CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants and appellants Eugene H. Twarowski, III, and Twarowski Pacific, LLC (TP LLC) appeal from the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent Sherrie Kramer and her husband, Philip Kramer. Defendants contend the court abused its discretion in entering the judgment, which defendants describe as a default judgment against both of them. We conclude the appeal by TP LLC must be dismissed, and we affirm the judgment against Mr. Twarowski.

We reverse the order compelling Rey Khaligh and Laura Flores to arbitrate their claims against their former employer, ConsumerTrack, Inc. (CTI), because the arbitration provisions of their respective employment agreements are unenforceable.
Flores and Khaligh sued CTI, alleging unfair competition and violation of various Labor Code statutes, including: failure to pay required overtime; failure to furnish proper wage statements; and failure to provide meal and rest periods. They sought damages, restitution, injunctive relief, civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.), and attorney fees and costs.

This is a judgment roll appeal of a judgment in favor of a general contractor based on the owner’s anticipatory breach of a fixed-price contract. The owner’s attempt to undermine the trial court’s findings on damages, the validity of the contractor’s license, and fraud is to no avail. Because the trial court’s findings are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, are binding on a judgment roll appeal, and we can find no error on the face of the record as a matter of law (Kruger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207), we affirm.

V.N. (born in April 1997) appeals from an order of the juvenile court that he obtain competency education services from the regional center. His notice of appeal specifically challenges the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a no-issue brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We notified appellant of his right to respond, but received no response.
The record on appeal shows that a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed against appellant in 2013, alleging receipt of stolen property and attempted second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 496, subd. (a), 664, 459.) Entry of judgment was deferred, and appellant was placed home on informal probation.

Tara T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition hearing over her daughter, T.T. Mother contends the court and San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not make appropriate inquiries under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and thus, there is not substantial evidence to support the court's finding that ICWA did not apply. The record shows that T.T. might be eligible for enrollment in the Campo Band of Mission Indians. The Agency concedes the evidence in the record does not support the court's ICWA finding and the case should be remanded for the receipt of further evidence on the enrollment eligibility issue. We conditionally reverse and remand for compliance with ICWA.

Defendants and appellants R.A. (Father) and A.I. (Mother) are the parents of a son Ryan, the child who is the subject of this appeal. Father is also the parent of Ryan’s half-brother Kody, and Father had custody of both boys at the time the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) instituted dependency proceedings in this case. The juvenile court sustained allegations that Ryan was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, finding (1) Father failed to obtain medical care for Ryan, placing his health and safety in jeopardy; and (2) Father failed to protect Ryan from a risk of serious harm by repeatedly allowing Mother, who had longstanding substance abuse problems, to supervise Ryan (and Kody) in violation of a juvenile court custody order.

L.G. (Mother) and David M. (Father) separately appeal from the disposition hearing regarding their daughter L.M., who was born with drugs in her system due to Mother's illegal drug use during pregnancy. In her appeal, Mother challenges the juvenile court's denial of reunification services to her under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), which permits the bypass of services based on a parent's failure to treat the problems that led to removal of a dependent child's sibling or half sibling. In his appeal, Father argues (1) the court abused its discretion in denying his request to continue the contested adjudication and disposition hearing and (2) substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that placing L.M. in his custody would be detrimental to her. We conclude the court did not err on any asserted ground and accordingly affirm.

Juan L. , Sr. (Father) challenges disposition findings and orders issued by the dependency court as to his son, J.L., Jr. (hereafter J.L). The reporter’s transcript from the disposition hearing shows that the court denied placing J.L. with Father as an available, noncustodial parent as contemplated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2. On appeal, Father argues the court erred in treating him as a noncustodial parent under section 361.2, and that the court instead should have treated him as a custodial parent from whom J.L. could not be removed except as provided in section 361, subdivision (c) (hereafter 361(c)). Father argues the error prejudiced him because, had the court correctly applied section 361(c), there would be insufficient evidence in the record to support an order removing J.L. from Father’s custody. We affirm the disposition orders.

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) alleged 16-year-old G.R. and 12-year-old R.R. needed the protection of the juvenile court because of their parents’ history of domestic violence and their father’s alcohol abuse. We consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to assume jurisdiction over the girls and to remove the younger of the two from her father’s physical custody.

C.B. (Father) appeals from a dependency court pre disposition permanent restraining order that enjoined him from certain conduct with respect to A.I. (Mother), Father’s 10 year old son, G.B., and Mother’s husband. Father claims that he was not provided sufficient notice or an opportunity to defend against the conduct order. As we shall explain, we agree and reverse.

A juvenile court judge took jurisdiction over A.M., the then 12-month-old child of G.M. (Father) and H.M. (Mother), based on an uncontested allegation that the parents had an unresolved history of engaging in physical altercations in A.M.’s presence. The juvenile court found reasonable efforts had been made to avoid removing A.M. from his parents’ custody and entered a disposition order entrusting the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) with A.M.’s care pending further proceedings. We are asked to decide whether Father is entitled to reversal based on his claim (not raised below) that the juvenile court failed to state facts supporting its reasonable efforts finding, and more broadly, that the order removing A.M. from his parents’ custody is not supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioner E.F. (Mother) seeks writ review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of a juvenile court order, issued at a postpermanency status review hearing, setting a new hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying Mother’s request that her children, A.P. (born 2006), L.P. (born 2008), and N.P. (born 2013) (collectively, Minors), be returned to her care or that she be provided with six additional months of reunification services. We deny the petition.

In this breach of contract case, appellant MPN-14 Limited Partnership (MPN) appeals from the judgment in favor of respondent Robert Caro. MPN and Caro are parties to a “Parking Agreement” that governs their rights and obligations with respect to the parking lot located on Caro’s commercial property. When MPN refused to reimburse Caro for capital improvements made to the parking lot, Caro sued MPN for breach of the Parking Agreement. After a court trial, the trial court held MPN was liable for its share of the capital improvements and awarded damages to Caro. On appeal, MPN argues the evidence does not support either the trial court’s finding that Caro sought advance approval for the capital improvements or the trial court’ damages award. We disagree on both counts and affirm.

A hospital sued a county health system authority that provides managed care services to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. The hospital claimed the county health authority is liable for the full amount of the hospital’s bills for the care of Medi-Cal beneficiaries because there was no contract limiting the amount it could charge for services. The trial court granted the health authority summary judgment. The court concluded the hospital’s fee for services is limited by Welfare and Institutions Code section 14499.6, subdivision (b). We affirm.