CA Unpub Decisions

An act of vandalism—spraying graffiti on a church wall—ended with one person dead and a second wounded. The shooter, Pedro Martinez, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. Following a mistrial and a second trial, Janeth Lopez, who had marked the church wall with spray paint, and Ivy Navarrete, who drove Martinez and Lopez away from the church after the shooting, were convicted of second degree murder and attempted premeditated murder with special findings the offenses had been committed to benefit a criminal street gang and a principal had personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury to the victims.
On appeal Lopez and Navarrete principally challenge the propriety of their convictions for murder and attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding the crimes were committed to benefit a criminal street gang. They also raise several sentencing

Defendant Karen Loper and her daughter assaulted her daughter’s former boyfriend with a baseball bat and a hammer in his home. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). In return, the remaining allegation was dismissed and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions.
On appeal, defendant argues the restitution fine under section 1202.4 contained in the court’s sentencing minute order and the felony terms and conditions of probation findings and orders of the court must be stricken because the trial court never ordered that fine during the sentencing hearing. The People agree that the trial court erred in failing to orally impose the restitution fine, but argue the appeal must be dismissed because section 1237.2 precludes a defendant from raising a restitution fine error as the sole issue on appeal without first exhausting his or her remed

Defendant Markese Darnell Hunter appeals after a jury found him guilty of transportation for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 1), possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 2), possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 3), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 4). The trial court found defendant had suffered four prior narcotics convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subds. (a) & (c)) and had served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court imposed an aggregate 19-year jail sentence, but suspended execution of five years of that term, such that defendant would serve 14 years in jail and then be under mandatory supervision for five years. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5).) One of the mandatory supervision conditions was that defendant “not use or possess alcohol, intoxicants, narcotics or other contro

Salvador Castro Hernandez appeals from the judgment imposed after his guilty plea. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B).) The trial court sentenced him to nine years in state prison. We affirm.
We appointed counsel to represent Hernandez in this appeal. After counsel examined the record, he filed an opening brief that raised no arguable issues. We advised Hernandez that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. Hernandez filed a supplemental letter brief in which he requests a different sentence.

Appointed counsel for defendant Mark Grosvenor asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

When Patricia Freeman saw defendant pushing Freddie Hunter’s 1980 Chevrolet El Camino down the street, she called Hunter to let him know. About 40 minutes later, Hunter found his car about a quarter-mile away from Freeman’s home. Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat. Hunter confronted defendant, punching him and tearing his pants as he attempted to flee, then chasing him. Hunter also called the police. Defendant picked up a piece of firewood and swung it at Hunter. Responding police officers caught defendant, and Hunter identified him as the man who had been inside his car. Officers found a piece of fabric near the passenger side of the El Camino that matched the

In May 2016, Gastelum's probation was summarily revoked. He thereafter admitted testing positive for alcohol and cocaine. Gastelum was reinstated on probation.
In February 2017, Gastelum again admitted violating probation. Probation was again revoked. The court declined to reinstate Gastelum on probation. He was sentenced to the midterm of four years for first degree burglary.
Gastelum filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.)
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating she has not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Gastelum the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal but he has not responded.

Appellant Rayna Marie Flores appeals her conviction on one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) , with the special allegation that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Prior to sentencing, appellant admitted to having one prior strike pursuant to sections 667 and 1170.12. In this appeal, appellant argues we must reverse the gang enhancement and her underlying conviction due to the improper admission of evidence regarding her status as a gang member. In particular, appellant contends the court improperly admitted statements she made during booking which violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and opinion testimony regarding her and her companion’s gang status based on testimonial hearsay that violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnes

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement Jovani Cruz pleaded no contest to two felony charges and admitted the truth of special allegations that he had suffered four prior felony convictions. On appeal Cruz contends the court misunderstood its sentencing discretion under the agreement when it sentenced him to six years in state prison. We affirm.

Appellants Antonio Francisco Castro and Randy Daniel Ortiz appeal from their convictions by jury verdict of first degree murder with findings that each personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime and that it was gang related. They contend the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of the deadly weapon enhancement constitutes constitutional structural error requiring reversal. In the alternative, they argue that if subject to harmless error review, the error was not harmless. Castro also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the crime was gang related. He also claims entitlement to 18 additional days of custody credit.

On the day Mark Vincent Andrews was released from prison, he crashed his vehicle while driving under the influence of heroin. He ultimately entered pleas of no contest to driving under the influence of a drug or narcotic and the combined influence of alcohol and drugs, with prior convictions for driving under the influence. He also admitted sentencing enhancements including a “strike” conviction. Andrews’s Romero motion to strike the prior conviction was denied, and he was sentenced to state prison. Andrews contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process in denying the motion to strike. We affirm.

In 1973, plaintiffs Steve and Zoe Nicolaidis purchased a home in a La Jolla development (the development). At that time, they enjoyed largely uninterrupted southerly views towards the Mission Bay and Point Loma shorelines. However, as the landscaping on other properties in the development matured, portions of their southerly view became obscured. By 1990, the Nicolaidises were complaining that trees on various properties to the south, including trees on the property then owned by Hector and Christina James (the property), were in violation of the landscaping height limitations imposed on lots in the development by the declaration of restrictions governing the development.
Defendant Kevin Wechter acquired the property from the Jameses in 2003, and shortly thereafter the Nicolaidises renewed their request that trees on the property be trimmed. When the Nicolaidises' requests in various contexts were repeatedly rebuffed, they filed the present action against Wechter in 2014.

The parties to this appeal – appellants Rocky Gentner and James Parkhurst, and respondents Brian Kyle, Bobbie Griffith, and Cindy Atkinson – have been before us on a previous appeal, from an order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion. We affirmed the order, which eliminated all but one cause of action – for declaratory relief – in appellants’ cross-complaint.
Respondents’ complaint and what remained of appellants’ cross-complaint were tried to the court in February 2015. The result was a victory for respondents Kyle, Griffith, and Atkinson. Gentner and Parkhurst have appealed, identifying four issues for review. These are (1) the nature of Atkinson’s interest in the limited liability company Bay Cities Partners, LLC; (2) whether a vote to sell Bay Cities’ real property required a majority of the members or a majority of membership interests; (3) whether the court properly entered an injunction against Gentner; and (4) the percentage interest of each Ba

Dwight B. appeals from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order declaring his daughter, eight-year-old S.J., a dependent child of the juvenile court and removing her from the custody of her mother, her sole custodial parent at the time dependency proceedings were initiated. Acknowledging the propriety of dependency jurisdiction based on the court’s findings relating to S.J.’s mother, Dwight challenges the court’s jurisdiction finding as to him and insists that issue is justiciable because it prevented him from obtaining preferential custody consideration as a noncustodial parent. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition as to 8-year-old A.I. and 13-year-old M.I., finding years of domestic violence between their parents placed the children at substantial risk for serious physical and emotional harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (c). ) Mother alone appeals, and she challenges only the section 300, subdivision (c) finding concerning serious emotional harm.
Mother concedes her appeal is moot, but nonetheless asks this court to exercise our discretion and reach the merits, contending this case presents a question of law or is one where the juvenile court’s “decision could negatively affect [her] in a future dependency proceeding . . . .”
We disagree. Mother fails to present any arguments concerning prejudice, nor does she raise a question of law. As mother’s appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support only one of the two sustained counts, resolution on the merits would have no practical effect and would not affor