CA Unpub Decisions

Andrijana Mackovska appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment on causes of action arising from the foreclosure sale of Mackovska’s house. Following the sale, Mackovska sued Bank of America, N.A. for fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR), Revenue and Taxation Code, Corporations Code, and Business and Professions Code. Mackovska also named ReconTrust Company, N.A., Bank of New York Mellon, and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) as defendants in some causes of action.

Respondent Jeffrey Straus obtained a judgment against appellant Greg Kurzulian in 2007. Appellant has paid nothing on the judgment. This appeal concerns respondent’s attempt to collect on the judgment by levying appellant’s Individual Retirement Account (IRA) at Scottrade Inc. (Scottrade). The trial court denied appellant’s claim of exemption of the account under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.115. We affirm the denial.

T.M., a ward of the juvenile court, appeals following his admission to the crimes of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215), receiving a stolen vehicle (id., § 496d), and possession of a dirk or dagger (id., § 21310). T.M. asserts that the court erred in imposing a probation condition that required him to turn over passwords to his social media accounts, because the condition is unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad.

Mother Cheyanne B. appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders of the juvenile court concerning her son Nehemiah B. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings. Because Nehemiah B. has since been returned to Cheyanne B.’s custody, her challenge to his removal is moot.

Andrew C. (minor) came to the attention of the dependency system on September 20, 2014, when—at less than one month old—he was admitted to the hospital with injuries including a skull fracture, bilateral hematomas on both sides of the brain, diffused retinal hemorrhage in his right eye, and multiple old fractures of the ribs. After an extended contested hearing held between February 6 and April 24, 2015, the juvenile court concluded that Andrew’s father, L.C. (father), was responsible for the infant’s serious injuries and denied father reunification services. Last year, we issued an opinion in response to writ petitions filed by Marina F. (mother) and father seeking extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order terminating mother’s reunification services with respect to Andrew and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Marina F. v. Superior Court (June 13, 2016, A147266 [nonpub. opn.].)

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that the minor, I.U., committed a felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and returned him to the custody of his parents on probation, with conditions including serving 45 days on the Cellular Electronic Monitoring Program.
On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred by finding he had committed the felony assault based in part on evidence that his companion fled when stopped by police. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Petitioner C.G. (Mother) filed this petition for an extraordinary writ seeking review of the court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and a permanent plan for eight-year-old G.G. and six-year-old N.G. Mother contends the court erred in denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) because the court did not properly consider whether reunification was in the children’s best interests given Mother’s voluntary engagement of services. We deny the writ petition on the merits.

Defendant and appellant, V.A. (Mother), is the mother of three boys, Z.H., D.E., and Z.E., born in 2006, 2010, and 2015. Mother appeals from the January 25, 2017 orders terminating parental rights to D.E. and Z.E. and denying her petition to reinstate her services for Z.H. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388.) Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erroneously concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) did not apply.
Mother claims the juvenile court failed to require plaintiff and respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), to thoroughly investigate Mother’s possible Indian ancestry, and as a result the notices of the proceedings given by DPSS to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA) and to three Indian tribes were inadequate to allow the BIA or the tribes to determine whether Z.H., D.E., and Z.E. were Indian children. DPSS argues substantial

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Cesar M. (appellant), a former ward of the juvenile court, appeals from an order denying relief under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The juvenile court declined to seal the records in a particular case based on a finding that appellant had failed to substantially comply with the terms of his probation. We affirm.

C.S. (minor) is the child of appellant Daniel S. (father) and Delia F. (mother). In August 2015, the minor, who was then three years old, was found crying alone in a vehicle with hundreds of pills within his reach while his parents slept in a U-Haul parked next to the vehicle. The parents were arrested for child endangerment.
In September 2015, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency), and declared the minor a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The minor was removed from the custody of the parents, who had substance abuse issues, and was placed in the care of the maternal grandfather. The court approved a reunification plan that called for the parents to participate in substance abuse services, counseling and parenting classes.

By way of a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, petitioner Paul Thomas Guiney challenges an order of respondent Superior Court of San Joaquin County denying his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 peremptory challenge to Judge Philip Urie.
Petitioner is presently charged with one misdemeanor count of public intoxication. (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f).) He was arraigned on the complaint in July 2016, and over the ensuing five months made numerous appearances before Judge Urie as the pretrial proceedings progressed.
In December 2016 petitioner asserted a peremptory challenge to Judge Urie. Judge Urie denied the motion as untimely, deeming it a belated challenge to his all purpose assignment. Successive writs to the appellate division of respondent court and to this court proved unsuccessful. Petitioner then sought relief in the Supreme Court, which granted the petition and transferred the matter to this court with directions that we vacate our order denying the petiti

Gabriel Cortez sued his former employer Doty Bros. Equipment Company for Labor Code and wage and hour violations on behalf of himself and a putative class of employees and former employees. Cortez’s complaint included a related representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). On September 19, 2014 the superior court granted Doty Bros.’ petition to compel arbitration of Cortez’s individual claims pursuant to an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing his employment and severed and stayed his PAGA claim, which was not subject to arbitration. The court reserved questions concerning the arbitrability of the class claims for the arbitrator. On November 19, 2014 we summarily denied Cortez’s petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order compelling arbitration.

Katharine Christian obtained a three-year Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) protective order against her former boyfriend, defendant Ser’Darius Blain. Blain asserts the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the protective order, contending there were no threats of violence and he was entitled to attempt to win her back even though she repeatedly told him not to contact her. We disagree.
“Abuse” under the DVPA does not require violence or threats of violence. Where the parties were formerly in a dating relationship, harassing contact by one party that disturbs the peace of the other party is sufficient. We affirm.

Katharine Christian obtained a three-year Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) protective order against her former boyfriend, defendant Ser’Darius Blain. Blain asserts the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the protective order, contending there were no threats of violence and he was entitled to attempt to win her back even though she repeatedly told him not to contact her. We disagree.
“Abuse” under the DVPA does not require violence or threats of violence. Where the parties were formerly in a dating relationship, harassing contact by one party that disturbs the peace of the other party is sufficient. We affirm.