CA Unpub Decisions

This is a shotgun-approach appeal in which trustee Kristopher D. Leino and his attorney Fred A. Ihejirika present 17 separate arguments against an order requiring them to jointly pay $16,060 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The trial court imposed the sanctions on grounds Leino and Ihejirika (appellants) refused to remove a lis pendens on Balkcom’s property for more than a year after Leino’s underlying probate action was dismissed. The trial court expressly found appellants’ refusal to withdraw the lis pendens was “for an improper purpose, that is was to harass or cause unnecessary cost and litigation, and it was because [Leino] simply refused to accept and honor the Court’s decision.”
Appellants contend (1) the motion for sanctions was not brought separately as required by section 128.7, subdivision (b), (2) the served and filed versions of the motion were different, (3) the version of the motion for sanctions filed with the court constituted

This wrongful death case arises from the tragic death of Respondents Ted and Kim Jacques’ (the Jacques) 20-year-old son, Brandon, at the hands of facilities and individuals entrusted with his care. After a few years of the Jacques attempting to get Brandon help for alcohol and eating disorder related problems, Brandon finally agreed to enter a residential treatment facility located in Arizona. The Jacques advised the facility of Brandon’s dual issues, but it became clear after a few weeks the facility was not able to treat his eating disorder. On recommendation of the Arizona facility, Brandon was transferred to a residential treatment facility located in Newport Beach, Morningside Recovery, LLC (Morningside). Although Morningside was not licensed to treat eating disorders, it reassured the Jacques that it had experienced staff who could do so.
Within about a week of Brandon entering Morningside, staff noticed behavior from him indicating his eating disorder was active. Their

Defendant and appellant A.H. (Father) is the father of two boys (the Children), who were ages six and almost eight on the date of the challenged orders. Father appeals from the juvenile court’s orders on December 2, 2016, dismissing the dependency and selecting guardianship with a maternal aunt as the Children’s permanent plan. Father contends the court erred when it found the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) gave adequate notice to the Indian tribes he identified under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.). Specifically, Father argues CFS failed to adequately inquire about his Native American ancestry so it could include that information on the ICWA notices to the tribes. For the reasons discussed post, we affirm.

Yeny Marta Gallegos was placed at Dispensing Dynamics International, Inc. (DDI) by Priority Business Services, Inc. (Priority), a contract employment provider, in November 2006. In December 2013, Priority ceased providing services to DDI and Gallegos ceased being Priority’s employee; Gallegos continued to be employed by DDI until October 2014, although her employer of record was Dream Team, a separate agency. Almost one year after her relationship with Priority ceased, in November 2014, Gallegos submitted what Priority described as a “new hire application” to Priority, which included an arbitration agreement.

Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (Family Health) appeals from an order granting Rosario Contreras-Velazquez's motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. Velazquez sued Family Health, alleging disability discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and related causes of action. Although the jury found in Family Health's favor on all of Velazquez's causes of action, the court found there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts as to her causes of action for failure to accommodate (§ 12940, subd. (m)), failure to engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)), and failure to prevent discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (k)). Consequently, the court ordered a new trial on these claims.
Family Health contends we must reverse the order because the motion's supporting papers were not timely filed. We conclude the motion's supporting papers were ti

In 1997, Gerald E. and Bente Buck created the Buck Family Trust (Trust) funded by approximately $81 million in assets. Initially, the primary beneficiaries were their two children, Alan M. Buck and Christina Buck. After Gerald’s and Bente’s deaths, Alan discovered he had been disinherited and filed a petition to invalidate amendments to the Trust that removed him as beneficiary. Christina, as trustee of the Trust, denied Alan’s allegations of undue influence and she prevailed in a court trial. On appeal, Alan argues the court “wrongfully hobbled” his ability to present a case by making several pretrial rulings. Specifically, Alan asserts the court erred in permitting his counsel to withdraw two months before the original trial date, by cancelling several depositions, and in denying his application to designate expert witnesses. We conclude Alan’s contentions lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.

