CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Mark Grosvenor asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

In July 2015 Gastelum unlawfully entered the residence of another without permission and with the intent to commit theft. His probation was revoked because he admitted violating probation by leaving the treatment program without permission.

Appellant Rayna Marie Flores appeals her conviction on one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) , with the special allegation that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Prior to sentencing, appellant admitted to having one prior strike pursuant to sections 667 and 1170.12. In this appeal, appellant argues we must reverse the gang enhancement and her underlying conviction due to the improper admission of evidence regarding her status as a gang member. In particular, appellant contends the court improperly admitted statements she made during booking which violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and opinion testimony regarding her and her companion’s gang status based on testimonial hearsay that violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnes

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement Jovani Cruz pleaded no contest to two felony charges and admitted the truth of special allegations that he had suffered four prior felony convictions. On appeal Cruz contends the court misunderstood its sentencing discretion under the agreement when it sentenced him to six years in state prison. We affirm.

Appellants Antonio Francisco Castro and Randy Daniel Ortiz appeal from their convictions by jury verdict of first degree murder with findings that each personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime and that it was gang related. They contend the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of the deadly weapon enhancement constitutes constitutional structural error requiring reversal. In the alternative, they argue that if subject to harmless error review, the error was not harmless. Castro also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the crime was gang related. He also claims entitlement to 18 additional days of custody credit.

On the day Mark Vincent Andrews was released from prison, he crashed his vehicle while driving under the influence of heroin. He ultimately entered pleas of no contest to driving under the influence of a drug or narcotic and the combined influence of alcohol and drugs, with prior convictions for driving under the influence. He also admitted sentencing enhancements including a “strike” conviction. Andrews’s Romero motion to strike the prior conviction was denied, and he was sentenced to state prison. Andrews contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process in denying the motion to strike. We affirm.

In 1973, plaintiffs Steve and Zoe Nicolaidis purchased a home in a La Jolla development (the development). At that time, they enjoyed largely uninterrupted southerly views towards the Mission Bay and Point Loma shorelines. However, as the landscaping on other properties in the development matured, portions of their southerly view became obscured. By 1990, the Nicolaidises were complaining that trees on various properties to the south, including trees on the property then owned by Hector and Christina James (the property), were in violation of the landscaping height limitations imposed on lots in the development by the declaration of restrictions governing the development.

The parties to this appeal – appellants Rocky Gentner and James Parkhurst, and respondents Brian Kyle, Bobbie Griffith, and Cindy Atkinson – have been before us on a previous appeal, from an order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion. We affirmed the order, which eliminated all but one cause of action – for declaratory relief – in appellants’ cross-complaint.
Respondents’ complaint and what remained of appellants’ cross-complaint were tried to the court in February 2015. The result was a victory for respondents Kyle, Griffith, and Atkinson. Gentner and Parkhurst have appealed, identifying four issues for review. These are (1) the nature of Atkinson’s interest in the limited liability company Bay Cities Partners, LLC; (2) whether a vote to sell Bay Cities’ real property required a majority of the members or a majority of membership interests; (3) whether the court properly entered an injunction against Gentner; and (4) the percentage interest of each Ba

Dwight B. appeals from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order declaring his daughter, eight-year-old S.J., a dependent child of the juvenile court and removing her from the custody of her mother, her sole custodial parent at the time dependency proceedings were initiated. Acknowledging the propriety of dependency jurisdiction based on the court’s findings relating to S.J.’s mother, Dwight challenges the court’s jurisdiction finding as to him and insists that issue is justiciable because it prevented him from obtaining preferential custody consideration as a noncustodial parent. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition as to 8-year-old A.I. and 13-year-old M.I., finding years of domestic violence between their parents placed the children at substantial risk for serious physical and emotional harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (c). ) Mother alone appeals, and she challenges only the section 300, subdivision (c) finding concerning serious emotional harm.
Mother concedes her appeal is moot, but nonetheless asks this court to exercise our discretion and reach the merits, contending this case presents a question of law or is one where the juvenile court’s “decision could negatively affect [her] in a future dependency proceeding . . . .”

Jennifer F. (mother) appeals from a judgment declaring her two children, J.L. and A.L., dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
300. Mother contends that the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
J.L. was born in 2008. In June 2016 A.L. (infant) was born prematurely “at only 32 weeks of gestation.” Before infant’s birth, mother was diagnosed as being RH negative. The juvenile court found that, because mother had “failed to obtain adequate and standard prenatal care,” infant developed “Hydrops Fetalis, which includes symptoms of anemia.” Mother missed three “of the last prenatal appointments.” Mother said she had missed two appointments because she was visiting family in Arizona. She missed the third appointment “because she did not feel well.”

At a dispositional hearing in November 2016, the juvenile court ordered then four-month-old Emily M. into a permanent plan of legal guardianship and set aside the visitation order with Emily’s brothers, Jacob and Evan, also juvenile court dependents. The previous August, the court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother, appellant Robin B. (mother), as to Jacob and Evan. Mother appeals from the dispositional order, contending the juvenile court erred in not ordering sibling visitation. She also contends Emily’s attorney had a conflict of interest. We conclude mother lacks standing to raise either issue and affirm.

In October 2014, a petition was filed to declare defendant, a juvenile, a ward of court, based on his commission of a robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) In January 2015, the petition was amended to allege commission of attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211.) Defendant admitted the petition as amended; the court sustained it; and defendant was placed home on probation.
Defendant’s probation went reasonably well until he committed the instant offense in September 2016. Defendant and his companion, identified only as Louie, went to a local mall with the plan to steal something to get money. They spotted a family sitting in the food court with their cell phones on their tables, and agreed to take the phones. Defendant grabbed the daughter’s phone from one table; Louie grabbed the mother’s phone from an adjacent table. They ran off with the phones. The family’s father gave chase and was joined by two mall security guards. As the thieves ran from the mall, Louie told def

Jonathan Q., the presumed father of 11-year-old Anthony Q., appeals from the juvenile court’s October 21, 2016 order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating his parental rights and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for Anthony. Jonathan contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error when it failed to transport him to court from the Los Angeles County Jail for the section 366.26 hearing as required by Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d), and the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to satisfy their affirmative duty of inquiry imposed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We agree there was not an adequate investigation of the possible Indian ancestry of Anthony’s mother, Christina R., remand the matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy that violation of federal and state law and otherwise conditionally affirm the orde