CA Unpub Decisions

Before us are the cross-appeals of a landlord, plaintiff and appellant Alvin Solomon (Solomon), and his tenant, defendant and appellant Isabella Dominguez-Konopek (Dominguez-Konopek). Litigation between Solomon and Dominguez-Konopek arose in multiple adjudicatory fora concerning whether Dominguez-Konopek had been charged rent in excess of that allowed by Santa Monica’s rent control law during her 15-year tenancy. Solomon argued he owed Dominguez-Konopek nothing, and Dominguez-Konopek contended she was entitled to withhold rent until she recouped 15 years of overpayments. The litigation eventually took the form of a declaratory judgment action brought by Solomon. The trial court found a “conflict” between the authority cited to support each party’s position and exercised its “broad powers” to fashion a remedy that reflects something of a compromise. We consider whether the court exceeded the scope of its authority in fashioning that remedy.

Appointed counsel for defendant Marvin Warren asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on this appeal from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 57. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
On November 22, 2013, defendant was subjected to a traffic stop while driving a 1995 Nissan Sentra that was reported stolen. Defendant identified himself as his brother and claimed he had purchased the car without knowing it was stolen.

A substantial quantity of methamphetamine was found by police in the home of Sagra Maria Walker. She admitted to arresting officers that the contraband was hers. At trial, she testified the admission was made only in exchange for a detective’s promise not to arrest her boyfriend and she was not in fact guilty of the crime. The detective denied any such agreement and the jury convicted Walker of possession of methamphetamine for sale. Walker argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by (1) reserving an argument on aiding and abetting liability until his rebuttal, thus precluding the defense from responding; (2) vouching for the detective’s credibility and honesty; and (3) telling the jury that, in order to believe Walker’s testimony, it would have to conclude the detective committed perjury. We affirm.

Daniel Floyd Vezina followed a stranger’s vehicle into a highway turnout. He then aimed and fired a rifle at a passenger from that vehicle. Fortunately, the passenger was uninjured. Vezina was convicted of attempted murder after a bench trial. Vezina contends the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.

Appellant Ryan Allen Vanostrand pled no contest to vehicle theft with a prior (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) & Pen. Code, § 666.5; count I) and evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count III). Vanostrand also admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On January 8, 2016, the court sentenced Vanostrand to an aggregate eight–year term. The court, however, put the matter over to allow the probation department to calculate Vanostrand’s presentence custody credit.
On January 22, 2016, the court awarded Vanostrand 1,197 days of presentence custody credit, 599 days of presentence actual custody credit and 598 days of presentence conduct credit.
On April 20, 2016, Vanostrand’s appellate counsel filed a brief requesting that we review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

The trial court denied defendant Thomas Jenkins Thomas’s petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act) based on a finding that resentencing him would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126; further unidentified section references are to the Penal Code.) The court based its dangerousness finding on defendant’s prior convictions, which included crimes of violence, his commitment offenses, which involved a firearm, and defendant’s recent conduct while incarcerated, including a rule violation for possessing a cell phone.
Defendant contends on appeal that the Act is unconstitutionally vague because the term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is not adequately defined. He also argues that even if sufficiently defined, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and that, at a minimum, he is entitled to resentencing on a

Julio Velasquez died while receiving care at a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility. Patients at the facility informed investigators that Velasquez lost consciousness after defendant Carlos Saenz and others had tied his arms and legs behind his back, and placed a gag in his mouth. The county medical examiner concluded that multiple factors had contributed to Velasquez’s death, including a pre-existing liver condition and the manner in which he had been restrained. Saenz was subsequently charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony false imprisonment. The jury found him guilty on both counts.
Saenz appeals his judgment of conviction, arguing that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that his actions were a substantial factor in causing Velasquez’s death; and (2) the trial court should have stayed his sentence for false imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 654. We modify Saenz’s sentence to stay his sentence for false imprisonme

Defendant Paul Marko pleaded no contest to various drug-related offenses and was granted probation. He now challenges some of the conditions of his probation, specifically those which: (1) require him to submit to warrantless searches of his social media accounts and provide the necessary passwords to access those accounts; (2) preclude him from entering social networking sites absent approval by a probation officer; (3) preclude him from knowingly accessing the Internet without first notifying the probation department; (4) preclude him from knowingly possessing or using any data encryption programs; and (5) require that he maintain at least the past four weeks of his Internet browsing history.

Defendant and appellant Christopher Robert Greenlee appeals from an order denying his petition to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor, pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 6, 2017, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18), in propria persona.
The People filed an opposition to the petition with the response that “[a] hearing should be held” because there was “[n]o record of conviction in RAP sheet.”
On March 16, 2017, the court held a hearing and denied the petition because defendant’s conviction for first degree burglary with a knife was not eligible for reduction under Proposition 47.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal, in propria persona.

A jury convicted defendant Jesse Garcia of first–degree murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a); count 1), with a true finding on the allegation that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)), and of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a); count 4). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)) true as to the murder count, but not as to the assault count. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison sentence of 50 years to life.

Defendant Alfred Garcia, Jr., was charged by information with one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)). It was also alleged that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and that he suffered a prior conviction for which he served a prison term (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.12).
Proceedings were suspended after defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s mental competence. Defendant was transferred Patton State Hospital. Patton opined that defendant was competent to stand trial, and after the court conducted a hearing at which the parties submitted on the letters from Patton, proceedings were resumed.
The jury found defendant guilty of making a criminal threat, and found the deadly and dangerous weapon allegation to be true. Defendant admitted his prior conviction.

Richard Allen Curry shot and killed his roommate, Robert Shelley. Shortly after the shooting, Curry told police in a recorded statement that he shot Shelley because Shelley harassed him and “I just can’t take any more.” At trial, Curry testified that he feared for his life at the time of the shooting. A jury convicted him of second degree murder. Curry argues the trial court erred in admitting his recorded statements and restricting voir dire on aspects of the law of self-defense. We affirm.

Appellant Martin Coleman Cloherty appeals from the judgment after pleading guilty to felony unlawful use of a contractor’s license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7027.3.) Following appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court sentenced him to 40 days in jail, recommended him to the Sheriffs’ Alternative Sentencing Bureau, and placed him on three years of felony probation. The trial court also ordered him to pay $52,319 in restitution.
Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, requesting that we conduct an independent review of the entire record on appeal. Counsel attests that appellant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief in a timely manner, but he has not exercised this right.
Mindful that our review is limited to grounds for appeal occurring after entry of the plea (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(5)), we have examined the entire record in accordance with People v. Wende

Defendant Damien William Christensen appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial, contending the trial court improperly limited the scope of the evidence he could present to impeach a prosecution witness. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of proffered impeachment evidence, and we therefore affirm.