In October 2006, plaintiff obtained a $448,000 loan from United Financial Mortgage Corp. (United Financial), which was secured by a deed of trust that identified First American Title (First American) as the “trustee” and identified Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as “a nominee” of the lender (and it’s successors and assigns) and as “beneficiary” under the security instrument. As such, MERS was authorized to exercise any of the lender’s rights, including the right to foreclose. The deed of trust was recorded the same month.
More than two years later, on January 20, 2009, MERS (as nominee of United Financial) executed an assignment of “all beneficial interest” in the deed of trust to LaSalle Bank NA (LaSalle) as trustee for Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2007-OA2 Trust (the securitized trust). This assignment by MERS of United Financial’s beneficial interest in the deed of trust was signed by Debora

In March 2016, the Monterey County Department of Social Services (Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of W.S. M.V., the mother of W.S., (mother) now appeals from the juvenile court’s November 15, 2016 orders that (1) denied her petition to modify the June 7, 2016 order bypassing family reunification services for her and (2) terminated parental rights and declared adoption to be the permanent plan for W.S. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. W.S.’s alleged father, whose initials are the same as the child, (father) also appeals from the November 15, 2016 order terminating parental rights.Mother asserts that she may challenge the court’s June 7, 2016 jurisdiction/disposition findings and orders, including the order bypassing family reunification services for her, because she was not properly advised of the requirement of filing a writ petition to preserve her appellate rights following the order setting the section 366.26 hearing on Ju

Defendant Laurie V. Montoya challenges the superior court’s denial of her Penal Code section 1170.18 petition seeking to have her 1983 felony conviction for possession of PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) redesignated as a misdemeanor. The Attorney General asserts that the appeal is “moot” because defendant’s 1983 conviction had already been reduced to a misdemeanor under section 17 in 2007. The record does not support the Attorney General’s claim. He concedes that the trial court’s rationale for denying defendant’s motion was erroneous and that reversal is required if the matter is not moot. We agree that the superior court erred, and we reverse the court’s order.

Defendant Joseph Martinez Garcia separately appeals from two post-judgment orders in Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. 190165 (case No. 190165): (1) the December 29, 2014 order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126 (case No. H042014) and (2) the April 28, 2016 order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18 (case No. H043552). This court ordered the two appeals to be consolidated for the purposes of briefing, oral argument, and disposition.
In case No. H042014, defendant’s consolidated appellate briefs raise no issues concerning the December 29, 2014 order denying his petition for resentencing under section 1170.126. Therefore, we shall dismiss the appeal as abandoned.
In case No. H043552, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for resentencing under section 1170.18 on the ground that his 1999 conviction of first degree burglary, for which he was serving a

A jury convicted defendant Esteban Delacruz Roman of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation.
We appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Counsel filed a brief summarizing the proceedings and facts of the case and advised the court he found no arguable issues to assert on defendant’s behalf. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) To assist us in our independent review, counsel suggested we consider whether the court erred by admitting a photograph of methamphetamine and guns found on defendant’s cell phone at the time of his arrest.
Counsel and this court both notified defendant that he could file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. However, we received no supplemental brief from him and the time to file one has passed.

Rosendo Flores III (defendant) stands convicted of arson of an inhabited dwelling, a violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (b). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

Sardina and two codefendants, Angel Avalos and Felipe Carillo, entered a residence and robbed a person within, at gunpoint, of his wallet, car keys, and 36-pack of beer. All three defendants were members of the Chankla Bulldog Gang of Sanger, with Sardina being a lower-level gang member than the other two defendants.
Sardina was charged with second-degree robbery, street terrorism, and possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 186.22, subd. (a), 29800.) The robbery charge was accompanied by enhancement allegations that (1) the offense was committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (gang enhancement), and (2) that Sardina personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (gun enhancement). (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) [gang enhancement provides for additional 10-year term when underlying offense is robbery, a violent felony], 12022.53, subd. (b) [gun enhancement also provides for additional 10-year term when underlying offe

During a warrantless search of appellant Vanna Sok’s person and a backpack she carried, Long Beach Police officers recovered four bindles of methamphetamine, a digital scale, and cash. During a separate search of her residence pursuant to a warrant, officers recovered a .38 caliber revolver, an additional scale, and drug packaging materials. Based upon these searches, the district attorney charged Sok with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)). In separate hearings, the trial court denied both Sok’s section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence from the search of her person and her motion pursuant to People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (Hobbs) to identify the warrant’s confidential informant and to quash and traverse the warrant. Thereafter, Sok pleaded no contest to both charges and the trial court granted her probation.