CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Leslie Lytle Daggett pled no contest to stalking and vandalism, both of which were reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The trial court granted defendant a two-year term of probation. Defendant contends that his term of probation must be modified to one year pursuant to Penal Code section 1203a, subdivision (a), as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019−2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950). The People agree that defendant is entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 1950 but contend that we should remand the matter to the trial court to reduce the term of probation to one year. We reduce defendant’s term of probation to one year. In all other respects, we affirm.

R.G., (minor) appeals from a disposition order adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). On appeal, minor argues that (1) insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that he was a perpetrator of the charged offenses and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. The People disagree. We affirm.

Appellant Kertel Communications, Inc., doing business as Sebastian (Kertel), appeals the superior court’s order denying Kertel’s petition to confirm (petition to confirm) an arbitration award (Arbitration Award) rendered against respondent Adrian Flores. We reverse and remand to the superior court with directions to enter a new order vacating the Arbitration Award, and to cause the appointment of an arbitrator to hear the arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6.

This is the companion case to AWCC Acquisition I, LLC v. Alta Oak Realty, LLC (May 26, 2022, F080581) [nonpub. opn.]), in which we affirmed the judgment entered in favor of Alta Oak Realty, LLC and Terra-Gen, LLC, and against plaintiff AWCC Acquisition I, LLC (AWCC), following a court trial on AWCC’s breach of contract claims. In a postjudgment proceeding, the trial court found the parties’ contracts supported a fee award to Alta as the prevailing party and awarded Alta $574,519.50 in attorney fees. AWCC appeals from the ruling awarding Alta its attorney fees.
As AWCC concedes, this appeal is purely protective: If AWCC had prevailed in its challenge to the judgment on the merits, it would not want to be burdened with a judgment for the other side’s attorney fees against it. AWCC does not make any arguments concerning the merits of the award.

AWCC Acquisition I, LLC (AWCC) appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants Alta Oak Realty, LLC (Alta) and Terra-Gen, LLC (Terra-Gen) after the trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 on AWCC’s breach of contract claims against Alta and Terra-Gen as Alta’s alter ego. AWCC contends the trial court erred in finding that Alta did not breach the terms of a royalty agreement between AWCC and Alta. Finding no merit to AWCC’s contentions, we affirm.

Appellant Larry Wayne Jones pleaded guilty to crimes arising from possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. On appeal, he requests the court review certain sealed materials to determine whether the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress evidence, to quash and traverse the warrant, and to unseal the warrant affidavit. Appellant further contends that People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (Hobbs) is unconstitutional, that the nighttime warrant execution was unreasonable, and that his prior prison term enhancement should be stricken. We requested supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of Senate Bill No. 567 on appellant’s sentence. We remand the case to the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancements and to resentence appellant in light of Senate Bill No. 567. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Kahlid Ramsey appeals the denials of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, his motion to withdraw his plea under the terms of the plea agreement and section 1018, and his request to enforce his plea agreement. Appellant makes these arguments in the alternative, noting the plea agreement argument is made only if this court rejects his arguments under section 1170.95. This structure likely exists because success on the request to enforce the plea agreement would have previously rendered appellant categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. (See People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993 [conviction for manslaughter categorically ineligible for relief].)
With respect to the section 1170.95 argument, the parties agree that the trial court erred in making certain factual findings and thus should not have denied appellant’s petition.

This is the companion case to AWCC Acquisition I, LLC v. ON Wind Energy, LLC (May 26, 2022, F079057) [nonpub. opn.]), in which we affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent ON Wind Energy, LLC (ON Wind), on plaintiff AWCC Acquisition I, LLC’s (AWCC) claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief. Another defendant in AWCC’s lawsuit, Oak Creek Wind Power, LLC (Oak Creek), also obtained summary judgment against AWCC in a separate motion. In a postjudgment proceeding, the trial court jointly awarded ON Wind and Oak Creek, who filed separate attorney fee motions, attorney fees as the prevailing party totaling $465,680.70. AWCC appeals from the ruling awarding ON Wind and Oak Creek their attorney fees.

Defendant ON Wind Energy, LLC (ON Wind) successfully sought summary judgment against plaintiff AWCC Acquisition I, LLC (AWCC) on AWCC’s claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief. On appeal, AWCC contends the trial court’s stated reason for granting summary judgment, that AWCC did not have standing to pursue these claims against ON Wind, is erroneous, and there remain triable issues of material fact on its breach of contract claim. Assuming AWCC has standing, we affirm the summary judgment on the alternate ground that there are no triable issues of material fact on the merits of any of AWCC’s claims.

D.M. (mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights over her son, J.C. (Welf. and Inst. Code, §§ 300, subd. (b), 366.26, unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) She argues the judge erred in concluding the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) conducted a sufficient inquiry into J.C.’s Indian ancestry as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We agree, and therefore conditionally reverse and remand with directions that the department complete its initial inquiry.

A trial court found defendant and appellant Robert Gower in violation of the terms of his parole. Defendant filed a timely appeal. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant David Scott Eynon pled no contest to one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d). The trial court ordered him to pay victim restitution for the difference between the replacement cost of the truck ($22,000) and the insurance payment the owner received ($19,361.04), plus the deductible the owner paid to his insurance company ($250). Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution since there was no evidence that he was involved with the theft of the truck, and the truck owner’s economic losses were unrelated to defendant’s possession of the truck several months later. We agree with defendant and reverse.

Scarlett S., a minor, appeals the trial court order granting her father’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and extending reunification services for six months. She argues the trial court couldn’t extend services for more than two and a half months and extending services was not in her best interests. We conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion by extending services, and therefore affirm.

Defendant Ryan Copeland appeals the upper term sentence imposed following his conviction for unlawful taking of a vehicle. Defendant contends recently enacted changes to Penal Code section 1170, effective January 1, 2022, necessitate a remand for resentencing because the changes limit the trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term. The People agree. We remand for resentencing.