CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Mark Black, a Tustin police officer, alleges he suffered injuries when a plastic bottle in a trash can exploded while he was at the Orange County jail delivering an arrestee for booking. Black sued the County of Orange (the County) for his injuries. Both sides sought the assistance of expert witnesses to determine the cause of the explosion.
The trial court entered an order disqualifying the County’s expert witness, Tom Maricich and the County’s attorneys, Wagner & Pelayes. The court found Maricich improperly consulted Neil Spingarn in formulating his opinions after Spingarn had previously undergone a retention interview with Black’s counsel during which confidential information concerning the facts and theories of Black’s case was disclosed. On appeal the County contends: (1) the trial court erred in finding confidential information materially related to the case was provided to Spingarn by Black’s counsel; (2) it rebutted the presumption that confidential m

Plaintiff Leann D. Wilson sued defendants Aram Bonni, M.D., Valley Surgical Center (VSC) and Garden Grove Hospital Medical Center for negligence and medical malpractice. Bonni is the only party to this appeal. Bonni and VSC moved to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings pursuant to multiple arbitration agreements Wilson had signed. The court granted the motion, and Bonni and VSC prevailed at arbitration. Subsequently, the case was dismissed. Wilson now appeals, arguing the court should not have granted arbitration as to Bonni because he, under Wilson’s theory, was not a party to any arbitration agreement with her. Due to the language in the agreements stating they applied to a broad class of persons associated with VSC, we disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

The jury convicted defendant and appellant Rakeem J. Williams in count 1 of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and in counts 2 and 3 of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). As to all three counts, the jury found true gang enhancement allegations pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). It also found true personal use firearm allegations pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d), in count 1, and use of a firearm by a principal pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), in counts 2 and 3.
Defendant was sentenced to 85 years to life in prison. In count 1, the trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life, plus 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). In count 2, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of 15 years to life, plus 20 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The court imposed a concurrent sentence of

In a trial by jury, defendant and appellant Andre Lamont Swafford was found guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). He admitted 10 prior convictions and prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), with one of the prior convictions being a “strike” (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 30 years to life, plus five years.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. He contends that the trial court erred by allowing the People to introduce gang evidence.
We affirm.

Appellant Phillip Herbert Sterns is serving life sentences in two Kern County Superior Court cases, numbers SC075046A and SC075100A. He appeals an order from the superior court that denied his applications for resentencing in both cases pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36). In case number SC075046A, the superior court determined that appellant was not eligible for resentencing because he had been armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the underlying offense. In case number SC075100A, the court ruled that appellant was eligible for resentencing but denied the petition, determining his release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
On appeal, appellant argues he is eligible for resentencing in both cases and the trial court erred. He further contends that the definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” must be analyzed under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, and not Prop

Michael Charles Simon appeals the judgment entered after he pled no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 459) and admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d) -(e), 1170.12, subds. (b) -(c)) and four prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The preliminary hearing transcript reflects that appellant burglarized a hair salon and took the business owner’s car keys and vehicle.

The trial court ordered Jeffrey Lee Knight to pay $2,162.45 in restitution to Khristy S. for damage to her car. Knight contends that the court abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting his alternate restitution plan and relying on a written repair estimate to fix the restitution amount. Because the restitution order was reasonably calculated to compensate the victim for her economic loss, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Jacquiz Emmanuel Jones, of first degree burglary (count 1; Pen. Code, § 459) and found true an allegation that another person, other than an accomplice, was present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)). Defendant subsequently admitted he had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 17 years’ incarceration.
After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the facts, a statement of the case, and identifying two potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the court erroneously withdrew defendant’s prior plea pursuant to his request; and (2) whether the court erroneously admitted the testimony of two witn

Appellant/defendant Russell Wayne Havner was convicted of two counts of battery by a prisoner on a correctional officer (Pen. Code, § 4501.5) and sentenced to the second strike term of 12 years in prison. The charges were based on an incident that occurred in November 2008, when defendant was a state prison inmate admitted to a Bakersfield hospital for treatment, and he assaulted two correctional officers in his hospital room. The felony complaint and arrest warrant were issued in 2009. Defendant was subsequently released from prison, and later convicted and sentenced in unrelated cases to prison terms in Arizona and California. In 2013, the district attorney’s office of Kern County located defendant, arraigned him on the felony complaint, and resumed the proceedings against him based on the assault charges. He was sentenced to the second strike term of 12 years in this case.

On February 5, 2008, defendant pleaded guilty to grand theft (§ 487) in a case involving the theft of property valued at $179. He was sentenced to serve a two-year state prison term.
Defendant filed a section 1170.18 application to redesignate the grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor on April 28, 2015. He filed a second application seeking the same relief on August 3, 2015, and a third on October 7, 2015.
On April 30, 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)), aggravated mayhem (§ 205), felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and sustained enhancements for personally discharging a firearm resulting in great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) on the attempted murder and mayhem counts. On July 15, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to serve 32 years to life plus four years.
The trial court denied the application on November 20, 2015, on the gr

This appeal presents a single issue: whether Penal Code section 654 required the trial court to stay any future sentence for defendant Ignacio Cervantes’s conviction for making criminal threats based on that conviction being part of an indivisible course of conduct with his other conviction for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The appeal is procedurally unusual because the trial court’s Penal Code section 654 determination occurred when defendant was placed on felony probation and before any sentence was imposed. Because this procedural situation is similar to an appeal from an order granting probation when a trial court imposes a sentence but suspends its execution, we find that the trial court’s Penal Code section 654 determination is reviewable despite being arguably premature.
Defendant assaulted and threatened a housemate, leading to convictions for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and makin

Lynne Nonnenmacher appeals from a judgment in favor of Denise Walsh. The trial court entered the judgment after a jury rendered a verdict finding that Walsh was not negligent. On appeal, Nonnenmacher raises 19 separately captioned arguments. Sixteen of the 19 arguments pertain to evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. The other three arguments pertain to alleged procedural errors committed by the trial court. The record on appeal does not contain any reporter's transcripts from either the proceedings pertaining to these rulings or from the jury trial.
Our state constitution provides that a court may not reverse a judgment based on a trial court's erroneous evidentiary or procedural rulings unless the reviewing court determines, after an "examination of the entire cause, including the evidence," that the errors "resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, italics added.) Without a reporter's transcript of the trial in

Lynne Nonnenmacher appeals from a judgment in favor of Denise Walsh. The trial court entered the judgment after a jury rendered a verdict finding that Walsh was not negligent. On appeal, Nonnenmacher raises 19 separately captioned arguments. Sixteen of the 19 arguments pertain to evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. The other three arguments pertain to alleged procedural errors committed by the trial court. The record on appeal does not contain any reporter's transcripts from either the proceedings pertaining to these rulings or from the jury trial.
Our state constitution provides that a court may not reverse a judgment based on a trial court's erroneous evidentiary or procedural rulings unless the reviewing court determines, after an "examination of the entire cause, including the evidence," that the errors "resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, italics added.) Without a reporter's transcript of the trial in

Macpherson filed its original complaint in July 2013. Macpherson alleged two causes of action for declaratory relief to resolve disputes as to the ongoing rights and obligations of Smoot, as lessor, and Macpherson, as lessee, under the 1926 oil and gas lease. Macpherson sought to establish that it did not need to bury its pipelines below “plow depth” under the lease as demanded by Smoot and that it was properly calculating certain royalty payments. Macpherson also alleged a cause of action for breach of the 1926 lease asserting that “Smoot’s bad faith demand that Macpherson bury all of its pipelines currently on the surface” of the leased land interfered with the benefits Macpherson was entitled to under the lease.