruz seeks remand for resentencing pursuant to recently enacted legislation, specifically Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 441) (Assembly Bill No. 518). The People agree the matter must be remanded for resentencing. We agree with the parties, vacate the sentence, and remand the matter for resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

Appellant Heliodoro Silva, an inmate serving two consecutive life terms, filed this civil suit for damages against the City of Merced in connection with his prior criminal case. The civil complaint alleged (1) the prosecutor and investigating detective involved in his prior criminal case, along with a judge who denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his criminal convictions, wrongfully conspired to secure and uphold his convictions, and (2) the investigating detective discriminated against him by punching him in the stomach to obtain a false confession. The trial court sustained the City of Merced’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

An inmate filed a civil suit for damages against a superior court judge who presided over habeas proceedings in which the inmate challenged his underlying criminal convictions. The trial court sustained the judge’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

In 1981, a jury convicted petitioner Cedric Lynn Struggs with the first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); first count) of Alfred Joe Dishman. For this offense, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 25 years to life with an additional one-year term for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)). (People v. Struggs (Jan. 24, 1983, 15006) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to section 1170.95. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on the ground petitioner was a major participant in the offense who acted with reckless indifference to human life, a disqualifying factor pursuant to section 1170.95.
On appeal, petitioner contends the trial court erred in applying a “sufficiency of the evidence” standard at the section 1170.95, subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing. The People concede error. We accept the People’s concession and reverse.

Plaintiff Best Energy Solutions & Technology Corp. (Best Energy) filed a complaint against the State Air Resources Board (ARB) seeking a declaratory judgment stating it had complied with California’s alternative diesel fuel regulation in obtaining certification of a biodiesel additive called BC-EC1c. ARB responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. ARB contends the declaratory relief action arose from protected activity and Best Energy failed to establish a reasonable probability it would prevail on its claim.
The trial court denied the motion. Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the trial court and conclude Best Energy’s declaratory relief action did not arise from activity “in furtherance of [ARB’s] right of petition or free speech.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
We therefore affirm the order.

Plaintiff Best Energy Solutions & Technology Corp. (Best Energy) filed a complaint against the State Air Resources Board (ARB) seeking a declaratory judgment stating it had complied with California’s alternative diesel fuel regulation in obtaining certification of a biodiesel additive called BC-EC1c. ARB responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. ARB contends the declaratory relief action arose from protected activity and Best Energy failed to establish a reasonable probability it would prevail on its claim.
The trial court denied the motion. Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the trial court and conclude Best Energy’s declaratory relief action did not arise from activity “in furtherance of [ARB’s] right of petition or free speech.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
We therefore affirm the order.