CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Emery Allen's conviction of attempted murder arose from a gang-related shooting. Gang cases are rarely the neat exemplars of criminal prosecutions found in trial practice textbooks. The gang vernacular, despite its origins in mainstream English, can be nearly impenetrable without translation. So also, the motives and impulses that induce gang members to commit acts of violence often require the insight of experts to understand. And the atmosphere of violence and intimidation that exists in the neighborhoods that gangs inhabit is rarely conducive to a free exchange of information between victims, witnesses, and law enforcement authorities. Witnesses are not always eager to testify; the excitement of the moment affects memories and perceptions. Thus, in this case, conversations between gang members, though spoken in English, require translation. Experts must help to make sense of what happened, and the two key eyewitnesses, both children concerned with being labeled

A jury convicted Anthony Alexandre of inflicting injury to a cohabitant resulting in traumatic injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1); stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 2); false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 3); and attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (§ 126.1, subd. (b)(1); count 4). The jury also found that Alexandre personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), and 12022.7, subdivision (e) as to count 1.

Following a jury verdict, defendant Louis Paul MacDonald admitted to various enhancements, including three enhancements for prior separate prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). On appeal, defendant challenges one of those enhancements arguing the underlying prison term was not a separate term. We conclude defendant’s challenge has merit, and we will strike that enhancement.

Aaron Patrick Martin, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the superior court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate. Martin sought a writ that would have ordered respondents, who are prison officials, to either return certain personal property supposedly taken from him improperly in the course of his transfer to the California Medical Facility (CMF) and then to the High Desert State Prison (HDSP), or pay compensation for the value of this property. Martin contends this missing property includes legal papers, photographs, clothing, music items, hobby materials and other sundry items, which he has valued in total at $29,956.07. The superior court denied Martin’s petition, concluding that he already had an adequate remedy at law, a civil action for conversion, and that he did not prove he lost all of his belongings or that respondents acted improperly.

Plaintiff IV Solutions, Inc. sought over $350,000 from defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc. (BCBS AZ) for one unit of a drug. It claimed that an agent of the defendant entered into a binding contract obligating defendant to pay that amount. Plaintiff sued for breach of written contract. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting no written contract existed and that its agent did not have actual or ostensible authority to enter into the agreement for defendant. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. We affirm.

The juvenile court found the three children of defendant and appellant J.C.C. (Father) came within the court’s jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) Father contends the juvenile court erred by (1) requiring him to complete a domestic violence program; (2) requiring him to complete a substance abuse treatment program; and (3) suspending his visits with his children. We affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant Nathaniel P. on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), setting forth the facts of the case, raising no issues, and requesting that we independently review the entire record. We provided defendant 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf; no supplemental response has been received.
We have examined the entire record and appointed appellate counsel’s Wende/Anders brief; we find no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

A school police officer arrested J.F., a minor student, after witnessing her spit on the high school principal during an altercation at school. The juvenile court subsequently sustained allegations against J.F. for vandalism and resisting arrest. J.F. argues the evidence was insufficient to support the finding she resisted arrest because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest her, making the arrest unlawful, and J.F. could not have resisted an unlawful arrest. J.F.’s arrest, however, was not unlawful. Because spitting on another person can be a crime (an assault or a battery), the officer had probable cause to arrest J.F. Therefore, we affirm.

William W., the father of seven-year-old Hayden, appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the six-month hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 364 continuing dependency jurisdiction over Hayden. Instead of terminating jurisdiction, the juvenile court continued jurisdiction because it found Hayden was not “thriving” emotionally. That finding, however, even if supported by substantial evidence, was not enough. To continue jurisdiction based on emotional harm, the court had to find under sections 300, subdivision (c), and 364, subdivision (c), that Hayden was “suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others.” The court did not make this finding, nor was there substantial evidence to support such a finding. Therefore, we reverse and remand to conduct a new hearing under section 364 in light of the curr

Appellant Dominik G., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order following a true finding on the charge appellant committed vandalism. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) Appellant initially argued a probation term regarding electronic searches was overly broad and that the trial court erred in failing to reduce appellant’s conviction to a misdemeanor. Following our request for supplemental briefing, appellant additionally argues the charge brought was a misdemeanor and therefore his felony conviction cannot stand. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Samantha Faulkner is a named successor trustee for the Mark Hughes Family Trust, dated September 3, 1987, as amended (the trust). She appeals an order disqualifying Miller Barondess, LLP (Miller Barondess) from representing her in this matter because three of its attorneys previously represented former trustees Conrad Lee Klein, Jack Reynolds, and Christopher Pair.

Samantha Faulkner and Dale Sefarian appeal from an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings against them and in favor of Alexander Hughes on their petitions to be appointed as successor co-trustees to the Mark Hughes Family Trust. We reverse.

Bill Bhaskar and the medical practice he incorporated under his name, Bill Bhaskar, M.D., Inc., (collectively Bhaskar) appeal from an order of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer by Farmers & Merchants Bank (F&M) without leave to amend certain causes of action in Bhaskar’s third amended complaint. The court granted Bhaskar leave to amend to plead other causes of action in a fourth and then a fifth amended complaint before ultimately sustaining F&M’s demurrer without leave to amend the fifth complaint. As we explain, Bhaskar’s third amended complaint stated a cause of action for common law negligence under Sun ‘n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 671 (Sun ‘n Sand) when a person not indebted to a bank writes or endorses substantial checks to the bank as the payee of the checks, but the bank deposits the funds to a third party’s account without inquiry, enabling a fraud.

Cross-complainants and appellants A-Ju Tours, Inc. (A-Ju) and Henry Bahk (Bahk) appeal an order granting special motions to strike brought by cross-defendants and respondents Mark Zimny (Zimny), Juyeon Lee (JL), Chapel Consulting Associates, LLC (Chapel), Henry M. Lee and Henry M. Lee Law Corporation (Lee). (Code Civ. Proc., (§ 425.16.) The order eliminated the second, third and fourth causes of action of the cross-complaint.
We conclude the second cause of action, alleging intentional interference with economic advantage, did not arise out of protected activity; therefore, that cause of action must be reinstated. The third and fourth causes of action, alleging fraud in the negotiation of a settlement agreement, did arise out of protected activity. On the merits, the two fraud claims are barred by the litigation privilege and were properly stricken.
Therefore, the order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.