CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Harry Haralambus (Haralambus) prevailed against plaintiff and respondent American Rag Cie, LLC (American Rag) in a non-jury trial on causes of action for declaratory relief (brought by American Rag) and breach of contract (brought by Haralambus). The court issued a judgment (1) declaring American Rag and Haralambus had an agreement that entitled Haralambus to certain royalty payments, and (2) awarding Haralambus damages for American Rag’s breach of that agreement in the years before the lawsuit. We consider whether the declaratory relief aspect of the judgment, which would obligate American Rag to make future royalty payments, was a judgment for “[m]oney or the payment of money” (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.1, subd. (a)(1)) such that Haralambus should be allowed to obtain some of those payments by drawing on the amount of the surety bond American Rag obtained to appeal the judgment.

Ehsan Torabi Tehrani (plaintiff) filed a complaint in propria persona against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (defendant) and others, asserting various causes of action. Plaintiff later filed a First Amended Complaint (the operative complaint), but a copy of that complaint is not included in the record.
Defendant demurred to the operative complaint and argued, among other things, that claim preclusion principles required dismissal of the action because the same claims and allegations had been finally adjudicated in two earlier lawsuits between the same parties.

San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. (SLRR) appeals from a judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandate asking the superior court to overturn certain orders of the California
Horse Racing Board (CHRB) regarding the management of a fund established and governed by Business and Professions Code sections 19607 and 19607.1. The superior court determined SLRR did not have standing because it did not have a direct interest in the disbursement of the fund and denied SLRR's petition. We agree SLRR does not have standing and affirm the judgment.

Leslie Page appeals the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Portofino Hotel Partners, L.P. in Page’s premises liability action. Page contends triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Portofino breached its duty of care by setting up a stage in a manner that created a dangerous gap between the back of the stage and the wall and then failing to provide safety measures or a warning. We reverse.

Appellant Christina Marie Williams pled no contest to one count of corporal injury on a cohabitant, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), in exchange for dismissal of other counts and enhancements. The trial court found unusual circumstances and placed Williams on three years probation. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause, which was granted. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Defendant Ruben Villa was charged by information with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 4). On count 1, the jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury convicted Villa on counts 2 and 3, and as to count 3 the jury found true the personal firearm use allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury convicted Villa on count 4 and found true the allegations he personally used and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)).

Defendant Nestor Alfonso Verduzco repeatedly stabbed his friend Luis Torres during a drunken brawl. Defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. The jury rejected his defense and convicted him of attempted second degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily harm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) He is serving an 11-year prison sentence. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant once threatened to stab another man. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) He also asserts prosecutorial misconduct for displaying during closing argument a photograph of defendant’s bloody handprint. We shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant Nerses Taschyan appeals from his conviction on one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Appellant contends his due process and state constitutional rights were violated when the trial court replaced his counsel before his retrial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant Nerses Taschyan appeals from his conviction on one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Appellant contends his due process and state constitutional rights were violated when the trial court replaced his counsel before his retrial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Armando Saucedo of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and found true allegations that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)) and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). He was sentenced to state prison for 40 years to life. He appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the trial court erred in precluding his trial counsel from cross-examining a jail informant about compensation he received in other cases, and (2) that under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the case must be remanded for defendant to make a record for a later youthful parole suitability hearing. We disagree with the first contention, and agree with the second. Therefore, we remand the matter for a Franklin hearing, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

An act of vandalism—spraying graffiti on a church wall—ended with one person dead and a second wounded. The shooter, Pedro Martinez, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. Following a mistrial and a second trial, Janeth Lopez, who had marked the church wall with spray paint, and Ivy Navarrete, who drove Martinez and Lopez away from the church after the shooting, were convicted of second degree murder and attempted premeditated murder with special findings the offenses had been committed to benefit a criminal street gang and a principal had personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury to the victims.

Defendant Karen Loper and her daughter assaulted her daughter’s former boyfriend with a baseball bat and a hammer in his home. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). In return, the remaining allegation was dismissed and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions.

Defendant Markese Darnell Hunter appeals after a jury found him guilty of transportation for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 1), possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 2), possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 3), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 4). The trial court found defendant had suffered four prior narcotics convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subds. (a) & (c)) and had served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Salvador Castro Hernandez appeals from the judgment imposed after his guilty plea. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B).) The trial court sentenced him to nine years in state prison. We affirm.
We appointed counsel to represent Hernandez in this appeal. After counsel examined the record, he filed an opening brief that raised no arguable issues. We advised Hernandez that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. Hernandez filed a supplemental letter brief in which he requests a different sentence.