CA Unpub Decisions

This case arises out of a hit-and-run, but the evidence shows it was no accident. Darren James Silva was convicted of attempted willful, premeditated and deliberate murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), after he ran over a pedestrian, Margaret Contreras, with his pickup truck and then departed the scene. He was sentenced to 15 years to life on the attempted murder, with three consecutive years for the great bodily injury enhancement.
Silva raises on appeal nine claims of error: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of premeditation and deliberation; (2) refusal of his request for instruction on third party culpability (CALCRIM No. 373); (3) failure to instruct sua sponte on third party culpability; (4) the instructions’ failure to relate the third party perpetrator defense to the prosecution’s burden of proof; (5) erroneous admission into evidence of a residential surveillance

Appellant Johnathan Ray Rowley appeals from his 32-month state prison sentence following his negotiated plea of no contest to one count of failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (b)), and his admission to having a prior strike.
Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which he asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, specifically referencing the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence made at the time of the preliminary hearing, and the denial of his motion to strike his prior strike under Romero. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a
supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No brief has been submitted by appell

Defendant Enrique Hernandez Relles challenges his multiple convictions arising out of his threats to kill several family members. We find no error and affirm.

Appellant Gabriel Chaska Ray appeals from a judgment following his no contest pleas to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of driving with a .08 or greater blood alcohol level (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)). Appellant’s counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellate counsel advised appellant of his right to file a supplementary brief to bring to this court’s attention any issue he believes deserves review. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) Appellant has not filed such a brief. We have reviewed the record and find no arguable issues. We modify the judgment to correct a fine error, and affirm the judgment as modified.

After a first trial ended in a hung jury and mistrial, a jury in the second trial convicted John Agapito Luna of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). As to both offenses, the jury found that Luna personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found that Luna had suffered three probation denial priors under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4), and one prison prior under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced Luna to a term of six years in prison.
Luna appeals. He argues that the evidence at trial did not support his convictions. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted Dwayne A. Farrell of two counts of first degree burglary, committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, and two counts of annoying or molesting a minor after entering an inhabited dwelling without consent. On appeal, Farrell raises two issues. He asserts the trial court abused its discretion by permitting evidence of two uncharged sex offenses, which he argues should have been excluded as dissimilar and highly prejudicial. We reject this argument. Farrell also contends the trial court should have stayed his concurrent sentences for burglary and annoying or molesting a minor under Penal Code section 654. The Attorney General concedes the error under Penal Code section 654, but asks this court to modify the sentence. Because the record does not indicate a modification is appropriate, we remand the cause for the limited purpose of resentencing Farrell in accordance with this opinion.

Defendant Anthony Escalante appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to vehicle theft. His sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erroneously imposed a curfew requirement as a condition of his mandatory supervision. We shall strike the curfew condition but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Roger Dale Cook was charged by information with residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1) and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 2). The information also alleged that he served three prior prison sentences (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), he had one prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and he had one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). A jury found defendant guilty of both counts, and he admitted all the prior conviction allegations. Defendant filed a Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction, which the court denied. The court sentenced him to the midterm of four years on count 1, doubled pursuant to the strike, one year four months on count 2, plus one year on each of the two prison priors and five years on the prior serious felony conviction, for a total of 16 years four months in state prison.
On appeal, de

Defendant Antaniqua Marcella Clay pleaded no contest to attempted grand theft of personal property with a value exceeding $950 (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484, 487, subd. (a)), misdemeanor concealing or withholding stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), possession of personal identifying information with intent to defraud and a prior conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2)), and misdemeanor battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including that she pay restitution to American Express in the amount of $622.59.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding restitution to American Express because it was not a “direct victim” within the meaning of the restitution statute. (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(2).) She also argues that the restitution award to American Express results in a “windfall” to another entity. Lastly, defendant

Appointed counsel for defendant Monroe Walter Burns asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. That letter was returned, labeled “Return to Sender/Unable to Forward/Out to Court Since 7/25. No forwarding address found.” On review, we find no arguable issues.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appointed counsel for defendant Monroe Walter Burns asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. That letter was returned, labeled “Return to Sender/Unable to Forward/Out to Court Since 7/25. No forwarding address found.” On review, we find no arguable issues.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appointed counsel for defendant Monroe Walter Burns asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. That letter was returned, labeled “Return to Sender/Unable to Forward/Out to Court Since 7/25. No forwarding address found.” On review, we find no arguable issues.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury convicted appellant of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211); unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and two counts of grand theft (Pen. Code § 484e, subd. (d)). The trial court found that appellant suffered nine prior strike convictions and five prior prison terms, and imposed an aggregate term of 131 years to life in prison.
Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible errors by (1) admitting evidence of uncharged acts of domestic abuse and murder committed against other victims; (2) admitting evidence of the victim’s statements about appellant; and (3) failing to instruct the jury regarding theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

It is ordered that the unpublished opinion filed July 11, 2017 be modified as follows:
Footnote 10 is added after the first full paragraph on page 20 with the following text:
“10 In its petition for rehearing, appellant argues that respondents, as the parties moving for summary judgment, had the initial burden of specifically denying that they signed the July 12, 2011 agreement. That is incorrect. “[A] summary judgment motion necessarily is addressed to the pleadings. [Citation.] ‘The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.’ [Citation.] . . .