CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found insurance broker John O. Bronson Co., Inc. (Bronson) liable to gallery owner Gary Koeppel for damages resulting from an insurance carrier’s denial of a dealer fine art policy claim. On appeal, defendant Bronson argues that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on a “special relationship” duty, (2) recognizing a duty to advocate, and (3) allowing evidence of defendant’s insurance liability coverage. Defendant also challenges (4) plaintiff’s standing to sue on behalf of a limited liability company, (5) damages awarded for emotional distress, (6) attorney’s fees awarded under the tort of another doctrine, (7) damages awarded for damaged posters by artist Herb Kane, and (8) the prejudgment interest rate. We find no error as to the standing, duty, emotional distress, and attorney’s fees issues. But we find that the damages award for the Kane posters is not supported by substantial evidence and that the trial court applied the wrong interest rate to

Petitioner Danny Renee Sanders brings this habeas corpus petition to challenge a July 16, 2015 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) denying him release on parole. At the parole hearing, the Presiding Commissioner conceded that after his pre-hearing review of the record “I thought you had a good chance of going home.” However, both commissioners (1) found that during the hearing petitioner had lied to them about the information he had provided to the psychologist who prepared the risk assessment; (2) based this finding on their experience and a phone call made during the hearing; and (3) stated that, as a result of the lie, they were no longer willing to credit any information petitioner had provided. As a consequence, parole was denied. Because the record reflects no evidence supporting the determination petitioner lied, and because of the decisive role played by that determination in the parole denial, we conclude petitioner is entitled to a new parole suitability

Harold G., father of minors M.F. and S.F., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) He contends the juvenile court erred in determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption does not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Ethan R. (minor) admitted one count of rape where the victim was prevented from resisting by intoxication (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3)), and was placed on indefinite probation in his father’s home. Within six months, minor ran away from home and went missing for over two weeks. He smoked marijuana daily, associated with gang members, and admitted to violating probation twice. Following the second violation of probation, the juvenile court committed minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) for eight years with credit for time served in precommitment custody.
On appeal, minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJF. He further contends the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion when setting his maximum term of confinement. Finally, he argues his sentence is unauthorized because it does not reflect credit for time served.We will remand the matter to the juvenile court to allow the court to exercise its discretion in set

Barbara K. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional finding and dispositional orders declaring her daughter, Alyssa K. (the child), a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in its jurisdictional and dispositional orders. Mother also contends the orders violated her due process rights. On May 10 and May 11, 2017 (while the current appeal was pending), the juvenile court entered a family law custody order defining the terms of the child’s custody and an order terminating jurisdiction. We provided the parties an opportunity to address whether we should declare moot the issues currently on appeal.
The Department of Children and Family Services (Department) took the position that the appeal is subject to dismissal as moot. Mother took the position that the jurisdictional findings could affect future family law court proceedings. She asserted the juvenile court’s erroneous judgment could only be challenge

J.P. (Mother) and D.W. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) does not apply and terminating parental rights to their daughter, A.W. A.W. was three years old on the date of the permanent plan selection hearing, held on October 19, 2016, under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26. We affirm because: (1) Father was not an enrolled member of a Native American Tribe on the date of the hearing; (2) the court had already continued the hearing four times to accommodate Father’s efforts to enroll, and a further continuance was not in A.W.’s best interest; and (3) ICWA does not require a child welfare agency to facilitate a tribe’s internal membership proceedings.

Plaintiffs Robert and Lorraine Farrell sued defendants James and Michelle Hines for alleged defects in a purchased house. Although the purchase agreement provided for arbitration of disputes, plaintiffs filed suit and did not move to compel arbitration until shortly before trial. The trial court concluded plaintiffs waived their right to arbitration.
Plaintiffs now challenge the trial court’s order. We will affirm.

James S. challenges the appointment of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS or LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), contending the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding he was gravely disabled. Because the one-year LPS Act conservatorship has terminated by operation of law, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.

Defendant M&C Hotel Interests, Inc. appeals from a judgment following a bench trial as to the existence and duration of an oral contract. Plaintiff Jackie Chen appeals from an attorney fees order. Plaintiff originally sued defendant for contract breach. She alleged she and defendant had an oral contract that provided that she would receive a 5 percent commission from defendant on the total revenue of any hotel room sales. Plaintiff obtained such a sale between China Southern Airlines and the Millennium Biltmore Hotel (the Biltmore), owned by defendant. China Southern Airlines and the Biltmore entered into an annual contract for flight crew rooms. Plaintiff terminated her employment with defendant while the contract between China Southern Airlines and the Biltmore was ongoing. Defendant did not pay her the commission. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to include a claim under Labor Code section 203 for withheld wages.
Following a bench trial, the court determined an ora

Appellants Antonio Francisco Castro and Randy Daniel Ortiz appeal from their convictions by jury verdict of first degree murder with findings that each personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime and that it was gang related. They contend the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of the deadly weapon enhancement constitutes constitutional structural error requiring reversal. In the alternative, they argue that if subject to harmless error review, the error was not harmless. Castro also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the crime was gang related. He also claims entitlement to 18 additional days of custody credit.

Plaintiff and appellant Westco Petroleum Distributors, Inc. (Westco) appeals from a judgment and an amended judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Huntington Beach Industrial (HBI), Huntington Beach Petroleum, LLC, and Paul Wakim (Wakim); West Covina Gas & Market, Inc. (West Covina), Mehraban Forughi, and Shahram Bakhtiari; and defendants A & A Dynamic (A&A) and Syed Haider (Haider); in Westco’s action for breach of contract and other claims. Westco also appeals from a postjudgment order granting West Covina $61,565 in attorney fees.
We affirm the judgment, the amended judgment, and the attorney fees award.

In 2012 the City of Alameda Health Care District, doing business as Alameda Hospital (Alameda), acquired a 120-bed skilled nursing facility (the Facility or the Waters Edge Facility) from The Waters Edge, Inc. (Waters Edge). The completion date of the transaction, marking the transfer of operation of the Facility, is governed by a contractually defined term—“Closing Date”—the meaning of which is at the heart of this appeal. As defined in the acquisition documents, the Closing Date was not a date certain, but was to be triggered by the fulfillment of certain conditions, including, most importantly here, Alameda’s receipt of a regulatory approval known as “Distinct Part” certification (DP certification), which was necessary for it to charge Medi-Cal reimbursable rates.

This case involves a dispute about a letter of intent agreement between Shailesh "Sunny" Patel and Chhatrala Business House (India) Private LTD (together Business House) and Deepak Israni and Pacifica Companies, LLC (together Pacifica) related to a development project for a property in India. Pacifica contended Business House breached fiduciary duties under the agreement by obtaining an order from the Supreme Court of India awarding Patel the property under a separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the government of the state of Gujarat, India. Business House contended the letter of intent agreement applied only if the property was acquired by the joint venture through a bidding process. After a five-week trial, a jury determined a joint venture existed between Business House and Pacifica, but neither Patel nor Business House acted against Pacifica's interests in connection with the project or on behalf of a party whose interests were adverse to Pacifica in conne

Following a jury trial, defendant Ryan Eddy Watenpaugh was convicted of two counts of infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, two counts of false imprisonment by violence, one count of cruelty to animals, one count of stalking, and one count of possession of an assault weapon. On the date set for sentencing, defendant asked the trial court to relieve his retained counsel and appoint a public defender. Following a closed hearing, the trial court denied the request. The trial court then sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years in state prison.