CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Jeremy James Lenz of continuous sexual abuse, assault, forcible rape, and lewd and lascivious acts upon a child. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 57 years eight months, consisting of upper terms on counts one to six. In his opening brief on appeal, defendant argued (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of six pornographic video titles defendant had viewed; (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument by arguing facts not in evidence and improperly describing the use of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) evidence; and (3) the trial court’s CALCRIM No. 375 [evidence of uncharged offense] instruction to the jury was erroneous.

A.R. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, A.R. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) He contends the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) failed to comply with their duties of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and related California law.
The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply based solely on the parents’ denials of Indian ancestry. Neither HSA nor the court asked any of A.R.’s extended family members whether she is or may be an Indian child, as required by section 224.2, subdivision (b).
HSA concedes that “because certain relatives were readily accessible in this case . . . father is probably correct that HSA and the court could have asked those relatives about Indian ancestry and that the court may have erred by accepting just mother’s and father’s denial of any Indian ancestry.”

Roel Adolfo Escobar appeals the order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. We appointed counsel to represent Escobar on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

Plaintiff and appellant Gabriel Munoz alleges he is the true owner of a property located in North Hills. On June 8, 2020, Munoz filed suit against defendant and respondent Jorge Luis Soto, defendant Mikael Puskulian, and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable interest in the property, averring causes of action for cancellation of written instruments and quiet title. Munoz alleges that in or about October 2013, Puskulian recorded a forged quitclaim deed, which purported to convey the property from Munoz to Puskulian, and that in or about July 2014, Soto recorded a quitclaim deed, which purported to convey the property from Puskulian to Soto. Munoz asserts he first discovered these transactions during a title search in November 2016.
Soto demurred to the operative verified second amended complaint, contending the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims barred these causes of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

Defendants and appellants Robert J. Hudock and Hudock Employment Law Group, APC, appeal from the order denying their special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). All further undesignated statutory references are to this code. Defendant and appellant Eric Wolf, who joined in the motion, also appeals from the court’s denial.
We affirm.

Plaintiff Le’Eldred Palm, Sr., sued Red Lobster Hospitality LLC (Red Lobster or defendant) and two of its employees, alleging causes of action for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act, Civ. Code, § 52.1). Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) motion to strike the complaint. (Undesignated statutory references are to section 425.16.) The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Defendant appeals, contending the court should have struck the entire complaint.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

This appeal stems from a family law proceeding between A.W. (Father) and I.C. (Mother) regarding the custody of their minor child, M.W. Father appeals the family court’s order granting Mother’s request that M.W. move with her to Washington, D.C. Father argues the court reversibly erred when, in granting this request, the court “ignored” the opinion testimony of a custody investigator that Mother was relocating to Washington, D.C. as a means of keeping M.W. away from Father. But the trial court was entitled to deem the investigator’s testimony not credible, and substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Mother’s move was not in bad faith. Father identified no other basis on which he challenges the court’s overall conclusion that the move was in M.W.’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm.

Alkiviades David sexually battered his employee Mahim Khan, engaging in despicable behavior witnessed by coworkers. David treated Khan’s harassment suit with cavalier indifference. He did not produce documents (including financial information) nor did he answer interrogatories, sit for a deposition or pay court-ordered discovery sanctions. After disobeying an order to submit to a deposition, he was barred from testifying at trial. At trial, he engaged in insulting behavior toward the jury, the judge, plaintiff, and counsel. After repeatedly disrupting proceedings with profane outbursts, David lost the right to represent himself.
The jury awarded Khan over $8 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages. David challenges rulings preventing him from introducing evidence that was not produced in discovery, revoking his self-representation, allowing expert testimony, and allowing plaintiff’s counsel to make certain unfavorable closing arguments.

Thomas Barber, Lori Barber, and their two children, (collectively, the Barbers) appeal from a judgment of the superior court in the Barbers’ lawsuit against Southern California Edison Company (SCE) following summary judgment in SCE’s favor. The Barbers previously lived on a property on Knob Hill Avenue in Redondo Beach (the Barbers’ former home), which is located a few doors away from one of SCE’s electricity substations, the Topaz substation. The Barbers’ lawsuit alleged that electricity from the substation caused them to experience shocks at various places on their property, and sought recovery primarily for the emotional distress they suffered as a result.
On appeal, the Barbers argue that the court (1) excluded evidence that would have created a triable issue of fact as to causation; (2) applied the wrong legal standard for causation by analogizing the case to a toxic tort suit; and (3) erred in concluding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor did not establish causation.

The instant appeal is from a judgment in a dissolution action between appellant Billy Edwin Waddell and respondent Virginia Dean (formerly Virginia Waddell). The judgment adopted the terms of a marital settlement agreement signed by both parties and their respective counsel (the MSA). Billy argues the MSA does not reflect the terms to which he and Virginia orally agreed regarding the distribution of Billy’s pension plans. He claims he signed the MSA without reading it because Virginia and her lawyer led Billy and his lawyer to believe that the MSA distributed the pension plans consistent with the parties’ oral agreement as Billy and his counsel understood it.
Billy argues that the MSA is sufficiently ambiguous that the trial court should have admitted extrinsic evidence of the parties’ negotiations to support his interpretation of the MSA.

Elijah C. appeals jurisdictional and dispositional orders adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him at Camp Wilmont Sweeny. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Elijah contends the juvenile court erred by: (1) failing to declare whether “wobbler” offenses Elijah was found to have committed are felonies or misdemeanors; (2) failing to calculate Elijah’s maximum term of confinement; (3) miscalculating Elijah’s precommitment credits; and (4) imposing an unconstitutionally vague probation condition requiring Elijah to “be of good conduct.” We will strike the challenged probation condition and remand this matter for the court to correct several errors that are conceded by the People.

Matt Ballard appeals from an order granting the petition of respondent John Balquist to approve his accounting as trustee of the Darlene Pyshora Trust (Trust) and denying Ballard’s cross-petition objecting to various acts by Balquist as trustee. We reverse.

In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner C.R. contended that a regulation promulgated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that excluded inmates currently serving an indeterminate life term for a violent felony offense from nonviolent offender early parole consideration was contrary to article I, section 32, the constitutional provision mandating early parole consideration that was enacted by voters through their approval of Proposition 57. Petitioner, who is currently convicted of two violent and several nonviolent felony offenses, asserted that under section 32’s plain language, he is entitled to nonviolent offender early parole consideration because he has completed serving the full term for his primary offense.
In an opinion filed July 21, 2021, this court held that CDCR’s regulation was a reasonable interpretation of section 32 and denied the petition.
Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.

Defendant Eric Jason Frahs has a history of mental illness and a lengthy criminal record. In 2015, Frahs was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon. According to a probation report, Frahs “engaged in a physical altercation, during which time the defendant cut the victim’s face with a broken beer bottle.”
Most recently, Frahs was convicted of two Estes robbery counts. (See People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23.) While attempting to steal beverages from a store, Frahs engaged in a physical altercation with two store workers; one of them “was hit in the head and fell down.” (People v. Frahs (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 784, 787 (Frahs I), affirmed and remanded by People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 (Frahs II).)
On remand, Frahs requested retroactive mental health diversion. (See Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(F).) The trial court judge denied Frahs’ request because, “I do believe that he is unreasonably dangerous to the public.”