CA Unpub Decisions

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant A.P. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. In particular, Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s findings that she put her then-eight-year-old daughter Vanessa at risk of serious physical harm by abusing alcohol or by engaging in violent domestic disputes. As explained below, we disagree and affirm.

Patrice Libaw Nikopoulos appeals from the probate court’s order granting Evan and Shawn Libaw’s motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. Because we are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we dismiss.

M.H. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) when father was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), after an accident with 17-month-old M.H. in the car, on February 7, 2015. Father, who tested above the legal limit and admitted he had drunk two beers, was driving at 45 miles per hour when he lost control and hit a parked car. M.H. required emergency medical treatment for a fractured foot, abrasions, and bruising to his temple. DCFS filed a petition on September 28, 2015, alleging under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), that father’s DUI endangered M.H., and that father abused alcohol, marijuana, and prescription medicine, suffered from bipolar disorder, and failed to take his prescribed psychotropic medicine. Mother failed to protect M.H.

C. H. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and its dispositional order removing his infant son, Juan H., from his custody. After the court ordered Juan released to the custody of both parents, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) moved to dismiss father’s appeal of the dispositional order on mootness grounds. We granted the partial motion to dismiss, but exercise our discretion to reach the merits of father’s remaining jurisdictional challenge. Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, we affirm the jurisdictional order.

Appellant J.R. has been a dependent of the juvenile court since she was 16. She became a nonminor dependent while still in high school, once she turned 18 years old, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) sought to terminate her dependency because she no longer met the statutory requirements that she be working, enrolled in school, or had been found incapable of doing so due to a medical condition.
J.R.’s counsel sought an extension of the termination hearing because J.R. had a psychological examination scheduled to determine if she had a qualifying medical condition, an examination that she had previously refused to undergo. Counsel also sought to call J.R.’s caregiver as a witness to testify about her mental health symptoms. The court denied both requests, and terminated J.R.’s nonminor dependent status. We conclude none of those orders were an abuse of discretion, and affirm.

D.N. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s November 15, 2016, dispositional judgment removing four-year-old Darius S. from his custody. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1); all statutory citations are to this code unless noted). He contends the court abused its discretion when it continued the dispositional hearing (§ 352) and insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that returning Darius to his custody would pose a substantial risk of harm to the child. Father complains there were reasonable means to protect Darius without removal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

On September 1, 2016, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral regarding Juana C. (mother). According to the reporting party, mother lived with her one-year old child, Daniel D. at the maternal grandmother’s home and was not adequately caring for Daniel D. According to the reporting party, mother would not bathe, change, or feed the child. Because mother fed Daniel D. only Cheetos and formula, the child had been reduced to eating things he found on the floor. The reporting party also stated that mother was away from home all night while claiming to be at work and that she used methamphetamine and marijuana, both in the past and recently. She was also physically aggressive and easily agitated. As a teenager, mother had been diagnosed with severe depression and placed on psychiatric holds several times following episodes where she harmed herself or threatened to harm herself.

Appellant Clayton C. admitted a charge of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and a charge of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211) in a subsequent petition (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 602) and was committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). After this court reversed the commitment order and remanded for further proceedings, the court recommitted appellant to the DJJ. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant Jason O. (father) challenges a juvenile court order that denied a request he made just before his parental rights were terminated to have his two children placed with his sister, whom he identified as a potential placement long after his children were taken from his custody. Because father does not challenge the termination of his parental rights, we conclude that he lacks standing, and we therefore affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Thomas M. Hall (Hall) appeals from an order granting a special motion to strike, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion), to all but one cause of action asserted against defendant and respondent Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) and sustaining, without leave to amend, Yahoo’s demurrer to the remaining cause of action in Hall’s first amended complaint. We affirm the trial court’s order.

In September 2015, grandmother petitioned for a probate guardianship of minors. Mother did not consent. Grandmother alleged the biological father was absent and mother failed to find reliable and adequate child care providers for the minors while she worked. The minors also had bruises on their faces, necks and arms, numerous mosquito bites, and possible impetigo. According to grandmother, there were also indications mother hit and yelled at minors. In addition, grandmother stated there were signs of child abuse and neglect, including not eating meals, bedwetting, “gritting teeth,” snoring, taking off their clothes for no reason, not enjoying baths as much as they used to, and “awaken[ing] crying and frustrated.” Grandmother also alleged mother left the minors unsupervised during play, let them watch too much television, and periodically refused to let them visit grandmother, which disrupted the minors’ friendships. The minors were tardy at school and submitted homewor

Edik Ghadimian appeals from an order granting respondent Ziyad Bedass d.b.a. King Lien Services’ (KLS) special motion to strike Ghadimian’s complaint against it with prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, hereinafter the anti-SLAPP statute. Ghadimian also appeals from the trial court’s order granting KLS’s motion for attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) In June 2014, Ghadimian’s vehicle caught fire and stopped working, and was transferred to Master Works Auto Body, Inc. (Master Works), pending inspection by Ghadimian’s insurance company. When the insurance company requested that the vehicle be transferred to another location, Master Works refused to release the vehicle without payment of storage fees. Ghadimian filed suit against Master Works and its owner for damages.

On March 24, 2015, Collins filed a verified complaint against the Salinan Heritage Preservation Association, three members and officers of the Salinan Indian Tribe, and an individual who is a professor of history at a local university. The complaint alleges causes of action for defamation based upon defendants’ statements that Collins is not an Indian of California Chumash descent.

In a first amended complaint, plaintiff and appellant Erica D. Brumfield (Renter) sued defendant and respondent Kyung Ho Choi (Owner) and Don Investments, Inc., a Nevada Corporation (Don Investments). Intervener and respondent Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Insurer) intervened because Don Investments is a forfeited corporation. Renter brought causes for action for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Owner and Insurer demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case with prejudice. Renter contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer. We affirm the judgment.