CA Unpub Decisions

While serving an 11-year sentence, defendant Pharaoh Haywood submitted a filing captioned, “Ex-Parte Motion For Amended Abstract of Judgment To Include Conduct Credits Pursuant To California Penal Code section 2900.5 and 4019.” In it, he requested an additional 366 days of custody credit (183 actual, 183 conduct). /
Defendant reasoned that he had been arrested on January 1, 2011, and posted bail a week later on January 8. He was rearrested a year later, on February 10, 2012, and remained in custody until he was sentenced on August 31, 2012. In total he had served 204 days in custody. Subtracting the 42 days of credit already awarded (21 actual, 21 conduct), he concluded he was entitled to the balance of 366 days of credits (183 actual, 183 conduct).

After a jury convicted Winston Haylock on two firearm-related counts, but deadlocked on two aggravated assault counts, Haylock entered a negotiated plea to one assault count, which included an agreed-upon sentence of nine years eight months on all three counts. After obtaining a certificate of probable cause, Haylock appealed. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Larry Darnell Ford of willfully failing to register as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, §§ 290.010, 290.018.) The jury acquitted him of four alleged sex offenses against three young children. The trial court found true allegations that he had four prior strike convictions under sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b), denied his Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to strike those prior strikes, and sentenced him to six years in state prison.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his Romero motion. Defendant did not provide this court with a complete and adequate record of the evidence that was before the trial court when it ruled on his motion. Further, defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant James Evans appeals following his conviction of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664), and burglary (§ 459). On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction based on the legally invalid theory that he intended to steal money, that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to amend the information at the time of trial, that the prosecutor improperly ambushed defendant by raising a new theory of robbery during closing argument, and that defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to challenge the admission of testamentary evidence on confrontation grounds.

In 2010 and 2011, law enforcement officers in the Los Angeles area were conducting a wiretap investigation into drug trafficking. The investigating officers learned of a large narcotics scale scheduled to take place on or about September 28, 2011.
On that day, law enforcement surveillance personnel traveled to a parking lot where some of the drug deal participants were scheduled to meet. The surveillance observed defendant arrive and converse with two other men (who had previously been heard on wiretapped calls). The two men got in defendant’s car, and, after a stop at a car repair shop and a change of vehicles, defendant drove both men in a Ford Fusion to a house in Rialto. Defendant opened the house’s garage to park the Fusion inside, and after a brief period, defendant and the other two men left the garage driving the same car. Police officers pulled the vehicle over and discovered approximately nine kilograms of cocaine concealed in a hidden compartment.

Appellants Phoebe Chanel Chao (Phoebe) and Peter An Chao (Peter) appeal from the judgments entered following their convictions by jury on seven counts of theft by false pretense, with the amount of each theft greater than $950 (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); counts 1 – 4, 6 – 8) and Phoebe’s conviction for perjury (§ 118; count 12). We affirm.

In April 1984, Tina Faelz, a 14-year-old high school student, was found dead on a path that connected her school to a nearby residential area. She had suffered 44 stab wounds, and the killing remained an open cold case for the better part of three decades. In 2011, DNA testing revealed the presence of defendant Steven Carlson’s blood on Faelz’s purse, which had been found in a nearby tree at the time of the crime. Defendant, 16 years old at the time of the killing, attended the same high school as Faelz.
In addition to the DNA evidence, the prosecution introduced statements defendant made during law enforcement interviews. In a 1986 interview, two years after the crime, an investigating detective asked defendant about a rumor he had heard that defendant had admitted the killing. Defendant acknowledged he had done so, but said he had been intoxicated and was joking.

Appellant Gabriel Joseph Bocanegra pled no contest to vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)/count 1) and hit and run driving resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)/count 2) and in count 1 he admitted a flight enhancement (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

In 2014, appellant Steven John Ames started two small fires in close proximity in the kitchen of his rented residence. A jury found him not guilty of two counts of arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)) but guilty in both counts for the lesser included offense of unlawful burning of a structure (§ 452, subd. (c); counts I & II). Prior to sentencing, appellant moved to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors, which the trial court denied. Imposition of sentence was suspended and the court placed appellant on felony probation for three years. He was ordered to pay a restitution fine of $1,500 and serve 169 days in the county jail, with credit for time served.
On appeal, appellant argues that the due process clause and section 17, subdivision (b) require reversal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors. We reject this claim. However, we agree with appellant’s second argument that he can only be guilty of a single violation of sect

Appellant Fereshteh Manochehri, appearing in propria persona, challenges an order declaring her a vexatious litigant and barring her from filing future litigation in propria persona without permission of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7, subd. (a).) Appellant argues that her conduct in repeatedly filing cases against her daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law’s family members did not rise to the level of vexatiousness. She also contends that both the motion to declare her a vexatious litigant and the court’s review were deficient. We affirm.

The Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of Y.G. (Child), then almost one-and-a-half years old, and detained him in January 2016. Mother subsequently pled no contest to allegations she (1) failed to protect Child by leaving him with an inappropriate caregiver, and (2) had a mental health diagnosis requiring continued treatment. On May 30, 2017, at the conclusion of a contested combined six- and twelve-month review hearing, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for September 28, 2017, and terminated reunification services.
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s conclusions that (1) she was offered reasonable reunification services, and (2) there was not a substantial probability Child would be safely returned to her home if the juvenile court extended Mother’s services for almost two more months, to an 18-month review hearing.

Defendant and appellant J.M. (Mother) has a history of being involved in violent relationships with men and a significant mental health history, resulting in the removal of her 12-year-old son T.M. Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s visitation order. She argues the court failed to make a specific visitation order, thereby improperly delegating discretion to the legal guardians. We find that the juvenile court erred in failing to make an appropriate visitation order at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to ensure that visitation with Mother, at a minimum level determined by the court, would occur. We accordingly reverse the portion of the order regarding Mother’s visitation and remand the matter to the juvenile court to make an appropriate visitation order consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

J.M.'s father, C.M. (Father), appeals from an order terminating his reunification services at a 12-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21. Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating his services where the court continued services to J.M.'s mother, J.J. (Mother), and did not set a hearing under section 366.26. Father contends that under these circumstances, the court's refusal to provide him further services was contrary to J.M.'s best interests. We affirm the order.

J.M. and M.M., then ages 10 and 6, came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) after the police responded to their parents’ home to quell a disturbance. The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition based on father’s conduct that placed the children at risk for serious physical harm. The children were removed from father’s custody and permitted to remain with mother; both parents were to be provided services. Father alone appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children. We affirm.