CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Nicholas Dunahoo was convicted of charges related to a domestic violence incident against his girlfriend. He contends (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding evidence of uncharged domestic violence, and (2) the trial court erroneously believed it did not have discretion to impose anything but the upper term sentence for count 1 in case No. MFE15000140. We conclude there was no prejudicial error in giving the jury instruction on evidence of uncharged domestic violence and the trial court exercised its discretion in imposing the upper term for count 1. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The information charged Carbajal with two felony counts, driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and evading a pursuing officer (id., § 2800.2), and one misdemeanor count of possession of burglar’s tools (Pen. Code, § 466). The information specially alleged Carbajal had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) and had served two separate prison terms for felonies (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Victor C. appeals from a judgment of paternity granting Christina M. primary physical custody of their minor children and awarding Victor C. custody of the children for only two weekends per month plus two hours on Wednesday evenings. He contends the trial court denied him due process by refusing to admit certain audio and video recordings into evidence, by refusing to appoint a neutral evaluator, and by failing to articulate its reasoning supporting the judgment. We disagree with each contention, and therefore affirm.

In May 2016, a jury convicted James Edward Wheeler (Wheeler) of fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), a felony (count 1), and hit-and-run driving resulting in property damage (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor (count 2). The trial court sentenced Wheeler to a term of 16 months in state prison.
On appeal, Wheeler claims that the trial court violated his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions by acting in a biased manner. We disagree.

Respondent Community West Bank (CWB) sued appellant Gregory B. Friedman for breach of contract relating to Friedman’s guaranty of a loan for a parcel of commercial real estate. Friedman and his company, borrower Olive Investment, LLC, cross-complained, alleging that CWB induced Olive into taking the loan by falsely promising that CWB would later provide construction funding for the project. CWB moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion. Friedman and Olive (collectively, appellants) moved to reopen the case to present additional evidence to undermine CWB’s claim for damages. The court denied the motion. Appellants appealed, challenging both rulings.

Defendants Charles Dunn Company, Inc. (CDC) and Hamid Soroudi appeal from the trial court’s order denying in part their motion to compel arbitration of all claims alleged against them by plaintiffs Christine Petrikas Ireland (Ireland), as an individual and as trustee of the Petrikas Family Bypass Trust and the Petrikas Family Survivor Trust (the Trusts will be referred to collectively as the Petrikas Trusts); Petrikas Family Limited Partnership (the Petrikas Partnership); and 14426 Palmdale Road, LLC (the Palmdale LLC). CDC was the real estate broker for plaintiffs in various real estate transactions, and Soroudi, one of CDC’s real estate agents, acted as plaintiffs’ agent in most of those transactions.
All of plaintiffs’ claims against CDC and Soroudi arise from those transactions, all but one of which were memorialized in purchase agreements containing arbitration clauses, and all transactions purported to be part of tax-deferred exchanges under 26 United States Code sect

A jury convicted Datwan Troy Bethell of kidnapping to commit robbery, second degree robbery, and battery. Bethell appeals, arguing that his convictions of kidnapping to commit robbery are not supported by substantial evidence. We agree, and reverse those convictions.

Michael appeals from the award of attorney fees to Mindey, contending that the trial court (1) erred by determining the amount of attorney fees based upon evidence of the amount Mindey paid to her attorneys, rather than on the attorneys’ billing records; (2) abused its discretion by failing to apportion the fees between those incurred in defending against Michael’s contractual claims and those incurred in defending against his tort claims; and (3) abused its discretion by awarding Mindey fees incurred in establishing her affirmative defense that Michael lacked standing to assert certain claims. Based upon a recent California Supreme Court case, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees that were incurred before the complaint was amended to add a claim for breach of a promissory note, because that award was made under an agreement that plaintiffs did not seek to enforce or interpret in their lawsuit. Instead, the agreement in this case was asserted as an a

Plaintiffs are members of a California nonprofit public benefit corporation. They filed a derivative action against several corporate officers for conversion of corporate funds and related claims. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs and ordered defendants to reimburse the funds owed to the corporation. The court also issued an injunction requiring defendants to relinquish their positions with the corporation; cease acting as officers or directors of the corporation; turn over the books, records, and financial accounts necessary to manage the corporation; and cease interfering with the lawful operation of the corporation.
In this appeal from the judgment, defendants contend plaintiffs lack standing, the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court erred by failing to honor a settlement agreement entered by the parties before judgment was entered. Finding no error, we affirm. The motion for sanctions on appeal is denied

Plaintiffs and appellants Clark and Karla Fratus (the Fratuses) seek to reverse a motion denying attorney fees incurred while obtaining a writ of administrative mandate directing respondent Department of Conservation and Development (DCD) to set aside $12,900 in fines erroneously imposed on the Fratuses for alleged regulatory violations. We conclude that the Fratuses’ motion for attorney fees under Government Code section 800 was timely and supported by competent evidence, and the DCD acted arbitrarily or capriciously by imposing the fines. We therefore reverse.

On August 19, 2015, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support], alleging that J.T., then 17 years old, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The petition alleged that the parents (who lived separately in Santa Cruz County) had placed J.T. in a Sacramento group home three years earlier and had been unwilling to participate in services that would facilitate J.T.’s return to their homes. J.T. had “identified her parents’ lack of involvement in her life as a trigger for her emotional struggles,” and the parents’ failure to provide adequate emotional support placed J.T. at substantial risk of harm and neglect. The parents were unwilling to pick J.T. up from a psychiatric hospital, were unable to make other arrangements for J.T.’s care, and did not want her returned to their homes.

Defendant Morris Kurtz entered a no contest plea to possession for sale of a controlled substance, possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, and possession of a nunchaku. He also admitted two prison prior enhancements. The court sentenced him to serve a two-year prison term, consecutive to a nine-year sentence he was serving in a case filed in Alameda County.
Defendant on appeal challenges the court’s imposition of penalty assessments on two levies made by the court. The two levies were a criminal laboratory analysis fee (see Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5; hereafter crime-lab fee), and a drug program fee (see § 11372.7). He argues that the crime-lab fee and drug program fee constituted administrative fees upon which the imposition of penalty assessments was improper. We conclude there was no error and will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Devon Sinclair English was convicted by a jury of nine felony charges for his role in a home invasion robbery, and sentenced to 14 years and eight months in prison. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts and that the trial court erred by not applying Penal Code section 654 to stay several of the prison terms imposed at sentencing. As we will explain, we find no error affecting defendant’s convictions, but Penal Code section 654 requires that some of the prison terms be stayed. We will therefore reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

This is a troubling case. We recognize that the juvenile dependency system in this county labors under the twin disadvantages of inadequate funding and crushing caseloads, so we are reluctant to throw stones at people struggling under such circumstances. But no one can suffer through this record without being profoundly disappointed. The stakes here are very high, perhaps the highest in our legal system: the lives and well-being of children. When the system fails to function properly, as it did here, the consequences can be heart-wrenching and tragic.
David G., Sr. (David, Sr.) appeals from an order of the juvenile court returning his son, David G., Jr. (David, Jr.) to David, Jr.’s mother, Ciera S., after the 18-month review hearing. David, Jr. was detained at age 16 months. At the time, David, Sr. was in Mexico, having been deported shortly after David, Jr.’s birth.
The reunification process dragged on far beyond the 12 months mandated by the Legislature for a child of