CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Selena Monique Armenta contends on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to designate her felony convictions for second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, § 460, subd. (b)) as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18). Since defendant filed her appeal, this issue has been resolved in her favor by People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858 (Gonzales), as the parties agree by way of supplemental briefing. We reverse and remand.

The trial court denied a motion brought by defendant and appellant Christian de Jesus Alvarez (defendant) to suppress a firearm recovered from defendant’s waistband as the result of a police stop on a public street. An officer discovered the weapon when he grabbed onto defendant as he was attempting to flee. We consider whether the officer’s conduct violated constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures.

Paykar Construction prevailed in a lawsuit against Medical Clinic and Surgical Specialties of Glendale, Mardiros Mihranian and Susan Chobanian (Medical Clinic) and assigned its rights against Medical Clinic to Scott Kohn, who successfully moved for summary judgment in an action to renew the judgment. Upon learning that formal judgment may not have been entered on the order granting summary judgment, Kohn moved to have judgment entered nunc pro tunc. Medical Clinic moved to have the action dismissed for failure to prosecute. The trial court denied both motions and entered a new judgment in the action. The parties appealed. We vacate the new judgment, direct the order granting summary judgment entered nunc pro tunc as the judgment and affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

In the underlying action, appellant Daniel Kim sought the partition of a condominium that he and his mother, respondent Al Soo Kim, owned as tenants in common, and requested an accounting of the rent respondent collected as manager of the property. Prior to trial, the parties sold the property. Following a bench trial on appellant’s request for an accounting, the trial court entered a judgment awarding him no share of the rent. Appellant challenges the judgment, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings, and that the court misapplied the statute of frauds. We reject those contentions and affirm.

In 2010, a jury convicted petitioner Johnny Villalobos of first degree murder, and found true a special allegation asserting that he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death. Villalobos was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in prison.
In October of 2016, Villalobos filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. (See Pen. Code, §§ 3051, 4086.) The trial court denied the petition, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus because Villalobos had not challenged the legality of his incarceration.
Villalobos then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court seeking an order requiring the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to Franklin. We issued an order to show cause, and now grant the petition.

M.F., a minor, appeals from a juvenile court order striking an amendment according to proof that added allegations regarding his father, Stephen F. (Father), to a dependency petition filed on his behalf. M.F. contends the court abused its discretion by removing the allegations without reopening proceedings for further evidence. Respondents Father, M.F.'s mother, Nicole W. (Mother), and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintain the court did not abuse its discretion. We agree and affirm the order.

Luis M. appeals from juvenile court orders denying his request to be designated the presumed father of his biological son, E.F., and denying him reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a). He challenges only the denial of services. He contends the juvenile court was precluded from offering him services because it found another man to be E.’s presumed father. On that basis, he argues the juvenile court erred in so finding and contends it was in E.’s best interest to offer him services. Finding no merit to Luis’s contentions, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

V.S. (Father) and S.M. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile court's termination of parental rights over their daughter, C.M. They contend the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not fulfill its continuing duty of inquiry and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and thus the court's finding that ICWA did not apply must be reversed. In particular, after Mother provided additional information regarding her Indian heritage, the Agency did not make further inquiries regarding whether C.M. may be an Indian child or provide further notice to certain tribes. The Agency concedes that Mother provided additional statistical and genealogical information in her ICWA worksheet, that it did not provide this additional information to the tribes, and that the case should be remanded for ICWA compliance. The parties have stipulated to the issuance of an immediate remittitur. We conditionally reverse and remand for compliance w

Appellant E.B. (Mother), mother of Andrew O., appeals the juvenile court order terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that Andrew was adoptable. We affirm.

Plaintiff Sara Hassman filed this case alleging claims based on actions taken by an array of defendants during her 2010 divorce case. Sustaining demurrers and granting anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), the trial court eventually dismissed the claims against all defendants. Plaintiff only properly appealed the final judgments and order as to three of them. Because each had a valid defense, we affirm.

In this employment case, plaintiff Robin Ford appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendants Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (together Chevron), on her single claim for age discrimination after she was not hired for either one of two work control specialist (WCS) positions or three administrative positions at Chevron’s El Segundo refinery. Having worked for a decade as a contractor for Chevron, including four years in a similar WCS role, she believed she was the most qualified applicant for the WCS positions and had an unblemished work record, so the only conceivable reason she was passed over in favor of two less qualified younger candidates was because she was 57 years old. Chevron claimed that, at the time it hired the two candidates, Ford was not selected because she was ranked last after interviews with potential candidates and she had “behavioral issues.”

Defendants Michael and Anisse Stephan possessed an easement for passage over a portion of an adjacent lot owned by plaintiffs Kamran and Mitra Ehsanipour. Prior to the Stephans’ purchase of their lot, the previous owner of the Ehsanipours’ property, an oil company, had erected a fence around the property that prevented all use of the easement. After purchasing the lot, the Ehsanipours maintained the fence for a period of 20 years, during which time the Stephans and their predecessor were unable to make any use of the easement. The trial court denied the Ehsanipours’ claim to have extinguished the easement by adverse possession solely on evidence that the oil company, when erecting the fence, had considered it temporary and intended to keep it in place only during environmental remediation of the property. We reverse, concluding the oil company’s original intent was irrelevant to a determination of adverse possession.

Plaintiff and appellant Kang Shen Chen appeals from an order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant, and requiring him to furnish security before he could proceed with the action he filed against defendants and respondents T.T. Group, Inc. (T.T.), Jennifer Chen, Booke & Ajlouny, and Victoria Booke (Booke). He also appeals from dismissal of the action based on his failure to attend an order to show cause (OSC) re dismissal.
As to the dismissal plaintiff contends the court prematurely dismissed the action, and he was not given sufficient notice of the hearing.
As to the vexatious litigant order, he claims the court lacked jurisdiction, including because he had filed requests to enter default. He also asserts there was insufficient evidence to show prior actions had been finally and adversely decided against him and there was no reasonable likelihood he would prevail is this action.
We find no error and affirm.

This employment dispute between appellant Terry L. Cheathem and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is before us for the second time. After appellant was terminated from her employment as an assistant general counsel for LAUSD, she appealed her termination to the Los Angeles Unified School District Personnel Commission (Commission). The Commission found she was not given sufficient notice of her performance deficiencies and ordered her reinstatement, but with no back pay. Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, seeking back pay and benefits. LAUSD also filed a petition, seeking to reverse the reinstatement. The trial court granted LAUSD’s petition, and appellant appealed.