CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Young Sook Yi filed a quiet title action alleging her son had forged a power of attorney that he then used to obtain a loan secured by a deed of trust to Yi’s home. The complaint further alleged that Yi’s son defaulted on the loan, causing her house to be foreclosed upon, and then sold to respondents Soung Jin Oh and Jamie J. Oh. Yi sought an order declaring the power of attorney, the deed of trust and the Ohs’ grant deed void.
The Ohs demurred, arguing Yi had failed to allege any facts showing they had actual or constructive knowledge that the power of attorney was forged, or that any of the documents in their chain of title were invalid. Yi, however, argued that it was immaterial whether the Ohs had any such knowledge because a forged instrument is void as a matter of law, and cannot provide foundation for good title.

Plaintiffs Andre’ and Tiffany Perry (plaintiffs) appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendant-landlords’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ cause of action for retaliatory eviction as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Plaintiffs contend that their cause of action did not arise from defendants’ protected activity of serving a notice to quit and filing an unlawful detainer action, but instead was based on defendants’ unlawful, retaliatory motive for evicting plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further contend that they carried their shifted burden to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. We discern no trial court error and affirm the order.

David Thomas Parker (Parker) owned the Il Ghiotto restaurant in Fullerton, California. Parker and his mother Ruth Anne Griffin (Griffin) leased the premises from the Trider Corporation (Trider) and signed the lease as tenants. After they failed to pay rent on the property for several months, Trider filed an unlawful detainer action against Parker and Griffin. Trider unsuccessfully attempted to serve Parker and Griffin with a complaint and summons at the restaurant location. Trider then sought and received a court order allowing the company to serve Parker and Griffin by posting. Parker and Griffin failed to appear in unlawful detainer action and a default judgment was subsequently entered in the case.

Joshua D. Williams appeals from a judgment following his guilty plea to one count of attempted robbery. The trial court sentenced him to 16 months in prison and imposed various fines and fees. Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Williams has not responded to our invitation to file a supplemental brief. After having independently reviewed the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

William Washington appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Proposition 57, a voter-enacted initiative on the November 2016 ballot officially titled “The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.” Following a review of the record, appointed counsel for Washington filed a brief identifying no meritorious issues. After independently reviewing the record and analyzing the contentions in Washington’s supplemental brief, we affirm.

Defendant Theodore Swain appeals from an order of the trial court approving the sale of real property in New Mexico that the receiver acquired from Swain after Swain was convicted of securities fraud and other financial crimes. In connection with his convictions, Swain was ordered to pay his victims approximately $6.775 million in restitution, and the trial court appointed a receiver to take possession of Swain's assets, which included the real property in New Mexico, in order to effectuate the restitution order.

A jury convicted Oscar Sualez of one count of second degree robbery after hearing evidence he stole an antique fire hydrant from the victim’s front yard and struck the victim’s dog with the hydrant before absconding with his associates. Sualez appeals his conviction on four grounds, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence of force or fear; (2) People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 was wrongly decided; (3) the accomplice liability instruction on natural and probable consequences was erroneous; and (4) the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by discouraging the jury from requesting testimony readbacks. We conclude none of these arguments has merit and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Robert Lee Roark II was convicted of bringing a controlled substance into county jail, possession of that substance, resisting a peace officer, and disturbing the peace. On appeal, he contends the trial court prejudicially erred (1) by declining to conduct an in camera review as requested in defendant’s motion to compel discovery of the arresting officer’s personnel records, and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial premised on an asserted showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude counsel did not render ineffective assistance, but we agree the trial court erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of the arresting officer’s personnel records. Therefore, we conditionally reverse the judgment for the purpose of conducting a discovery hearing in camera.

A jury found Jimmy Muhammad guilty of assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 1), attempting to make a criminal threat (§§ 422 & 664) (count 3); interfering with another person's civil rights by force or threat (§ 422.6, subd. (a)) (count 4); battery (§ 242) (count 5); and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) (count 6). The jury found Muhammad not guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) (count 2). Muhammad admitted having suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668).

On April 10, 2013, defendant Thomas Moore pled no contest to one felony count of possession or control of child pornography in violation of Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years, subject to various terms and conditions, including no contact with children. In August 2014, the probation department sought a modification of defendant’s probation to add new conditions. After holding probation modification hearings on August 22, 2014, and September 16, 2014, the trial court, in relevant part, imposed compliance with section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3), but stayed enforcement pending an appeal of its constitutionality.

Defendant Francisco Javier Miranda, Jr., was the driver of a 2004 Ford Taurus that struck two women, Cynthia Lee Lane and Linda Rascon Williams, killing them. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of seven offenses. Multiple allegations were found true.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his murder convictions (§ 187, subd. (a)) (counts 1 & 2) and his convictions of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)) (counts 3 & 4). He also asserts that the conviction of causing bodily injury while driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23153) (count 5), upon which the trial court stayed punishment, must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (counts 3 & 4).

Defendant Juan Carlos Martineztrejo pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (c).) He was placed on probation for three years and required to register as a sex offender. (§ 290.) The trial court also imposed a number of probation conditions as required by section 1203.067, subdivision (b): defendant was ordered to “enter, participate in, and complete an approved sex offender management program,” “participate in polygraph[] examinations for [the] purpose of supervision only,” and “waive any psychotherapist/patient privilege” in order to facilitate “communication between the sex offender management professional and the probation officer.” (See § 1203.067, subd. (b)(1), (3) & (4).)

M.T. (the Minor) filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s order declaring the Minor a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on probation under the terms of a disposition agreement. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appointed counsel filed a brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. The Minor was granted 30 days to file written arguments in his own behalf, but did not file anything.
We have examined the entire record and counsel’s Wende/Anders brief and have found no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.) We therefore affirm.

Defendant and appellant Dennis Lewis was convicted following a jury trial on one count of carjacking. (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a).) Appellant’s counsel on appeal filed a Wende brief (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende)) requesting that we conduct an independent review of the record. We have done so and conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.