CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Alejandro C., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court. Following a contested hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant was found to have committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred because the evidence was insufficient to show he aided and abetted the robbery that occurred. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

A.O. appeals from a judgment after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging he committed misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.)
A.O. pushed his mother into a dresser and squeezed her arm. She sustained bruises on her heel and arm. The juvenile court ordered A.O. suitably placed in an open facility, with a maximum confinement term of six months. The court awarded him 25 days of predisposition credits.

Appellant A.O. (Mother), mother of A.K. (Ama) and A.K. (Ali), appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, finding the children at risk of physical harm due to Mother’s unstable mental condition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and its dispositional order, removing the children from Mother’s care. She contends the court misunderstood the criteria for a section 300, subdivision (b) finding, and that substantial evidence does not support its orders. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs and respondents Harriet Goslins, Janey Sweet, as trustee of the Janey Sweet Revocable Trust, and Sara Lemlich, as trustee of the Sara Lemlich Trust (collectively, plaintiffs) purchased a note secured by a deed of trust on real property from Diversified Mortgage Company (DMC). DMC and plaintiffs thought the deed of trust had first position. Instead, a deed of trust in favor of Massrock, Inc. had first position. Massrock foreclosed on its deed of trust and acquired the property at a foreclosure sale. To protect their security interest in the property, plaintiffs sued, among others, defendants and appellants Massrock and the borrowers Ronald and Nadina Taxe, individually and as trustees of the Taxe Family Trust (collectively, defendants). Defendants cross-complained against, among others, DMC. After a bench trial, the court found against defendants on the complaint and cross-complaint.

Plaintiffs Dolores Duty and her three children appeal a judgment entered in favor of TRZ Realty, LLC (TRZ) on consolidated complaints for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of the death of their husband and father, William Duty, from colon cancer. They contend the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of their expert witness that William’s cancer was caused by his occupational exposure to asbestos. We agree and therefore shall reverse the judgment entered following the adverse evidentiary ruling.

Jessica Druez was a kindergarten teacher at a private school. While she was out on leave after giving birth, the school attempted to hire her for the coming year. After Druez refused to accept and return the school’s proposed written contract, it withdrew its employment offer. In response, Druez sued the school for wrongful termination and failure to engage in the interactive process. Druez appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant.
We conclude that Druez forfeited her claim of evidentiary error. We also conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment because defendant presented substantial evidence of a nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory basis for its decision—Druez refused to accept and return an employment contract for the coming school year—and Druez did not meet her burden to show defendant’s stated reason was pretextual. Finally, defendant accommodated Druez’s pregnancy, and any breakdown in the interactive process is at

In an effort to reverse the San Francisco Housing Authority’s (SFHA) decisions denying him Section 8 housing assistance, appellant John Doe sought both a writ of administrative mandate and a writ of ordinary mandate from the superior court. In these consolidated appeals, Doe now challenges the trial court’s denial of writ relief and the ensuing judgment entered against him. We affirm.

Eastgate Petroleum, LLC (Eastgate) appeals an order denying its motion to vacate a judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 ) against it. The judgment was entered following an administrative decision in which civil penalties were assessed against Eastgate for violation of environmental regulations relating to hazardous materials. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25404.1.3.) Eastgate did not timely file a petition to review the administrative decision.
We conclude, among other things, that 1) the judgment is enforceable against Eastgate; 2) the trial court did not err by denying Eastgate’s motion to vacate the judgment for counsel error (§ 473, subd. (b)); and 3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not staying the proceedings. We affirm.

Mother Cheyanne B. appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders of the juvenile court concerning her son Nehemiah B. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings. Because Nehemiah B. has since been returned to Cheyanne B.’s custody, her challenge to his removal is moot.

Andrew C. (minor) came to the attention of the dependency system on September 20, 2014, when—at less than one month old—he was admitted to the hospital with injuries including a skull fracture, bilateral hematomas on both sides of the brain, diffused retinal hemorrhage in his right eye, and multiple old fractures of the ribs. After an extended contested hearing held between February 6 and April 24, 2015, the juvenile court concluded that Andrew’s father, L.C. (father), was responsible for the infant’s serious injuries and denied father reunification services. Last year, we issued an opinion in response to writ petitions filed by Marina F. (mother) and father seeking extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order terminating mother’s reunification services with respect to Andrew and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Marina F. v. Superior Court (June 13, 2016, A147266 [nonpub. opn.].) We denied both

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that the minor, I.U., committed a felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and returned him to the custody of his parents on probation, with conditions including serving 45 days on the Cellular Electronic Monitoring Program.
On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred by finding he had committed the felony assault based in part on evidence that his companion fled when stopped by police. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Petitioner C.G. (Mother) filed this petition for an extraordinary writ seeking review of the court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and a permanent plan for eight-year-old G.G. and six-year-old N.G. Mother contends the court erred in denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) because the court did not properly consider whether reunification was in the children’s best interests given Mother’s voluntary engagement of services. We deny the writ petition on the merits.

Defendant and appellant, V.A. (Mother), is the mother of three boys, Z.H., D.E., and Z.E., born in 2006, 2010, and 2015. Mother appeals from the January 25, 2017 orders terminating parental rights to D.E. and Z.E. and denying her petition to reinstate her services for Z.H. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388.) Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erroneously concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) did not apply.
Mother claims the juvenile court failed to require plaintiff and respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), to thoroughly investigate Mother’s possible Indian ancestry, and as a result the notices of the proceedings given by DPSS to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA) and to three Indian tribes were inadequate to allow the BIA or the tribes to determine whether Z.H., D.E., and Z.E. were Indian children. DPSS argues substantial

Cesar M. (appellant), a former ward of the juvenile court, appeals from an order denying relief under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The juvenile court declined to seal the records in a particular case based on a finding that appellant had failed to substantially comply with the terms of his probation. We affirm.