CA Unpub Decisions

C.S. (minor) is the child of appellant Daniel S. (father) and Delia F. (mother). In August 2015, the minor, who was then three years old, was found crying alone in a vehicle with hundreds of pills within his reach while his parents slept in a U-Haul parked next to the vehicle. The parents were arrested for child endangerment.
In September 2015, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency), and declared the minor a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The minor was removed from the custody of the parents, who had substance abuse issues, and was placed in the care of the maternal grandfather. The court approved a reunification plan that called for the parents to participate in substance abuse services, counseling and parenting classes.

By way of a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, petitioner Paul Thomas Guiney challenges an order of respondent Superior Court of San Joaquin County denying his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 peremptory challenge to Judge Philip Urie.
Petitioner is presently charged with one misdemeanor count of public intoxication. (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f).) He was arraigned on the complaint in July 2016, and over the ensuing five months made numerous appearances before Judge Urie as the pretrial proceedings progressed.

Gabriel Cortez sued his former employer Doty Bros. Equipment Company for Labor Code and wage and hour violations on behalf of himself and a putative class of employees and former employees. Cortez’s complaint included a related representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). On September 19, 2014 the superior court granted Doty Bros.’ petition to compel arbitration of Cortez’s individual claims pursuant to an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing his employment and severed and stayed his PAGA claim, which was not subject to arbitration. The court reserved questions concerning the arbitrability of the class claims for the arbitrator. On November 19, 2014 we summarily denied Cortez’s petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order compelling arbitration.

Katharine Christian obtained a three-year Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) protective order against her former boyfriend, defendant Ser’Darius Blain. Blain asserts the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the protective order, contending there were no threats of violence and he was entitled to attempt to win her back even though she repeatedly told him not to contact her. We disagree.
“Abuse” under the DVPA does not require violence or threats of violence. Where the parties were formerly in a dating relationship, harassing contact by one party that disturbs the peace of the other party is sufficient. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Harry Haralambus (Haralambus) prevailed against plaintiff and respondent American Rag Cie, LLC (American Rag) in a non-jury trial on causes of action for declaratory relief (brought by American Rag) and breach of contract (brought by Haralambus). The court issued a judgment (1) declaring American Rag and Haralambus had an agreement that entitled Haralambus to certain royalty payments, and (2) awarding Haralambus damages for American Rag’s breach of that agreement in the years before the lawsuit. We consider whether the declaratory relief aspect of the judgment, which would obligate American Rag to make future royalty payments, was a judgment for “[m]oney or the payment of money” (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.1, subd. (a)(1)) such that Haralambus should be allowed to obtain some of those payments by drawing on the amount of the surety bond American Rag obtained to appeal the judgment.

On August 23, 2012, Certified Unified Program Agency for San Luis Obispo County (CUPA), an environmental protection enforcement agency, issued “unilateral enforcement orders” against Eastgate and another petroleum company, Bay Area Diablo Petroleum (Bay Area Diablo). It found they violated Health and Safety Code and state regulations relating to controlling hazardous materials in their underground storage tanks. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25404.1.1.)
The companies appealed. At an administrative law hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found against the companies and assessed $1,412,355 as “administrative penalties.” The ALJ ruled the companies could “seek reduction of the total penalty” for “financial hardship” by presenting evidence to CUPA. In a supplemental unilateral enforcement order, CUPA determined Eastgate’s penalty was $933,330.

Ehsan Torabi Tehrani (plaintiff) filed a complaint in propria persona against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (defendant) and others, asserting various causes of action. Plaintiff later filed a First Amended Complaint (the operative complaint), but a copy of that complaint is not included in the record.

San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. (SLRR) appeals from a judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandate asking the superior court to overturn certain orders of the California
Horse Racing Board (CHRB) regarding the management of a fund established and governed by Business and Professions Code sections 19607 and 19607.1. The superior court determined SLRR did not have standing because it did not have a direct interest in the disbursement of the fund and denied SLRR's petition. We agree SLRR does not have standing and affirm the judgment.

Leslie Page appeals the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Portofino Hotel Partners, L.P. in Page’s premises liability action. Page contends triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Portofino breached its duty of care by setting up a stage in a manner that created a dangerous gap between the back of the stage and the wall and then failing to provide safety measures or a warning. We reverse.

Appellant Christina Marie Williams pled no contest to one count of corporal injury on a cohabitant, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), in exchange for dismissal of other counts and enhancements. The trial court found unusual circumstances and placed Williams on three years probation. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause, which was granted. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Defendant Ruben Villa was charged by information with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 4). On count 1, the jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury convicted Villa on counts 2 and 3, and as to count 3 the jury found true the personal firearm use allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury convicted Villa on count 4 and found true the allegations he personally used and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)).
Villa moved for a new trial, in part on the ground the trial court erred in failing

Defendant Nestor Alfonso Verduzco repeatedly stabbed his friend Luis Torres during a drunken brawl. Defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. The jury rejected his defense and convicted him of attempted second degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily harm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) He is serving an 11-year prison sentence. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant once threatened to stab another man. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) He also asserts prosecutorial misconduct for displaying during closing argument a photograph of defendant’s bloody handprint. We shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant Nerses Taschyan appeals from his conviction on one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Appellant contends his due process and state constitutional rights were violated when the trial court replaced his counsel before his retrial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Armando Saucedo of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and found true allegations that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)) and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). He was sentenced to state prison for 40 years to life. He appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the trial court erred in precluding his trial counsel from cross-examining a jail informant about compensation he received in other cases, and (2) that under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the case must be remanded for defendant to make a record for a later youthful parole suitability hearing. We disagree with the first contention, and agree with the second. Therefore, we remand the matter for a Franklin hearing, but otherwise affirm the judgment.