CA Unpub Decisions

Jennifer F. (mother) appeals from a judgment declaring her two children, J.L. and A.L., dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
300. Mother contends that the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

In October 2014, a petition was filed to declare defendant, a juvenile, a ward of court, based on his commission of a robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) In January 2015, the petition was amended to allege commission of attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211.) Defendant admitted the petition as amended; the court sustained it; and defendant was placed home on probation.

In October 2014, a petition was filed to declare defendant, a juvenile, a ward of court, based on his commission of a robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) In January 2015, the petition was amended to allege commission of attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211.) Defendant admitted the petition as amended; the court sustained it; and defendant was placed home on probation.

Jonathan Q., the presumed father of 11-year-old Anthony Q., appeals from the juvenile court’s October 21, 2016 order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating his parental rights and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for Anthony. Jonathan contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error when it failed to transport him to court from the Los Angeles County Jail for the section 366.26 hearing as required by Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d), and the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to satisfy their affirmative duty of inquiry imposed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We agree there was not an adequate investigation of the possible Indian ancestry of Anthony’s mother, Christina R., remand the matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy that violation of federal and state law and otherwise conditionally affirm the orde

Appellant Alejandro C., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court. Following a contested hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant was found to have committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred because the evidence was insufficient to show he aided and abetted the robbery that occurred. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

A.O. appeals from a judgment after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging he committed misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.)
A.O. pushed his mother into a dresser and squeezed her arm. She sustained bruises on her heel and arm. The juvenile court ordered A.O. suitably placed in an open facility, with a maximum confinement term of six months. The court awarded him 25 days of predisposition credits.

Appellant A.O. (Mother), mother of A.K. (Ama) and A.K. (Ali), appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, finding the children at risk of physical harm due to Mother’s unstable mental condition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and its dispositional order, removing the children from Mother’s care. She contends the court misunderstood the criteria for a section 300, subdivision (b) finding, and that substantial evidence does not support its orders. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs and respondents Harriet Goslins, Janey Sweet, as trustee of the Janey Sweet Revocable Trust, and Sara Lemlich, as trustee of the Sara Lemlich Trust (collectively, plaintiffs) purchased a note secured by a deed of trust on real property from Diversified Mortgage Company (DMC). DMC and plaintiffs thought the deed of trust had first position. Instead, a deed of trust in favor of Massrock, Inc. had first position. Massrock foreclosed on its deed of trust and acquired the property at a foreclosure sale. To protect their security interest in the property, plaintiffs sued, among others, defendants and appellants Massrock and the borrowers Ronald and Nadina Taxe, individually and as trustees of the Taxe Family Trust (collectively, defendants). Defendants cross-complained against, among others, DMC. After a bench trial, the court found against defendants on the complaint and cross-complaint.
Defendants appeal. They contend that the judgment must be reversed because, among

Plaintiffs Dolores Duty and her three children appeal a judgment entered in favor of TRZ Realty, LLC (TRZ) on consolidated complaints for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of the death of their husband and father, William Duty, from colon cancer. They contend the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of their expert witness that William’s cancer was caused by his occupational exposure to asbestos. We agree and therefore shall reverse the judgment entered following the adverse evidentiary ruling.

Jessica Druez was a kindergarten teacher at a private school. While she was out on leave after giving birth, the school attempted to hire her for the coming year. After Druez refused to accept and return the school’s proposed written contract, it withdrew its employment offer. In response, Druez sued the school for wrongful termination and failure to engage in the interactive process. Druez appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant.
We conclude that Druez forfeited her claim of evidentiary error. We also conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment because defendant presented substantial evidence of a nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory basis for its decision—Druez refused to accept and return an employment contract for the coming school year—and Druez did not meet her burden to show defendant’s stated reason was pretextual. Finally, defendant accommodated Druez’s pregnancy, and any breakdown in the interactive process is at

In an effort to reverse the San Francisco Housing Authority’s (SFHA) decisions denying him Section 8 housing assistance, appellant John Doe sought both a writ of administrative mandate and a writ of ordinary mandate from the superior court. In these consolidated appeals, Doe now challenges the trial court’s denial of writ relief and the ensuing judgment entered against him. We affirm.

Eastgate Petroleum, LLC (Eastgate) appeals an order denying its motion to vacate a judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 ) against it. The judgment was entered following an administrative decision in which civil penalties were assessed against Eastgate for violation of environmental regulations relating to hazardous materials. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25404.1.3.) Eastgate did not timely file a petition to review the administrative decision.
We conclude, among other things, that 1) the judgment is enforceable against Eastgate; 2) the trial court did not err by denying Eastgate’s motion to vacate the judgment for counsel error (§ 473, subd. (b)); and 3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not staying the proceedings. We affirm.

The People charged defendant Jesus Francisco Osorio with two felonies: a battery on a police officer causing injury, and an attempt to deter an officer from performing his duties using force or violence. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (c)(2), 69.) A jury deadlocked on the battery charge and convicted Osorio of the section 69 offense. At sentencing, the trial court reduced the battery charge to a misdemeanor, Osorio pleaded guilty, and the court imposed an aggregate three-year prison term.
In this appeal, Osorio makes several interrelated claims of error involving the jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Several of these claims concern the battery charge, but those claims are not cognizable on appeal because he pleaded guilty to that crime and did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.) As far as the section 69 conviction, we find no reversible errors. We also reviewed the transcript of an in camera Pitchess hearing

A jury convicted appellant Dennis Paul Napier of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)/count 1) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)/count 2) and found true a great bodily injury enhancement in each count (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding, the jury found true a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and allegations that Napier had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.