CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Antoine Leeotis Mims of several felonies, including attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and shooting at a person from a car (§ 26100, subd. (c)). The jury found true various sentencing enhancement allegations, including allegations Mims committed the offenses for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Mims to 40 years to life in state prison.
Mims appeals, contending: (1) the court erred by denying his motion to exclude statements made in a custodial interview; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to evidence regarding Mims’s prior felony conviction and gang membership; (3) the court erred by instructing the jury that the right to self-defense cannot be contrived (CALCRIM No. 3472); and (4) cumulative errors require reversal.
We affirm.

Defendant Arthur McAdory was convicted of kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), seven counts of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237), and seven counts of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The prior appeal resulted in reversal of the judgment with a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing on juror disqualification for possible bias. The disposition stated in relevant part: “If the trial court finds that there are no grounds for juror disqualification, the judgment shall be reinstated as of that date. If the trial court determines that it is not feasible to hold a hearing due to unavailability of these jurors or finds that there are grounds for juror disqualification, the prosecutor shall be afforded the opportunity to retry the case.” After a hearing was held, the trial court found no basis for juror disqualification and ordered judgment reinstated. On appeal, defendant contends that the hearing proved inadequate to reconstr

Defendant Jammie D. Lee appeals from an order reinstating his probation after a contested revocation hearing. Defendant contends he was denied due process because he was not given adequate written notice of the alleged probation violation and no substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. He also argues the trial court failed to give him appropriate credit for domestic violence counseling classes. We find no merit in defendant’s claims and affirm.

Defendant Rizamavel Lascuna challenges the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of four years and four months after she entered guilty pleas to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and possession of methamphetamine for sale (§ 11378), and no contest pleas to a second count of possession of methamphetamine for sale and misdemeanor providing a false name to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9). Defendant also admitted a weight allegation in connection with the second possession count that rendered her probation ineligible. (Pen. Code, § 1203.073, subd. (b)(2).) Although defendant’s plea agreement, which specified the four years and four months sentence, required defendant to admit a weight enhancement (§ 11370.4, subd. (b)) allegation and a prior conviction enhancement (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)) allegation attached to that same possession for sale count, the trial court neglected to obtain an admission to either of these enhancement alle

Appointed counsel for defendant Kou Her has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury found defendant Kyle Henely guilty of 10 offenses arising from his use of altered stolen checks, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. Henely, who was represented at trial by appointed counsel, contends the trial court erred by (1) denying his request for a trial continuance to "try to gather money to retain an attorney," and (2) failing to treat the request as one for a hearing under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). He also contends the trial court erred by failing to conduct a postconviction Marsden hearing after receiving a copy of a letter Henely sent to his counsel requesting that new counsel be assigned to file a motion for new trial based in part on alleged "[m]isconduct and ineffective counsel." We affirm.

Michael Clair Glines appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of numerous sexual offenses against multiple child victims, including his own daughter. Glines argues his lengthy sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the trial court erred by failing to consider probation for crimes committed before 2006, and the court improperly imposed separate sentences. None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment

In April 2014, defendant and appellant Jeanette Romie Gatson pleaded guilty to 37 felony counts of violating various provisions of the Penal and Health and Safety Codes, and admitted to five prison prior allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and two alleged out-on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years in state prison.
Subsequently, Gatson sought relief pursuant to the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, enacted as Proposition 47 in the November 2014 election. The trial court granted Gatson some of the relief she requested, reducing 13 of the 37 convictions to misdemeanors, and striking an out-on-bail enhancement related to one of the reduced counts. The trial court denied the petition with respect to the remaining 24 counts and a second out-on-bail enhancement. It also denied Gatson’s request to dismiss four of the five prison prior enhancements on the basis that the underlying convictions had been reduced to misdemean

In 2011, defendant and appellant Jason Andrew Gallegos pleaded guilty to one count of commercial burglary, a felony, under Penal Code section 459. Defendant appeals from an order finding that the commercial burglary offense did not qualify as misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5 and denying defendant’s petition for resentencing to misdemeanor forgery. (§ 1170.18.)

In March 2016, an amended information was filed charging appellant with first degree residential robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (a); count 1), false imprisonment (§ 236; count 2), battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 3), taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 5). The information alleged appellant had been convicted of two or more prior serious and/or violent felonies (strikes) (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)), in addition to other allegations based on prior convictions and prison terms. The information was further amended to allege only one strike prior (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
Appellant agreed to plead no contest to felony vehicle theft in count 4 and misdemeanor vandalism in count 5, and to admit one strike prior (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and probation ineligibility (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), in exchange for a maximum sentence of 32 months and consideration of his Romero motion and request for probation. In Jul

An ambulance service and a county fire authority became embroiled in a dispute about the terms of a 2004 contract – actually a number of contracts made with various cities serviced by the authority. The county fire authority believed the contracts required the ambulance service to dedicate a certain number of ambulances to each city in the county who had contracts with the service. The ambulance service, on the other hand, believed that the contracts allowed it to use a “fluid deployment approach” which meant ambulances could circulate among several cities. The difference was that under the service’s interpretation it didn’t have to deploy as many ambulances as it had to under the fire authority’s interpretation. (See Medix Ambulance Service v. Orange County Fire Authority, Inc. (May 25, 2010, G042031) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 2 (Medix I).)

Plaintiff Adrianna Siobhan Miller obtained a restraining order against defendant Jon Davidson pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA; Fam. Code , § 6200 et seq.) Defendant contends on appeal the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence did not support a finding of abuse as defined under section 6203. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Chauné Williams (Williams), appearing in pro per, appeals from the trial court’s orders denying her motion to set aside a default judgment and denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over distributions from the Walt Disney Family Trust (the Trust). Under the terms of the Trust, because Walt Disney’s children have died, the remaining beneficiaries are entitled to a final distribution of their share of the res of the trust. Petitioner Bradford Lund (Brad) is Walt Disney’s grandchild and is a beneficiary entitled to his share. At the time he became eligible for his final distribution, however, he was the subject of a conservatorship proceeding in Arizona, where he lives. In that proceeding, his sister Michelle Lund and two half-siblings alleged Brad has congenital cognitive defects and was subject to undue influence from his father and stepmother. In that proceeding, prior to the death of the heirs that triggered the final distribution, Brad and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), the sole remaining trustee, stipulated that monthly distributions would be made under certain conditions designed to mitigate the risk of undue